Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Eritrea – History – Autonomy and independence movements“

Abstract Abstract The post-independence government of Eritrea introduced Proclamation 86/1996 to redraw the administrative structure of the newly independent territory. The principle behind the redrawing was pronounced to be to serve decentralised governance system where considerable power is devolved to the regions. According to this principle the regions were provided with legislative, executive and judiciary bodies of local governance. Further the regions were also to be divided into sub-regions and village/area units with provisions of legislative, executive and judiciary organs that would enhance the local governing system where the local communities are provided both legally and practically the autonomy to run their political, economic, social and cultural life with less central interference. In practice however the governance system that was introduced following independence proved to be highly centralised. This became glaringly obvious following the outbreak of the second war (1998-2000) between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The paper critically re-examines local governance in Eritrea. It examines the various stages of redrawing of the regions over the historical trajectory of the making of Eritrea until the redrawing following independence. It examines the corresponding power structures and local governance systems. It also examines the modality of the redrawing and the political intentionality behind it. Through text interpretation and analysis the paper examines the connection between local governance and decentralisation. The paper draws the conclusion that the legal mechanism put in place and the discretionary power arrangement between the executive and legislative bodies could not provide ample space for local governance.

The end of the First World War was a crucial time for nationalist leaders and minority communities across the European continent and beyond. The impact of the post-war spread of self-determination on the redrawing of Eastern European borders and on the claims of colonial independence movements has been extensively researched. By contrast, the international historiography has paid little attention to minority nationalist movements in Western Europe. This article focuses on three regions (Catalonia, Flanders and South Tyrol) that experienced considerable sub-state national mobilization in the interwar period. We aim to understand whether the leaders of Western European minorities and stateless nations shared the same enthusiasm as their anti-colonial and Eastern European counterparts for the new international order that self-determination seemed to foreshadow in the months following the end of the First World War. Because the American President Woodrow Wilson stood out as the most prominent purveyor of the new international legitimacy of self-determination, the article further examines how Western European nationalist movements exploited Wilson's image and advocacy to achieve their own goals. Nationalist forces in Catalonia, Flanders and South Tyrol initially mobilized self-determination and referred to Wilson as a symbol of national liberation, but this instrumentalization of self-determination was not sustained. Large-scale mobilization occurred only in Catalonia, and, even there, it disappeared suddenly in spring 1919. Furthermore, sub-state nationalist movements in Western Europe tended to mobilize self-determination to gain regional autonomy, rather than full independence, thus pursuing internal, not external, self-determination. The willingness of these movements to privilege autonomy over full independence made them more receptive to compromise. Radical forces would become stronger only in the 1930s and largely for reasons not directly connected to the post-war mobilization around self-determination.

State responsiveness to pressures from women's movements in Africa has been limited. However, where inroads have been made, associational autonomy from the state and dominant party has proved critical. The women's movement is one of the most coordinated and active social movements in Uganda, and one of the most effective women's movements in Africa more generally. An important part of its success comes from the fact that it is relatively autonomous, unlike women's movements in earlier periods of Uganda's post-independence history. The women's movement, in spite of enormous pressures for cooptation, has taken advantage of the political space afforded by the semi-authoritarian Museveni government, which has promoted women's leadership to serve its own ends. Leaders and organisations reflect varying degrees of autonomy and cooptation. Nevertheless the women's movement has had a visible impact on policy as a result of its capacity to set its own far-reaching agenda and freely select its own leaders.

This paper explores the idea that poor governance explains the rise of separatist nationalism in situations such as Zambia, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia (in Africa) that had previously been independently governed during the colonial times, but later joined other states at independence to enjoy normal politics, but later degenerated into violent separatist nationalism. Our argument is that centralisation of power in an environment in which cultural groups are calling for regional autonomy, for even development, and for the international community to intervene on the side of peace, create grounds that explain the rise of violent separatist movements. The Barotseland Protectorate negotiated for autonomous development and, after securing constitutional guarantees in its favour, voluntarily joined Zambia in what was expected to be a one nation, two states system. After four decades of resisting constitutional amendments in favour of the centralisation of power, the Barotse of Zambia abandoned the politics of autonomous development and started calling for a separate state. Their resolve to remain peaceful is not aided by the international community that is reluctant to intervene, exposing the political process to radicals who consider violence as an alternative. The paper argues that violent separatist politics is preventable.

