Dissertationen zum Thema „Existentialist Ethics“

Existentialist ethics tell us that we as individuals cannot be truly liberated until all are. This means that we must pursue a more just world for all. Interestingly enough, as we look at the evidences of the ways in which cultural violence have been used historically and today as a means to withhold power from the people, we find that participating in the arts grants a great deal of power to the people. Thus, accessibility to participating in artistic acts or the creative process become fundamental to activism for social justice. This work lays out five fundamental aspects of the creative process that help us move towards liberation—confrontation of ideas, vulnerability, choice making, truth or world building, and authentic identity formation. In order to realize the full potential of positive impact the creative process can have in the realm of social justice, however, we must reframe our understanding of artists and the creative process in our society. This is a call to action both to artists and audience to recognize and wield the power of the arts to liberate all within our society.
Doctor of Philosophy
We have all heard the disparaging stereotypes surrounding the arts--the arts aren't a viable career choice, they aren't important, they're just meant for hobbies, or they're for folks who aren't smart enough to do something "useful" with their lives. If you have been a practicing artist for any number of years you have surely been offered payment in "exposure" at least half a dozen times by now. And yet, creating art is perhaps one of the most powerful and political acts we may undertake as humans. With each creative act we make claim to our own identities and have the opportunity to support the unique identities of others. In a world plagued by injustice perhaps artists are just the heroes we need. In this work I outline the connection between the artistic act and liberation. It is a call to action both to artists and audience to recognize the great potential that artists have to shape the world for better or worse. It asks you, the reader, to support social justice by supporting accessibility to confrontational, vulnerable, and deliberate artistic acts both by others and yourself.

The dissertation pursues the thesis that although Karol Wojtyła makes great strides in expanding the notion of subjectivity beyond consciousness and then establishing the other as acting subject as the foundation for ethical personalism, his analysis could be significantly enhanced through engagement with the classical Confucian interpersonal ethical sensibility. After all, Wojtyła reviles both individualistic and collectivistic forms of ethics. With Jean-Paul Sartre functioning as a foil for the purposes of appraisal, we can see how Wojtyła extends the notion of subjectivity into the dimension of action and how he establishes the person and, moreover, the other as subject, that is, as acting subject. Subjectivity understood on the basis of action instead of (as reducible to) consciousness is compatible with the personalistic ethical postulate “to treat the other not as an object but as a subject.” On Wojtyła’s account, ethical action is an interaction ipso facto and implies intersubjectivity insofar as one’s action is guided by the other’s subjectivity. What is more, Wojtyła contends not only that the subject is the person but also that person is act. In so doing, he has set the stage for an interpersonal ethics that is the middle way between individualistic and collectivistic forms of ethics. The trajectory of Wojtyła’s ethics bends toward the interpersonal dimension of the human condition, but, perhaps held back by his metaphysics and soteriology, he never fully or methodically develops this interpersonal ethical sensibility. It is regarding this lack that an appeal to Confucius and classical Confucianism is auspicious. Indeed, there is a somewhat surprising but striking compatibility between Wojtyłan personalist ethics and classical Confucian humanistic ethics. They are both built around the interpersonal dimension. While the interpersonal ethical sensibility of the classical Confucians lacks modern theoretical development, unlike Wojtyła they provide vivid descriptions of interpersonal ethical conduct and a clearer vision for an interpersonal ethical program. What emerges from adapting Wojtyła’s ethics to the classical Confucian interpersonal ethical sensibility is enhancement of the Wojtyłan interpersonal ethos and a comprehensive interpersonalist ethics.

The guiding question of this project is, "Why does it count as a critique of Heidegger that he does not defend a particular moral position?" A standard criticism levied against Heidegger is that, since he has nothing positive to say about post-Enlightenment moral theory, he has nothing to contribute to moral philosophy, and this marks his greatest shortcoming as a philosopher. Why is there a demand for Heidegger, or any other philosopher, to theorize about morality, when we do not have this expectation for, say, aesthetics, theology, or various other regional domains of human life? Why should we expect Heidegger to theorize about what humans must be like in order to care about and engage in moral thought? Answering these questions involves an extended discussion of ways of understanding ethics in Western philosophical thought, as well as, Heidegger's own view of ethics. I begin with a detailed exposition of the paradigmatic shift from premodern ethics, as it is based on an understanding of ethos (a form of life with its practical and normative dimensions), to modern conceptions of ethics based on Enlightenment (1750-1850) individualism and the fact-value distinction. This account of the history of ethics in philosophy attempts to demonstrate that the transition to modernity is marked by a schism between Being (ontology) and Ought (ethics) which makes any post-Enlightenment justification of ethics impossible (and helps us see why Heidegger always scoffs at the project of working out an ethics). My primary goal is to prove that Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's thought not only challenges the underlying metaphysical assumptions of mainstream moral philosophy, but also shows us a way back to the unity of ethics and ontology. My claim is that Being and Time is an ethics in the same way Nicomachean Ethics is an ethics: both are based on an understanding of the human ethos and attempt to show what is characteristic of a life that is structured by the "ought." This argument sets the stage for uncovering the underlying presuppositions governing two prominent objections raised against Heidegger: the existentialist and nihilistic critiques. I find that these critiques are grounded on the assumption of "ontological individualism." In contrast to this individualistic ontology of the social world, I argue that, for Heidegger, individuality is not an ontological or biological given; rather, it is a relatively rare accomplishment of members of a linguistic community. What is important, in Heidegger's view, is that the ethos is the ontological bedrock of ethics. The ethos does not offer us universal principles or morals rules of the kind modern morality seeks, but it does provide paths, ways of being, and possibilities for living meaningful lives. In the end, all we have are understandings of life in certain domains (art, religion, love, etc.) that provide character ideals that, together with meaningful goals and projects for the whole of our lives, make possible a flourishing ethos. My secondary goal is to demonstrate that Heidegger undercuts the uncritical presuppositions of much of mainstream moral philosophy and provides an alternative account of ethics that picks up the stick from the other end. I formulate my thesis as an extension of the recent scholarship on Heidegger's work, arguing that Heidegger's emphasis on the human ethos puts forth a proper way of dwelling and Being-at-home within the current of the historical essence of a community. What is original about Heidegger's post-humanist ethics is that it denies the modern Being-Ought distinction and calls us to be ready and prepared to be claimed by Being. Refusing to give an absolute position to anthropomorphism, Heidegger's ethics serves as an attempt to specify what it is to be fully human in the sense of being a respondent who receives an understanding of Being and has to own up to the task of being claimed by Being. If I am correct, then it is a mistake to judge Heidegger's ethics according to whether he succeeds at formulating a list of responsibilities, rights, and obligations of individuals. Whereas modern moral theory is concerned with providing impartial and value-free guidelines and principles for individual behavior, Heidegger is asking about the conditions for the possibility of transforming how one lives. This puts the burden of proof on those who think there is something important about moral theory. The onus of proof rests with those who want to claim that a right way to be human exists and that there is an absolute, unchanging, timeless ground for understanding the right.

