Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Fiat-Shamir transform with aborts“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Fiat-Shamir transform with aborts"
Cheon, Jung Hee, Hyeongmin Choe, Julien Devevey, Tim Güneysu, Dongyeon Hong, Markus Krausz, Georg Land, Marc Möller, Damien Stehlé und MinJune Yi. „HAETAE: Shorter Lattice-Based Fiat-Shamir Signatures“. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems 2024, Nr. 3 (18.07.2024): 25–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i3.25-75.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLinh, Võ Đình. „Xây dựng lược đồ chữ ký số an toàn từ các lược đồ định danh“. Journal of Science and Technology on Information security 8, Nr. 2 (09.04.2020): 27–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.54654/isj.v8i2.30.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBrier, Éric, Houda Ferradi, Marc Joye und David Naccache. „New number-theoretic cryptographic primitives“. Journal of Mathematical Cryptology 14, Nr. 1 (01.08.2020): 224–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2019-0035.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleYe, Qing, Yongkang Lang, Zongqu Zhao, Qingqing Chen und Yongli Tang. „Efficient Lattice-Based Ring Signature Scheme without Trapdoors for Machine Learning“. Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2022 (19.09.2022): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/6547464.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBellare, M., und S. Shoup. „Two-tier signatures from the Fiat–Shamir transform, with applications to strongly unforgeable and one-time signatures“. IET Information Security 2, Nr. 2 (2008): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs:20070089.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBellini, Emanuele, Chiara Marcolla und Nadir Murru. „An Application of p-Fibonacci Error-Correcting Codes to Cryptography“. Mathematics 9, Nr. 7 (06.04.2021): 789. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math9070789.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAbdalla, Michel, Jee Hea An, Mihir Bellare und Chanathip Namprempre. „From Identification to Signatures Via the Fiat–Shamir Transform: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Security and Forward-Security“. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 54, Nr. 8 (August 2008): 3631–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tit.2008.926303.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleZheng, Zhongxiang, Anyu Wang und Lingyue Qin. „Rejection Sampling Revisit: How to Choose Parameters in Lattice-Based Signature“. Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2021 (07.06.2021): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9948618.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLee, Youngkyung, Dong Hoon Lee und Jong Hwan Park. „Revisiting NIZK-Based Technique for Chosen-Ciphertext Security: Security Analysis and Corrected Proofs“. Applied Sciences 11, Nr. 8 (08.04.2021): 3367. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app11083367.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleUlitzsch, Vincent Quentin, Soundes Marzougui, Alexis Bagia, Mehdi Tibouchi und Jean-Pierre Seifert. „Loop Aborts Strike Back: Defeating Fault Countermeasures in Lattice Signatures with ILP“. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 31.08.2023, 367–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2023.i4.367-392.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDissertationen zum Thema "Fiat-Shamir transform with aborts"
Fallahpour, Pouria. „Lattice-based cryptography in a quantum setting : security proofs and attacks“. Electronic Thesis or Diss., Lyon, École normale supérieure, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024ENSL0023.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleThe rise of quantum machines poses both challenges and opportunities for cryptography. In particular, security proofs may require revisions due to adversaries' quantum capabilities. This thesis presents two contributions in this respect: a positive result and a negative one. The Fiat-Shamir transform with aborts is one of the major paradigms for designing post-quantum secure signature schemes. Part of this thesis consists of a detailed security analysis of this transform in the quantum random oracle model. It is worth noting that all previous works have neglected subtle details, jeopardizing the correctness of their proofs. Consequently, our security proof stands as the first of its kind that is correct. Moreover, we analyze the runtime and correctness of the signatures obtained from this transform. The learning with errors (LWE) problem has been extensively utilized to construct cryptographic schemes that are secure against quantum adversaries. A knowledge assumption of the LWE problem states that obliviously sampling an LWE instance, namely without knowing its underlying secret, is hard for all polynomial-time algorithms. One can use this assumption to prove the security of some succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs). While it seems a hard task for classical algorithms, we demonstrate a quantum polynomial-time oblivious LWE sampler. Consequently, our sampler breaks the security analysis of the mentioned SNARKs in the quantum setting
Buchteile zum Thema "Fiat-Shamir transform with aborts"
Devevey, Julien, Pouria Fallahpour, Alain Passelègue und Damien Stehlé. „A Detailed Analysis of Fiat-Shamir with Aborts“. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2023, 327–57. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38554-4_11.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBambury, Henry, Hugo Beguinet, Thomas Ricosset und Éric Sageloli. „Polytopes in the Fiat-Shamir with Aborts Paradigm“. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 339–72. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68376-3_11.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDas, Dipayan. „Fiat-Shamir with Aborts: From Identification Schemes to Linkable Ring Signatures“. In Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering, 167–87. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66626-2_9.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLyubashevsky, Vadim. „Fiat-Shamir with Aborts: Applications to Lattice and Factoring-Based Signatures“. In Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2009, 598–616. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_35.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleTan, Chik How, und Theo Fanuela Prabowo. „New Lattice-Based Signature Based on Fiat-Shamir Framework Without Aborts“. In Cryptography, Codes and Cyber Security, 57–76. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23201-5_4.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFaust, Sebastian, Markulf Kohlweiss, Giorgia Azzurra Marson und Daniele Venturi. „On the Non-malleability of the Fiat-Shamir Transform“. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 60–79. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34931-7_5.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBarbosa, Manuel, Gilles Barthe, Christian Doczkal, Jelle Don, Serge Fehr, Benjamin Grégoire, Yu-Hsuan Huang, Andreas Hülsing, Yi Lee und Xiaodi Wu. „Fixing and Mechanizing the Security Proof of Fiat-Shamir with Aborts and Dilithium“. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2023, 358–89. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38554-4_12.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLee, Ming Feng, Nigel P. Smart und Bogdan Warinschi. „The Fiat–Shamir Transform for Group and Ring Signature Schemes“. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 363–80. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_23.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCiampi, Michele, und Yu Xia. „Multi-Theorem Fiat-Shamir Transform from Correlation-Intractable Hash Functions“. In Applied Cryptography and Network Security, 555–81. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33491-7_21.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCiampi, Michele, Giuseppe Persiano, Luisa Siniscalchi und Ivan Visconti. „A Transform for NIZK Almost as Efficient and General as the Fiat-Shamir Transform Without Programmable Random Oracles“. In Theory of Cryptography, 83–111. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49099-0_4.
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