AbstractIn late 1909, the liberal Russian newspaperBirzhevye Vedomostiexpressed the fear that Finland could become ‘Russia’s Ireland’. The implication was that by restricting the autonomy that Finland had enjoyed within the Russian Empire for much of the preceding century, Russian nationalists risked creating a chaotic, discontented eastern province, dangerously close to the imperial capital. The ‘Russia’s Ireland’ motif became so prominent in the following eight years – before Finnish independence in 1917 – as to become an international cliché. The discourse of imperial subjugation that existed in both Ireland and Finland in the first decade of the twentieth century has rather obscured the fact that, despite obvious superficial parallels, the nineteenth-century experiences of these nations differed considerably. Both Finland and Ireland were part of larger imperial systems in the nineteenth century, and national movements emerged in both countries that sought to develop political, economic and cultural autonomy. Finland became a sporadic model for diverse Irish national aspirations, but the analogy was rejected consistently, and often vigorously, by Finns in the nineteenth century. This article charts the development of the Finnish–Irish constitutional analogy from the middle of the nineteenth century to the eve of both nations’ independence. It demonstrates that despite the similarities in overall historical timelines, contemporaries perceived differences between the two cases.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of Latvia, a minority group became a majority and a majority group became a minority. This has been the situation for Latvians and Russians after August 1991. The Baltic States led the way towards first autonomy and then independence. The nationalist movement in the Latvian SSR was primarily a minority nationalist movement. Why do minorities mobilise? Gurr finds that minorities rebel for two reasons: relative deprivation and group mobilisation. Relative deprivation answers the question of why and it characterizes the status of the Latvian language and culture vis-à-vis that of Russia during the Soviet period. While relative deprivation has come under considerable criticism because of its inability to explain when a group will mobilise, the notion can be found in the nationalist rhetoric before and since the restoration of Latvian independence. Group mobilisation goes further in explaining when minorities may assert political claims. Considered in terms of changes in the political opportunity structure, the changing politics of glasnost allowed the nationalist movements to mobilise in the Baltic States.

Abstract This essay offers an intellectual history of the armed mobilizations that traversed the highlands and valleys of the Dominican Republic's southern borderlands during the last decades of the nineteenth century, finding at their very heart a spiritually grounded defense of autonomy within an embattled geography of community and freedom. The residents of these highlands and the San Juan Valley mounted repeated guerrilla movements against the island's two capitals in service of defending the whole island's independence; unlike borderlands struggles elsewhere, residents forged these campaigns long before any capital transformations encroached on their own territory. The essay analyzes the spiritual, political, and geographic logic of self-rule that these individuals invoked and also, critically, the gendered cost of violence that these campaigns fostered. The success of these anticolonial struggles highlights the profound fugitive history of the center island, just as it rewrites narratives of exclusivist Dominican nationalism in the present day.

The study synthesizes the most important events and transformations that marked Moldovan society in 1989 and its future developments. The study’s primary aim is to highlight the most important events from 1989 that led the Moldovan society towards obtaining the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, the study also shows the current knowledge of the 1989 developments to draw new research perspectives. Thus, in chronological order, the most critical social, cultural, and political events that have had long-term effects on Moldovan society are reviewed. The article analyzes the national emancipation movement’s emergence, activity, and counter-movements to maintain the Soviet regime. The 1989 events in the Moldavian SSR resulted from Gorbachev’s reforms (glasnost, perestroika) and the “revolutions” in the socialist states that succeeded in bringing down the communist regimes. Starting with cultural demands and rights (the language and alphabet), people had reached economic and political demands (economic autonomy, sovereignty, independence). The emergence of alternative political forces to the Communist Party, their official registration, the legalization of their meetings, and public manifestations led to the consolidation of the critical mass opposed to the Communist regime. Changing the language legislation, returning to the Latin alphabet, and condemning the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are just some of the successes of 1989 that impacted the following years, resulting, eventually, in the Declaration of Sovereignty of 1990 and the Declaration of Independence of 1991.