Philosophy
Ph.D.
In this study I advance the thesis that Simone de Beauvoir's account of the development of subjectivity is based in a consideration of the Hegelian description of the development of subjectivity in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Like Hegel, Beauvoir argues that an aspect of the development of subjectivity is the ability to discover oneself as related to the collective world. Additionally, she shows through her various works that individual identity and freedom are conditioned by the possibility for intersubjective recognition, and development of a project within an ambiguous relationship between the self, others, and the shared social world. Nevertheless, throughout history this foundation for the possibility of freedom has often been lacking and more so for some groups than others, which points us to an important difference in focus in Hegel and Beauvoir's work. For one, the subject in the idealized Hegelian account comes to recognize its power and freedom as it progresses in its connections and influence within the world. But, for those who have historically lacked options (women, those who happen to be black, the poor, etc.) transcendence in terms of the actualization of one's identity and recognized participation in the collective is at best often co-opted or concealed and at worst impossible. Thus, one of the central differences between Hegel's narrative in the Phenomenology and Beauvoir's in The Second Sex is that for women the cycle is a building up of deception, not a progression to clarity and understanding. This progression as Beauvoir shows is neither natural nor perfect, rather it depends upon the possibilities historically granted to specific social groups and denied to others. The central focus of this study is Beauvoir's analysis of the process of becoming (a) woman, but it is not limited to this. Rather, I argue that through engaging with Beauvoir's philosophy, including her appeal to Hegel, we (1) come to understand the ambiguity of the human condition, desire, intention, and identity, (2) the bad faith that often manifests in our relations with others, and (3) the existence of the spectrums of oppression and privilege. There are, of course, several ways to approach the study of historical figures in philosophy. We can treat them as though they are our contemporaries, analyzing their arguments and clarifying their ideas with the intention of showing their relevance to our contemporary concerns. Or, we can study them in their historical contexts with an eye toward tracing the development of their doctrines, attempting as we go to restructure them within their historical situations and as individuals. Both of these approaches have their benefits and drawbacks. In the former, we succeed in making Beauvoir and Hegel relevant as participants in our contemporary dialogues; but we may be making them relevant through reading our own contemporary views and concerns into their texts. In taking the latter approach, we do not use these historical figures as mere mouths, but through reifying them in their historical context we may find them to be less relevant. In what follows I seek to strike a balance between these approaches, especially in that I am engaging a philosophical predecessor (Beauvoir) who is engaging a philosophical predecessor (Hegel). In order to do this I look at the context in which Beauvoir is using Hegel, the influence of her closest philosophical companions on her use of Hegel, and how feminists have since used Beauvoir's philosophy to address contemporary problems. And while I understand the purpose of philosophy to be in fact engagement, rather than a process of historical excavation, I believe that through examining these various relations we can use historical figures to analyze and resolve the urgent social, political, and theoretical issues of our time, while simultaneously understanding that the times in which they originally philosophized may be vastly different from our own.
Temple University--Theses

This thesis examines the possibilities for feminism that arise from the work of Michel Foucault, which I explicate by comparison it with humanist existentialism. I begin with The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir's application of existentialism to women. I expose the problems that arise in Beauvoir's project. Woman's body is an obstacle to her transcendence, and further, she must abandon her feminine desires and values, and accommodate herself to masculine patterns if she is to overcome her immanence and subordination. To understand why such problems recur in The Second Sex, I turn to Sartre's Being and Nothingness. After examining the conceptions underlying his thought, I conclude that his philosophy is unable to encompass difference, and is therefore antithetical to the feminist project. ¶ Foucault's philosophy offers solutions to these problems by eliminating consciousness as universal subject of action, and by making subjectivity a product of time, through showing how subjects are formed though the changing effects of power upon bodies. His thought encompasses difference at a fundamental level, through understanding human beings as particular 'events' in time. I argue that Foucault's philosophy does not depend fundamentally, as does Sartre's, upon woman as Other. ¶ Foucault shows how our particular historical form of rationality, created within power relations, sets limits on what we can think, be and do. He shows how thought can overcome some of these limits, allowing us to become authors of our own actions. Misunderstandings are common, particularly of his conception of power and its relation to subjectivity. Many commentators demand changes that reinstate the concepts he fundamentally rejects. Others do not see the unity of his philosophy. I show its importance to women's emancipation and to a feminist ethics. ¶ Finally, I compare Foucault's thought with feminism of difference. With the help of Heidegger, I argue that Foucault offers a superior but complementary way to know who we are, through understanding the history of our making. I show how the masculine and the feminine can be reconciled through a reconceptualisation of the relation of sex to time. All told, Foucault is a philosopher of freedom and for him the practice of freedom is an ethics.

This dissertation explores the experience of participating in collective protest. I performed an existential-phenomenological analysis of five participants’ in-depth accounts of their involvements participating in collective protest. I considered my interviewees’ discourse to be reflective of their lived, embodied experiences of being in protest with others. Participants each described distinct protesting experiences. I explored their accounts in relation to six basic aspects of existence: self, other, embodiment, time, space, and choice/freedom. From within these existential realms, participants’ accounts revealed five key existential themes of participating in collective protest: (1) Existential Crises and Activation; (2) Existential Magnification; (3) Existential Horizons; (4) Existential Stakes; and (5) Existential Time-Space. These themes emerged from the ways my participants discussed their experiences in contingent and concrete interrelationships with the six basic states of existence. I considered phenomenological similarities and departures across participants’ descriptions and uncovered 30 distinct modes, or manners in which they experienced their participation in embodied collective protest. My insights suggest that collective protests frequently emerge during periods of heightened cultural disorder. During such anxious times, many participants seek the company of others in collective protest to have their voices heard and to be with people who are similarly concerned. Participants discussed the importance of preserving and exercising their First Amendment rights to publicly communicate dissent in this way. My interviewees also described understandings that protesting is a potentially dangerous activity, but that the risks are assumed collectively. While protesting can be unsafe, this collective action pertains to individuals banding together to make an ethical statement addressing the sense that something bad is on the horizon. While in protest together, people often meet like-minded others, and sometimes these connections bond members in enduring activist communities. At the heart of participating in collective protest are individuals who make a personal choice to adventure out in public to demonstrate in communicative interaction with fellow citizens.

Jean Paul Sartre proposed that: Historical situations vary…What does not vary is the necessity for him to exist in the world, to be at work there, to be there in the midst of other people, and to be mortal there. The limits are neither subjective nor objective, or rather, they have an objective and a subjective side. Objective because they are to be found everywhere and are recognizable everywhere; subjective because they are lived and are nothing if man does not live them, that is, freely determine his existence with reference to them (Sartre 1987: 38, 39). The Existential philosophy as outlined by Sartre, Levinas, and Kierkegaard cares about the lived experiences of individuals. Such a view is in contradistinction to other philosophical views which have a tendency to reduce human experience, or to lose the individual in abstraction. This thesis has a central concern for the ethical care of patients in the National Health Service. In order to explore the concrete experiences of patients it is necessary to consider the care providers. To that end, the individual health professional then becomes the focus of study. To assist in this approach a double narrative runs through the thesis, which comprises exploring ethical decision making in the NHS, and also on the legal concept of clinical negligence. These two concepts are intertwined in that legal hearings and rulings have a normative influence upon health care practice, and also influence public expectations. The explicit purpose of this approach was to ensure that the theory was explored and developed; grounded upon everyday clinical NHS practice, which includes legal and political influences. The first four chapters of the thesis constructs the three main areas of analysis; Philosophical, legal, and political. With this framework established, the critical analysis of five legal cases of clinical negligence (Chapters Five and Six), establishes convergences in the work of Sartre, Levinas, and Kierkegaard in relation to the subject, freedom and the ethical. The Kierkegaardian concept of kinesis is applied to explore the transition from possibility to actuality in ethical action. During this process a range of dynamics are identified in creating the concept as best described by Levinas as totalisation . Where previously the argument was located at the individual (subject) and organisational (system) level, in Chapter Seven it moves outwards to consider how the authentic individual can create a civil society. Given the recalcitrant barriers identified in the analysis, Chapter Eight considers existentialism as a theory of community and as contributing to epistemology. Together these theories are proposed as addressing the real needs of individuals, by promoting their freedom, and achieving unity in diversity. The recommendations in Chapter Nine are based upon the interplay of two main dialectics uncovered in the body of the thesis concerning ethics and epistemology. Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Virtue ethics were found to all contribute towards professional conduct. However, they were found to be insufficient because they reduce patients and health professionals’ existence to the same as everyone else. Further, Virtue ethics reverses the way in which ethical behaviour is evaluated in comparison to the other two main normative theories. That is, behaviour is evaluated against the virtue being foundational, as opposed to the act performed. However, there is no discussion on how the individual health professional would decide which approach to use. All three approaches then lack a crucial factor which is the existential dimension. Existential ethics is then presented as a possible approach to facilitate the development (kinesis) of health professionals to the ethical sphere of care. Existential ethics emphasises the pre-theoretical aspect in caring for patients. That is, it appreciates the individual and their difference, prior to any conceptualization which has the potential to reduce individual difference to sameness. From this perspective recommendations are outlined for facilitating individuals to develop the ethical aspect of care, for health care pedagogy, and for leadership within the NHS.