After World War II, Great Britain's loss of power in the international system had a great impact on the start of the decolonization process (the beginning of the independence movements in colonial geographies and the acquisition of peoples' independence) and expansion of it. India, one of the most important colonies of the British Empire which is known as the empire on which the sun never sets, was also the most important representative and perhaps even the trigger of this process. The Republic of India (hereafter referred to as India) which gained independence from Britain in 1947, also witnessed the birth of another state from its territory. The newly established state of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Pakistan) has maintained a high-tension relationship with India since the foundation. The main cause of this tension has been the dispute over the Jammu and Kashmir region. The controversial region has again become a conflictual geography with the decision of the Indian Parliament on the 5th of August 2019. By this, the autonomous status of the J&K was abolished and Pakistan and India came to the edge of confrontation. The measures and precautions of the Indian government regarding the region has increased the tension not only in J&K but also in India and in Pakistan. This study tries to analyze the Kashmir dispute in line with the recent developments and how the issue effects the regional political dynamics. In the first part of the paper; there will be a short history of the dispute, the claims of the parties, and the place of this dispute in the international system. In the second part, the current situation will be tried to investigate from the foreign policy and regional policies aspect. The general conclusion of the author is that the recent decision on autonomy of Kashmir will have cumulative negative impacts on the stability of the region in coming years.

This thesis assesses several theories about the social basis of the Quebec independence movement. The most prevalent of these theories locates the core of support for Quebec independence in the Francophone new middle class. The Marxist perspective offers a closely related hypothesis, according to which the independence movement is based in the Francophone new petite bourgeoisie. A third theory sees the new class as at the helm of the new social movements, among which is the Quebec independence movement. Finally, a fourth hypothesis is that the Francophone intellectuals and professional intelligentsia are the foremost separatists.
The results of tabular and logistic regression analysis of data on referendum support for sovereignty-association refute the new middle class and new petite bourgeoisie hypotheses. The analyses indicate considerable support for sovereignty-association among a narrow variant of the new class. Within this narrow new class, or professional intelligentsia, support for sovereignty is most heavily concentrated among the Francophone intellectuals. The most discriminating predictor of separatism is not class, but the opposition between those in intellectuals vs. the business/managerial occupations. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

In nationalism studies, there has been insignificant analysis of the politics of imagining nations. This thesis addresses this lacuna in an examination of the form and design of imagined nations in Scotland and Quebec. I argue that the Scottish National Party and the Parti Quebecois have, since their advent in the 1960s, created a political-civic image of the nation that breaks with previous cultural conceptions. However, cultural images of the nation, propagated by centralist institutions, remain entrenched in contemporary Scotland and Quebec. The juxtaposition of centralist cultural images and nationalist political images of the nation have led to a dualistic, or what I have termed a 'Jekyll and Hyde', national consciousness in both countries. This exercise indicates that images of the nation are subject to multitudinous interpretations and (re)construction by various actors in the competitive state-nation political arena.

The fact that it took so long, in spite of successive waves of invaders and spirited yet sporadic resistance, to fashion a united national front, points out an anomaly in Algerian society: a divided identity. It took a cruel French occupation, the incompetence of colonial authorities, and the infiltration of European nationalist ideology to fashion a united front, but it was only a front, for immediately after independence, the unity was shown to be a temporary one.
The Berber majority found itself excluded, both culturally and politically, from the new Algerian state. Strangers in their own land, Berbers were faced with a new, more insidious colonialism: Arabization.

Since the early 1980's, the Punjab state of India has been in turmoil as a result of a separatist movement that developed among elements of the Sikh community. Political tensions not only characterized the relationship between the Punjab and New Delhi/ but also between Sikhs and Hindus and among different segments within the Sikh community itself. The most important attempt to end the conflict in the state has been the Rajiv Gandhi-Sant Longowal Accord signed on July 24, 1985. However, the Accord failed and by mid-1987 the Punjab was once again racked by political violence. This thesis focuses on the events that led to the signing of the Accord and the forces that caused its demise. Bargaining theory provides the general theoretical framework against which the data are analyzed. This thesis highlights the fact that political bargains in Third World weakly-institutionalized states are often the result of particular configurations of political power which are short lived. The corollary of this is that once the configuration of political forces changes, the chances of success for the previously reached political bargain are weakened. In the particular case of the Punjab Accord, there was a change, beginning in late 1985, in the relative political power of the participants in the bargain. Also, the terms of the bargained Accord unleashed forces on both sides which undermined its implementation. Third World leaders should draw two major lessons from this. First, they should be careful not to have exaggerated perceptions of their power since this may be counterproductive in the future if they cannot deliver what they have promised. Second, these leaders should attempt to consult all interests with a stake in the bargained settlement as a way to prevent opposition to it.
Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
Graduate