117f.
Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-04-16T17:58:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Jorge Povoasseg.pdf: 467030 bytes, checksum: be8005afc77e74511ae87ef91c91335b (MD5)
Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-29T14:41:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Jorge Povoasseg.pdf: 467030 bytes, checksum: be8005afc77e74511ae87ef91c91335b (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-29T14:41:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Jorge Povoasseg.pdf: 467030 bytes, checksum: be8005afc77e74511ae87ef91c91335b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005
Presente na obra filosófica sartriana O Ser é o Nada, o conceito de má-fé, não ocorre em dois momentos distintos da realidade humana, mas em um só. Na má-fé não existe a dualidade do enganador e do enganado que estão presentes na mentira. Não há um interlocutor na má-fé para quem a mentira possa ser direcionada. Logo, a má-fé é uma espécie de negação interna, um mentir para si mesmo. Aqui, o enganador conhece tudo que o enganado busca esconder. É a consciência que direciona sua negação para dentro de si mesma. Desta forma, a má-fé não vem de fora da realidade humana. É a consciência que infecta a si mesma de má-fé. Porém, se toda consciência é consciência de alguma coisa, quem age de má-fé tem consciência desse agir, sabendo exatamente o que busca esconder, já que ser consciente é conhecer, é saber o que se sabe. A consciência na visão sartriana é plenamente consciente de si, não havendo inconsciente ou não-consciência que possa justificar as ações humanas. Nesse sentido a má-fé representa uma eterna fuga. Fuga da angústia provocada pelo peso da responsabilidade. É nesse contexto que a má-fé se instaura, quando o homem tenta fugir do que ele não é, em busca do que ele nunca será. Por se configurar como um ser inacabado o para-si jamais será como um ser em-si pleno, conciso em si mesmo, devendo-se isso ao fato de que a consciência esconde em seu ser um permanente risco de má-fé, uma vez que para Sartre ela se revela como um ser que não-é-o-que-é. Assim, a consciência é um vazio e por ser consciência de alguma coisa ela nunca será o que busca ser, sendo sempre uma representação. Por conseguinte, é através dessa desagregação da consciência que a má-fé se instaura e se habilita a propiciar alívio imediato, em forma de fuga, para o existir humano.
Salvador

In William Golding’s Free Fall, the novel ends without its protagonist, Sammy Mountjoy, receiving the atonement he seeks. As a consequence, the novel ends in an unresolved manner, leaving Sammy in a state of suspension. Despite having a metaphysical awakening in a Nazi POW camp, the consequences of his enlightenment do not reflect the way the Sammy retrospectively narrates the tale of his life. The existentialist theories of Danish thinker and writer Søren Kierkegaard offer a solution to the dilemma. Kierkegaard’s theories concerning the aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres of life, as well as his concept of ‘existential dread’, may be used to show that Sammy is able to make a ‘leap of faith’ from the aesthetic to the ethical sphere. However, because of his inability to make the last leap into the metaphysical sphere of life, he does not attain the insight he needs, namely that he is ‘a child of the finite and infinite’. The essay relates the ways Sammy Mountjoy fits into the Sartrean and Kierkegaardian expressions of existentialism, soon moving on to describe the details of Kierkegaard’s thought concerning the three spheres of life and the concept of ‘dread’. Sammy’s preoccupation with the present, his focus on the exterior rather than the interior and his inability to commit himself to people or situations fit neatly into the criterion for the aesthetic sphere of life. This, in turn, leads him to a state of dread, which reaches its climax in the dark cupboard. When released from his imprisonment Sammy has reached a state of awareness concerning the “vital morality” between people, previously a foreign concept. However, Kierkegaard points out that also the ethical sphere is flawed, leaving the religious/metaphysical sphere as Sammy’s ultimate destination. By failing to make the final ‘leap of faith’, due to a misguided conception of the boundaries between the ethical and the Absolute, Sammy falls short of the resolution he desires and the forgiveness he seeks from the three people that have influenced him the most. Thus an explanation is proposed to the unresolved manner in which Free Fall ends.

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-05-27T16:44:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Carlos Favero.pdf: 966635 bytes, checksum: 853590da02b3bfb1cb690d19da8baf4f (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-27T16:44:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Carlos Favero.pdf: 966635 bytes, checksum: 853590da02b3bfb1cb690d19da8baf4f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-01-14
Nenhuma
A presente tese tem por objetivo mostrar a amplitude e as derivações do conceito de liberdade em O Ser e o Nada de Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Nessa perspectiva, trata-se de uma análise que visa investigar as condições de possibilidade do conceito de liberdade sartreana como fundamento para um compromisso ético-moral que se traduza em responsabilidade para com a sociedade. Essa abordagem se justifica na medida em que o conceito de liberdade em Sartre é contestado pela tradição filosófica como um conceito destituído de qualquer compromisso ou implicação moral,sendo assim, a liberdade sartreana passou a ser tomada como sinônimo de liberdade total ou absoluta. Assim, para alcançar o objetivo, investigou-se a ideia de liberdade em Sartre. A questão central que norteia esse estudo apresenta-se na obra O Ser e o Nada, na qual o autor constrói argumentos para o estudo fenomenológico do ser e do aparecer do ser, a consciência da qual se pode esperar uma perspectiva ética. A pergunta que orienta a pesquisa está assim formulada: é possível deduzir um compromisso ético-moral de uma obra cuja intenção principal é realizar um tratado sobre a ontologia fenomenológica? Demonstra-se que, para Sartre, a liberdade é a condição própria do homem e que, se o autor tivesse o propósito de construir uma Filosofia Moral, conclui-se que essa teria por base a atitude de engajamento. Depois analisam-seas implicações éticas da filosofia sartreana, que se tornam mais evidentes à medida que o homem se dá conta de suas limitações e, sobretudo, de sua situação existencial, que é marcada por um estado de angústia, acrescido pelas dificuldades geradas no convívio humano, no qual aparece a má-fé.O último capítulo, no qual é apresentado o argumento maior da tese, identifica a ideia de liberdade em Sartre associada à ideia de responsabilidade, que é igualmente radical na condição humana. Nesse sentido, o existencialismo sartreano está afastado de qualquer relativismo. A partir de O Ser e o Nada,fundamenta-se e redimensiona-se uma ética que, de forma absoluta, realiza-secomo liberdade. Assim, nessa conclusão, mostra-se que os conceitos liberdade-responsabilidade, na compreensão sartreana, são indissociáveis e permitem inferir uma ética humanista.
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the breadth and the derivations of the concept of freedom in Being and Nothingness of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). This is an examination designed to investigate the conditions of possibility of Sartre's concept of freedom as the foundation for an ethical-moral commitment, which expresses itself in responsibility towards the society. This approach is justified as far as the concept of freedom in Sartre is contradicted by the philosophical tradition as a concept devoid of any commitment or moral implication. Thus, the Sartrean freedom came to be as synonymous with complete or absolute freedom. To achieve the aim, we investigated the idea of freedom in Sartre. The central question guiding this study is presented in the book Being and Nothingness, in which the author constructs arguments for the phenomenological study of being or appearing to be, the conscience of that can be expected an ethical perspective. The question that guides the search is thus formulated: it is possible to deduce an ethical-moral commitment to a work whose main intention is undertake a treatise on phenomenological ontology? We demonstrate that, for Sartre, freedom is the very condition of men and if the author had intended to build a Moral Philosophy, this would be based on the attitude of engagement. In the following chapter we deal with the ethical implications of Sartre's philosophy, which become more apparent as the men realizes his limitations and, above all, his existential situation, which is marked by a state of anguish, increased by the difficulties generated in human society, in which the bad faith appears. The final chapter, where we present the main argument of the thesis identifies the idea of freedom in Sartre associated with the idea of responsibility, which is also radical in the human condition. The Sartrean existentialism is away from relativism. From Being and Nothingness is rooted in and resizes an ethic that, in absolute terms, as freedom is realized. In our conclusion, we show that the concepts freedom-responsibility in Sartre's understanding are inseparable and allows us to infer a humanistic ethics.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
This paper seeks to elucidate the Sartrean existentialism from an ethical perspective, therefore using literature as an irreverent way relationship between the writer and the reader. There are several ways to explore the ethical aspect in the thinking of Jean-Paul Sartre, but in this work we see a more informative way to clarify it through literature. Since it already suggests a call between human freedoms through generous relationship between writer and reader, both require a compromise of freedom of each other and establish a trust between themselves. The responsibility and engagement between the writer and the reader are identified, and the role of the same plays to change a receptive world look for a transformer look, agent of practical actions and significant in the environment in which they are released, as Sartre puts. In order to talk on literature and freedom of speech, you must first resume some placements of Husserl on the design of intentionality, ie, "all consciousness is consciousness of something" and as near as the philosopher discusses the concept of meaning. While the significance is marked up while donor acts direction made by means of a language and therefore use of words, display objects in the world, men aiding in understanding the same. Soon after this resumption of phenomenology, shows the Sartrean reading of intentionality and later how Sartre addresses the issue of significance. Note that although some approaches of Husserlian theses in the Sartrean existentialism, the philosophy of Sartre, there is a change of perspective intend and mean a logical and epistemological aspect of Husserl, a world unveiling aspect in existential sense. In the latter, the main concern is about the human being, what it means to exist in the world, to be released along with others and how to carry the weight of an unconditional release, as well as a responsibility that is not only for their actions, but for all mankind. In addition to the issue of liability evidenced by Sartre in order to establish a dialogue and reflection on the subject, presents some placements to Levinas on the responsibility and the encounter with the Other. This is done because both philosophers were contemporaries within the phenomenology, and despite their differences of thoughts, both deal with themes that revolve around common issues that underlie the objective of this dissertation.
Esta dissertação busca elucidar o existencialismo sartreano sob uma perspectiva ética, para tanto se utiliza a literatura enquanto uma maneira irreverente de relação entre o escritor e o leitor. Existem vários meios de explorar o aspecto ético no pensamento de Jean-Paul Sartre, mas nesta dissertação observamos uma forma mais elucidativa de explicitá-lo por meio da literatura. Uma vez que a mesma já sugere um apelo entre as liberdades humanas por meio da relação generosa entre o escritor e o leitor, ambos exigem um comprometimento da liberdade um do outro e estabelecem uma confiança entre si. A responsabilidade e o engajamento entre o escritor e o leitor são evidenciados, o protagonismo dos mesmos desempenha a mudança de um olhar receptivo do mundo para um olhar transformador, agente de ações práticas e significativas no ambiente em que estão lançados, como coloca Sartre. Para que se fale em literatura e da liberdade de palavra, é necessário antes retomar algumas colocações de Husserl quanto à concepção de intencionalidade, isto é, toda consciência é consciência de algo e de que maneira o filósofo aborda o conceito de significação. Enquanto a significação caracteriza-se enquanto atos doadores de sentido feitos por meio de uma linguagem e, portanto do uso das palavras, indicam os objetos no mundo, auxiliando os homens no conhecimento dos mesmos. Logo após dessa retomada da fenomenologia, apresenta-se a leitura sartreana da intencionalidade e posteriormente de como Sartre aborda a questão da significação. Nota-se que apesar de algumas aproximações das teses husserlianas no existencialismo sartreano, com a filosofia de Sartre, há uma mudança de perspectiva do intencionar e significar de um aspecto lógico e epistemológico de Husserl, a um aspecto de desvendamento do mundo em sentido existencial. Nesse último, a preocupação maior é sobre o ser humano, do que significa existir no mundo, de estar lançado junto aos outros indivíduos e de como carregar o peso de uma liberdade incondicional, assim como de uma responsabilidade que não é só por suas ações, e sim por toda a humanidade. Para complementar a questão da responsabilidade evidenciada por Sartre, a fim de estabelecer um diálogo e reflexão sobre o tema, apresenta-se algumas colocações de Levinas sobre a responsabilidade e o encontro com o Outro. Faz-se isso devido ambos os filósofos serem contemporâneos dentro da fenomenologia, e apesar de suas diferenças de pensamentos, os dois tratam de temas que giram em torno de questões comuns que perpassam o objetivo desta dissertação.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:01:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 10
Nenhuma
Humanismo, uma releitura existencial de Albert Camus e de Jean-Paul Sartre é o tema da presente dissertação, que consiste no exercício filosófico de criar um mundo possível nessa vida. Acreditar no mundo e no verdadeiro humanismo é o que nos falta. Nós perdemos, completamente, o senso de valorizar, respeitar e dar condições necessárias, para que o ser humano se realize na sua plenitude e com referenciais éticos. O racional tornou-se o irracional; o humano, o inumano. Acreditar no homem significa, principalmente, suscitar acontecimentos, atitudes, ainda que corriqueiras, mas que visem a redescobrir a essência do humanismo. É necessário, pois, urgentemente, uma redefinição em nosso próprio conceito de humanismo que nos impulsione a um compromisso humanizador.A proposição básica dos filósofos, Camus e Sartre, é que: como é impossível salvar tudo, salve-se, ao menos, o corpo de cada indivíduo. Que homem algum seja vítima, carrasco e omisso perante o próprio homem. Ambos nos pedem um mundo, onde não se mate, onde
Humanism, an existential rereading of Albert Camus and Jean-.Paul Sartre, is the subject of this presentation, which consist of a philosophical pratice of creating a possible world in this life. Believing in the humanism, is what is missing for us. We have los completely, meaning that, valuing, respecting and giving the necessary conditions for the human being became inhumane. Beliving in humanity means maily rousing humanism. Therefore, it is urgently necessary to redefine our own concept of humanism which compels us to a humanising compromise.The basic propositions of the philosophers, Camus and Sartre, as it is impossible for us to save everything, unless each individual body can be saved. That the man is a victim or cruel and not neglectin before the humanity itself. Both require a world in which crimes against humanity and at least evil, terrorism, violence, social exclusion, and prejudices will be outlawed.Sartre introduces to us freedom and an absolute value. The existentialism puts the humanity befor