The "end of the century" nourishes a questioning movement on national identity and on the concept of modernity that is encouraged by the Quebec essayists. We propose an organization of the elements of the sovereign narrative which would be able to conduct and constitute a generative grammar of its argumentation. Our project consists in creating a matrix of the nationalistic discourse during the 1995 Quebec referendum period on sovereignty. This schematic figure will bring to its most simple expression the narrative of the Quebec nationalistic discourse selecting examples from ten texts of our primary bibliography. Our matrix will incorporate ideas, dogmas, theories, facts and myths stemming from the ideological discourses. We will see how these elements do interact, to be able afterwards to gather them in a framework on which national identity and legitimity of the national accession to sovereignty should be based. The study of this narrative of the past, as well as the analysis of the public characters will be leaded by the sociocritical approach of discourse analysis.
The francophone cultural nation living on the territory of the Province of Quebec demonstrates itself through the values of tenacity, solidarity, labour and openness of mind towards "Others". The nation increases the standing of a society project based on a democratic basis, condemning the traitors of the Quebec nation. This history concerns the francophone majority even though it is linked to the other "oppressed peoples" of the World History. This "french-quebecer" history is enhanced with a collective memory, projected towards the future in making the project of sovereignty the purpose of its teleological progression.

The official language policies and their basic concepts, the principle of personality in Canada and the principle of territoriality in Switzerland, are critically analyzed. The two democratic federations are compared as two multination states since 'nation' is defined in cultural terms. Language survival is justified in liberal theory through minority rights. The principle of territoriality that assures the dominance of the linguistic majority over a territory within the federation is in accordance with liberal democracy if fundamental rights are protected. The principle of territoriality contributes thus to political stability within a multination federation. There is no movement in Switzerland that is fed by a language-based grievance despite the existence of three linguistic minorities: Switzerland accommodates successfully linguistic diversity. In Canada, the perception that the survival of the French language might not be sustained fuels a secessionist movement threatening the unity of the federation.

This thesis examines the reaction of organized labour to Quebec separatist nationalism for the period between 1960, the year of the creation of the Rassemblement pour l'independance nationale and the beginning of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, and 1980, the year of the first referendum on Quebec's constitutional status. The thesis investigates four labour organizations: the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the Federation des travailleurs et travailleuses du Quebec (FTQ), the Confederation des syndicats nationaux (CSN), and the Centrale de l'enseignement du Quebec (CEQ). It shows in which ways the positions of the four centrals have been informed by their members' national identifications and the emotional and cognitive mechanisms that resulted from these identifications.

During most of the 1960s, the CSN was both an advocate of provincial autonomy and a defender of federalism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, a majority of its leaders and militants came to favour separatism. Many of them saw independence as a precondition for the creation of a socialist Quebec. In 1972, the CSN rejected capitalism, endorsed socialism, and envisaged an internal referendum on the independence issue. The internal debate, however, took place only after the Parti quebecois was elected to power in 1976. Fearing internal divisions and disaffiliations, the CSN did not endorse separatism. Being disappointed with the Parti quebecois' governmental record, the CSN was content to give a critical support to a yes vote in the referendum in 1980.

For much of the last twenty years, political leaders and academics have assumed that the survival of Canada depends on constitutional reform, and never more so than in the wake of the 1995 Quebec referendum. This thesis updates the literature by explaining the remarkable story of the last several years: the achievement of a national unity peace in the absence of constitutional reform. The explanation centres on the post-referendum shift in federal strategy from constitutional reform to Plan B, a strategy based on the rules of secession that has its origins, it is argued, in the Reform Party's response to Mulroneyera constitutional reform. The thesis concludes that Plan B was a successful national unity strategy because it made secession seem risky and undesirable, but also because the strategy - unlike constitutional reform - was based on widespread national support and on the viability of the constitutional status quo.