There has been to date no attempt at a detailed examination of Aleksandr Grin’s philosophical views interpreted on the basis of his literary work. Whilst some critics have noted interesting links between the writer’s oeuvre and a few popular philosophers, this has usually been done in passing and on an ad hoc basis. This thesis aims to fill this gap by reconstructing Grin’s views in relation to the European philosophical tradition. The main body of the thesis consists of three parts built on and named after three essential themes in philosophy: External World, Happiness and Morality. Part One delineates Grin’s views on nature and civilisation: I argue first that his cult of nature makes it possible to conceive of Grin as a pantheistic thinker close to Rousseau and Bergson, and then I reconstruct the author’s criticism of urbanisation and industrialisation. In the second part I assess the place of happiness in Grin’s world-view, indicating its similarities to the philosophy of various thinkers from the Ancients to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. After sketching a general picture of the concept of happiness in Grin’s works, I discuss the place of material and immaterial factors in the writer’s outlook. I also gather maxims expressed by the protagonists in his fiction that can be taken as recommendations concerning ways of achieving and defending happiness. Finally, I link happiness with the problem of morality in Grin’s oeuvre. In the final part I examine modes of moral behaviour as displayed by the author’s protagonists. Firstly, I argue that in Grin’s works we find numerous examples and themes that allow us to perceive him as an existentialist. Secondly, I indicate Grin’s adherence to rules of conduct commonly associated with chivalric literature. Thirdly, I emphasise the importance of Promethean-like characters in the moral hierarchy of Grin’s protagonists.

Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo incrementar saídas diante da crise de sentido na atual pós-modernidade, assim como a formação de uma identidade ecumênica nos alunos adolescentes por meio do Ensino Religioso cristão, tendo como exemplo a ética do Rabino e profeta Jesus de Nazaré, conduzindo o adolescente hodierno inserido nesta realidade desafiadora do mundo atual, para abertura com o diferente e uma vida com propósito. Sendo um trabalho de cunho eminentemente bibliográfico, que visou a sistematizar as ideias e a prática do E. R. ecumênico na aprendizagem dos adolescentes. Estimou-se por este trabalho, contribuir na busca do diálogo, respeito e tolerância inter-religiosa para a convivência harmônica entre as pessoas e a edificação de uma sã cidadania no adolescente hodierno.

La noció de ‘relació’ té una posició central en el pensament d’Arnold Schönberg i resulta fonamental per entendre el seu desenvolupament artístic, intel·lectual i humà. La seva importància es fonamenta en tres àmbits: 1) el context sociocultural vienès, on les relacions entre realitat i aparença eren poc transparents; 2) la situació del llenguatge musical tardo-romàntic, la hipertròfia sintàctica del qual va obligar Schönberg a buscar noves relacions entre els sons; 3) la inquietud espiritual de Schönberg que —més enllà de confessions concretes— estava preocupat per la relació efectiva entre inmanència i transcendència. Aquesta noció de ‘relació’ marcarà cada cop més la producció del nostre autor, fins a culminar en l’òpera Moses und Aron, on formula una proposta existencial per habitar el món després de l’enfonsament dels discursos metafísics. Anticipant la crisi religiosa de la segona meitat del segle XX, la proposta existencial de Schönberg obre l’home a l’ètica del sempre avançar i a la dimensió experiencial del sagrat.
La noción de ‘relación’ ocupa un lugar central en el pensamiento de Arnold Schönberg y es fundamental para entender su desarrollo artístico, intelectual y humano. Su importancia se sustenta en tres ámbitos: 1) el contexto sociocultural vienés, donde las relaciones entre realidad y apariencia eran poco transparentes; 2) la situación del lenguaje musical tardo-romántico, cuya hipertrofia sintáctica obligó a Schönberg a buscar nuevas relaciones entre los sonidos; 3) la inquietud espiritual de Schönberg que —más allá de confesiones concretas— estaba preocupado por la relación efectiva entre inmanencia y trascendencia. Esta noción de ‘relación’ marcará cada vez más la producción de nuestro autor, hasta culminar en la ópera Moses und Aron, donde formula una propuesta existencial para habitar el mundo después del desmoronamiento de los discursos metafísicos. Anticipando la crisis religiosa de la segunda mitad del siglo XX, la propuesta existencial de Schönberg abre al hombre a la ética del siempre avanzar y a la dimensión experiencial de lo sagrado.
The notion of ‘relationship’ occupies a central place in the thought of Arnold Schoenberg and is fundamental to understanding his artistic, intellectual and personal development. Its importance is based on three areas: 1) the Viennese sociocultural context, where the relationship between reality and appearance lacked clarity; 2) the situation of Late-Romantic musical language, whose overblown, sclerotic syntaxis forced Schoenberg to find new relationships between sounds; 3) Schoenberg's spiritual concerns which – beyond any particular belief – focused on the relationship itself between immanence and transcendence. This notion of ‘relationship’ increasingly determines Schoenberg's work, culminating in the opera Moses und Aron, where he formulates an existential proposition about how to live in the world after the collapse of the metaphysical discourses. Foreseeing the religious crisis of the second half of the twentieth century, Schoenberg's existential proposition sets human existence in front of the ethics of `ever advance' and the experiential dimension of the sacred.

This dissertation examines Lennart Sjögren’s conception of life as revealed through his poetry and other written documents. Light is shed on his writings in three chapters, with an Introduction that opens the investigations, and a Conclusion that sums up the findings. His collection of poetry Ur männisovärlden (2008, From the world of the living) is commented upon in an epilogue. Chapter Two analyses the collection Havet (1974, The Sea), focussing on Sjögren’s view of nature and his imagery. A religious tone can be apparent throughout the poems. In earlier centuries, poems about migratory birds often gained in authenticity via their Christian context. In a secularised age, ecological insights add to the credibility of the poems. Chapter Three is an analysis and interpretation of Sjögren’s collection of poems Fågeljägarna (1997, The Bird Catchers), as well as of the intra- and intertexts that the reader meets in his writings and that, for various reasons, serve to make Sjögren’s poetic voice so distinctive. In a series of subsections the uniqueness of Fågeljägarna is defined by means of a comparison with ecology, secularisation (secularism), nihilism, religion and mythology. In addition, there is a discussion of the “poetry of place” and a final analysis of what unites and divides Sjögren and K. E. Løgstrup, regarding a poetic understanding of life. Independent of the ideological direction that is identi-fied, this cycle of poems is marked by an elegiac mood. The poem “Dagen före plöjarens kväll” (1984, “The Day before the Plough-man’s Evening”) from the eponymous collection of poems is an example of an ekphrasis (a transformation of images). Chapter Four makes a close reading of this poem, for which Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s picture “Landscape with the Fall of Icarus” is a model. Four interpretative hypotheses are advanced: a moral, ontological, theological and a folkloristic one. The interpretation of the poem points out that the dialogue is not merely the poet’s private affair – the reader is also invited to take an active part in the discussion, now with the picture and the ekphrasis as prerequisites. The chapter contains a further three analyses of ekphrasis dealing with other poems from the collection Dagen före plöjarens kväll.

This thesis explores ways in which the reality of Kantor’s existence at a key moment in occupied Kraków may be read as directly informing the genesis and development of his artistic strategies. It argues for a particular ontological understanding of human being that resonates strongly with that implied by Kantor in his work and writings. Most approaches to Kantor have either operated from within a native perspective that assumes familiarity with Polish culture and its influences, or, from an Anglo-American theatre-history perspective that has tended to focus on his larger-scale performance work. This has meant that contextual factors informing Kantor’s work as a whole, including his happenings, paintings, and writings, as well as his theatrical works, have remained under-explored. The thesis takes a Heideggerian-hermeneutic approach that foregrounds biographical, cultural and aesthetic contexts specific to Kantor, but seemingly alien to Anglo-American experience. Kantor’s work is approached from Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian perspectives that read the work as a world-forming response to these contexts. Read in this way, key writings, art and performance works by Kantor are revealed to be explorations of existence and human being. Traditional ontological distinctions between process and product, painting and performance, are problematised through the critique of representation that these works and working practices propose. Kantor is revealed as a metaphysical artist whose work stands as a testament to a Heideggerian view of human being as a ‘positive negative’: a ‘placeholder of nothing’, but a ‘nothing’ that yet ‘is’ …

This article considers the nature of interpretation as important question in constitutional interpretation from a theonomic epistemological perspective. Theonomic epistemology is summarily described. The modem language philosophy's view of the nature of interpretation is then investigated, after which a theonomic definition of interpretation and hermeneutics is suggested. Different approaches to interpretation commonly found in legal practice are evaluated on the basis of the suggested definition. The theonomic approach is then applied to another issue in constitutional interpretation, the nature of the judicial function, and broad guidelines are given for the practical application of theonomic epistemological considerations.
Hierdie artikel ondersoek die wese van interpretasie as belangrike vraagstuk by grondwetuitleg vanuit die perspektief van die teonome epistemologie. Die teonome epistemologie word oorsigtelik beskryf. Die modeme taalfilosofie se beskouing van interpretasie word dan behandel, waama 'n teonome definisie van interpretasie en hermeneutiek voorgestel word. Die verskillende uitlegbenaderings wat algemeen in die praktyk voorkom, word aan die hand van die voorgestelde definisie geevalueer. Vervolgens word die teonome benadering op 'n ander vraagstuk van grondwetuitleg - die aard van die regterlike funksie - toegepas, en word bree riglyne vir toepassing van teonome epistemologiese oorwegings in die praktyk van regspraak gegee.
Department of Constitutional International & Indigenous Law
LL.M.

I denna vetenskapliga essä undersöker jag begreppet helhetssyn som ord, dess historiska utveckling inom hälso- och sjukvård, hur det uppfattas inom aktuell forskning samt ur ett filosofiskt perspektiv. Fenomenologi, hermeneutik och existentialism utgör det filosofiska ramverket och jag låter dessa teorier gå i dialog med gestaltade berättelser från mitt yrkesutövande som fysioterapeut men också med mina reflektioner och tidigare erfarenheter. Hälsa är ett annat begrepp som undersöks eftersom det är nära besläktat med helhet och också något som människan strävar mot genom hela livet. Eftersom mitt arbete huvudsakligen utförs i möte med åldrade patienter ger jag extra mycket utrymme åt just åldrandet och kroniska sjukdom som fenomen. Den praktiska klokheten, kunskapsformen fronesis, växer fram som en grundläggande förutsättning för att kunna sträva mot helhetssyn med en etiskt grundad kvalitet. Även om jag kommer fram till att helhetssyn förmodligen är en utopi så är det fortfarande ytterst viktigt att sträva mot den. Den essentiella delaspekt av helhetssyn som vuxit fram vid sidan av fronesis väljer jag att benämna situasyn. Utmaningen kallas NPM.
In this scientific essay, I examine the concept of the holistic view — as a notion, its historical development in health and medical care, how it is perceived within current research, and from a philosophical perspective. Phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism constitute the philosophical framework and I let these theories go into dialogue with depicted stories from my professional practice as a physiotherapist, and also with my own reflections and past experiences. Health is another concept that I investigate because of its close relationship with wholeness, and also because it is something that man strives towards throughout his life. Since my work is mainly done in meetings with elderly patients, I give extra space to aging and chronic illness as phenomena. The practical wisdom, phronesis, as a form of knowledge, emerges as a basic prerequisite for being able to strive towards a holistic view of an ethically founded quality. Although I will argue that a holistic view is a utopic vision, I conclude that it is still important to strive towards it. The essential part of the holistic approach that emerged, alongside phronesis, I've chosen to call situasyn. The challenge is called NPM.

The work deals with the selected ethical concepts of social work, such as human and person, freedom, conscience, values, suffering and death. These concepts are thoughtful and their understanding is deepened on the basis of the texts of Viktor Emil Frankl. In the work the personality of V. E. Frankl is presented, his method of logotherapy and existential analysis, further are presented the fields of ethics and social work. The selected concepts are introduced as they are introduced in the work of V. E. Frankl and in the works of representatives of existential philosophy whose approaches Frankl used. There is also evaluated the relevance of these concepts for ethics of social work on the basis of monographs and on the basis of the academic articles of the authors dealing with ethics in social work.The work pointed out the potential benefits of logotherapy and existential analysis of ethics of social work during the application of Frankl's psychotherapeutic methods into the fields of social work.