This chapter examines the backgrounds of several elite networks and coalitions that were instrumental to establishing independence and, subsequently, peace in the 1990s, focusing on the relationships, configurations of power, and ideas that they drew on and further embedded. Being denied access to significant external funding or support, these networks were largely dependent upon one another for either their survival as elites or for their prosperity. Their mutual dependence reverberates throughout the independence discourse, building layers of meaning around the idea that Somaliland was forged through the self-reliance of its people, which followed on from the self-reliance demonstrated by earlier civil society movements and the Somali National Movement (SNM) guerilla fighters. This framing of history is not only used to illustrate the authenticity of Somaliland’s independence but also the degree to which its experience upends hegemonic assumptions about state fragility and the usefulness of international intervention for correcting it. This chapter thus explores the ways in which the autonomy of local actors is framed as one of the core elements of Somaliland’s peace-building processes.

Banco de la República is celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2023. This is a very significant anniversary and one that provides an opportunity to highlight the contribution the Bank has made to the country’s development. Its track record as guarantor of monetary stability has established it as the one independent state institution that generates the greatest confidence among Colombians due to its transparency, management capabilities, and effective compliance with the central banking and cultural responsibilities entrusted to it by the Constitution and the Law. On a date as important as this, the Board of Directors of Banco de la República (BDBR) pays tribute to the generations of governors and officers whose commitment and dedication have contributed to the growth of this institution.1 Banco de la República’s mandate was confirmed in the National Constitutional Assembly of 1991 where the citizens had the opportunity to elect the seventy people who would have the task of drafting a new constitution. The leaders of the three political movements with the most votes were elected as chairs to the Assembly, and this tripartite presidency reflected the plurality and the need for consensus among the different political groups to move the reform forward. Among the issues considered, the National Constitutional Assembly gave special importance to monetary stability. That is why they decided to include central banking and to provide Banco de la República with the necessary autonomy to use the instruments for which they are responsible without interference from other authorities. The constituent members understood that ensuring price stability is a state duty and that the entity responsible for this task must be enshrined in the Constitution and have the technical capability and institutional autonomy necessary to adopt the decisions they deem appropriate to achieve this fundamental objective in coordination with the general economic policy. In particular, Article 373 established that “the State, through Banco de la República, shall ensure the maintenance of the purchasing power of the currency,” a provision that coincided with the central banking system adopted by countries that have been successful in controlling inflation. In 1999, in Ruling 481, the Constitutional Court stated that “the duty to maintain the purchasing power of the currency applies to not only the monetary, credit, and exchange authority, i.e., the Board of Banco de la República, but also those who have responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of the general economic policy of the country” and that “the basic constitutional purpose of Banco de la República is the protection of a sound currency. However, this authority must take the other economic objectives of state intervention such as full employment into consideration in their decisions since these functions must be coordinated with the general economic policy.” The reforms to Banco de la República agreed upon in the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 and in Act 31/1992 can be summarized in the following aspects: i) the Bank was assigned a specific mandate: to maintain the purchasing power of the currency in coordination with the general economic policy; ii) the BDBR was designatedas the monetary, foreign exchange, and credit authority; iii) the Bank and its Board of Directors were granted a significant degree of independence from the government; iv) the Bank was prohibited from granting credit to the private sector except in the case of the financial sector; v) established that in order to grant credit to the government, the unanimous vote of its Board of Directors was required except in the case of open market transactions; vi) determined that the legislature may, in no case, order credit quotas in favor of the State or individuals; vii) Congress was appointed, on behalf of society, as the main addressee of the Bank’s reporting exercise; and viii) the responsibility for inspection, surveillance, and control over Banco de la República was delegated to the President of the Republic. The members of the National Constitutional Assembly clearly understood that the benefits of low and stable inflation extend to the whole of society and contribute mto the smooth functioning of the economic system. Among the most important of these is that low inflation promotes the efficient use of productive resources by allowing relative prices to better guide the allocation of resources since this promotes economic growth and increases the welfare of the population. Likewise, low inflation reduces uncertainty about the expected return on investment and future asset prices. This increases the confidence of economic agents, facilitates long-term financing, and stimulates investment. Since the low-income population is unable to protect itself from inflation by diversifying its assets, and a high proportion of its income is concentrated in the purchase of food and other basic goods that are generally the most affected by inflationary shocks, low inflation avoids arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth.2 Moreover, low inflation facilitates wage negotiations, creates a good labor climate, and reduces the volatility of employment levels. Finally, low inflation helps to make the tax system more transparent and equitable by avoiding the distortions that inflation introduces into the value of assets and income that make up the tax base. From the monetary authority’s point of view, one of the most relevant benefits of low inflation is the credibility that economic agents acquire in inflation targeting, which turns it into an effective nominal anchor on price levels. Upon receiving its mandate, and using its autonomy, Banco de la República began to announce specific annual inflation targets as of 1992. Although the proposed inflation targets were not met precisely during this first stage, a downward trend in inflation was achieved that took it from 32.4% in 1990 to 16.7% in 1998. At that time, the exchange rate was kept within a band. This limited the effectiveness of monetary policy, which simultaneously sought to meet an inflation target and an exchange rate target. The Asian crisis spread to emerging economies and significantly affected the Colombian economy. The exchange rate came under strong pressure to depreciate as access to foreign financing was cut off under conditions of a high foreign imbalance. This, together with the lack of exchange rate flexibility, prevented a countercyclical monetary policy and led to a 4.2% contraction in GDP that year. In this context of economic slowdown, annual inflation fell to 9.2% at the end of 1999, thus falling below the 15% target set for that year. This episode fully revealed how costly it could be, in terms of economic activity, to have inflation and exchange rate targets simultaneously. Towards the end of 1999, Banco de la República announced the adoption of a new monetary policy regime called the Inflation Targeting Plan. This regime, known internationally as ‘Inflation Targeting,’ has been gaining increasing acceptance in developed countries, having been adopted in 1991 by New Zealand, Canada, and England, among others, and has achieved significant advances in the management of inflation without incurring costs in terms of economic activity. In Latin America, Brazil and Chile also adopted it in 1999. In the case of Colombia, the last remaining requirement to be fulfilled in order to adopt said policy was exchange rate flexibility. This was realized around September 1999, when the BDBR decided to abandon the exchange-rate bands to allow the exchange rate to be freely determined in the market.Consistent with the constitutional mandate, the fundamental objective of this new policy approach was “the achievement of an inflation target that contributes to maintaining output growth around its potential.”3 This potential capacity was understood as the GDP growth that the economy can obtain if it fully utilizes its productive resources. To meet this objective, monetary policy must of necessity play a countercyclical role in the economy. This is because when economic activity is below its potential and there are idle resources, the monetary authority can reduce the interest rate in the absence of inflationary pressure to stimulate the economy and, when output exceeds its potential capacity, raise it. This policy principle, which is immersed in the models for guiding the monetary policy stance, makes the following two objectives fully compatible in the medium term: meeting the inflation target and achieving a level of economic activity that is consistent with its productive capacity. To achieve this purpose, the inflation targeting system uses the money market interest rate (at which the central bank supplies primary liquidity to commercial banks) as the primary policy instrument. This replaced the quantity of money as an intermediate monetary policy target that Banco de la República, like several other central banks, had used for a long time. In the case of Colombia, the objective of the new monetary policy approach implied, in practical terms, that the recovery of the economy after the 1999 contraction should be achieved while complying with the decreasing inflation targets established by the BDBR. The accomplishment of this purpose was remarkable. In the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, economic activity recovered significantly and reached a growth rate of 6.8% in 2006. Meanwhile, inflation gradually declined in line with inflation targets. That was how the inflation rate went from 9.2% in 1999 to 4.5% in 2006, thus meeting the inflation target established for that year while GDP reached its potential level. After this balance was achieved in 2006, inflation rebounded to 5.7% in 2007, above the 4.0% target for that year due to the fact that the 7.5% GDP growth exceeded the potential capacity of the economy.4 After proving the effectiveness of the inflation targeting system in its first years of operation, this policy regime continued to consolidate as the BDBR and the technical staff gained experience in its management and state-of-the-art economic models were incorporated to diagnose the present and future state of the economy and to assess the persistence of inflation deviations and expectations with respect to the inflation target. Beginning in 2010, the BDBR established the long-term 3.0% annual inflation target, which remains in effect today. Lower inflation has contributed to making the macroeconomic environment more stable, and this has favored sustained economic growth, financial stability, capital market development, and the functioning of payment systems. As a result, reductions in the inflationary risk premia and lower TES and credit interest rates were achieved. At the same time, the duration of public domestic debt increased significantly going from 2.27 years in December 2002 to 5.86 years in December 2022, and financial deepening, measured as the level of the portfolio as a percentage of GDP, went from around 20% in the mid-1990s to values above 45% in recent years in a healthy context for credit institutions.Having been granted autonomy by the Constitution to fulfill the mandate of preserving the purchasing power of the currency, the tangible achievements made by Banco de la República in managing inflation together with the significant benefits derived from the process of bringing inflation to its long-term target, make the BDBR’s current challenge to return inflation to the 3.0% target even more demanding and pressing. As is well known, starting in 2021, and especially in 2022, inflation in Colombia once again became a serious economic problem with high welfare costs. The inflationary phenomenon has not been exclusive to Colombia and many other developed and emerging countries have seen their inflation rates move away from the targets proposed by their central banks.5 The reasons for this phenomenon have been analyzed in recent Reports to Congress, and this new edition delves deeper into the subject with updated information. The solid institutional and technical base that supports the inflation targeting approach under which the monetary policy strategy operates gives the BDBR the necessary elements to face this difficult challenge with confidence. In this regard, the BDBR reiterated its commitment to the 3.0% inflation target in its November 25 communiqué and expects it to be reached by the end of 2024.6 Monetary policy will continue to focus on meeting this objective while ensuring the sustainability of economic activity, as mandated by the Constitution. Analyst surveys done in March showed a significant increase (from 32.3% in January to 48.5% in March) in the percentage of responses placing inflation expectations two years or more ahead in a range between 3.0% and 4.0%. This is a clear indication of the recovery of credibility in the medium-term inflation target and is consistent with the BDBR’s announcement made in November 2022. The moderation of the upward trend in inflation seen in January, and especially in February, will help to reinforce this revision of inflation expectations and will help to meet the proposed targets. After reaching 5.6% at the end of 2021, inflation maintained an upward trend throughout 2022 due to inflationary pressures from both external sources, associated with the aftermath of the pandemic and the consequences of the war in Ukraine, and domestic sources, resulting from: strengthening of local demand; price indexation processes stimulated by the increase in inflation expectations; the impact on food production caused by the mid-2021 strike; and the pass-through of depreciation to prices. The 10% increase in the minimum wage in 2021 and the 16% increase in 2022, both of which exceeded the actual inflation and the increase in productivity, accentuated the indexation processes by establishing a high nominal adjustment benchmark. Thus, total inflation went to 13.1% by the end of 2022. The annual change in food prices, which went from 17.2% to 27.8% between those two years, was the most influential factor in the surge in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Another segment that contributed significantly to price increases was regulated products, which saw the annual change go from 7.1% in December 2021 to 11.8% by the end of 2022. The measure of core inflation excluding food and regulated items, in turn, went from 2.5% to 9.5% between the end of 2021 and the end of 2022. The substantial increase in core inflation shows that inflationary pressure has spread to most of the items in the household basket, which is characteristic of inflationary processes with generalized price indexation as is the case in Colombia. Monetary policy began to react early to this inflationary pressure. Thus, starting with its September 2021 session, the BDBR began a progressive change in the monetary policy stance moving away from the historical low of a 1.75% policy rate that had intended to stimulate the recovery of the economy. This adjustment process continued without interruption throughout 2022 and into the beginning of 2023 when the monetary policy rate reached 12.75% last January, thus accumulating an increase of 11 percentage points (pp). The public and the markets have been surprised that inflation continued to rise despite significant interest rate increases. However, as the BDBR has explained in its various communiqués, monetary policy works with a lag. Just as in 2022 economic activity recovered to a level above the pre-pandemic level, driven, along with other factors, by the monetary stimulus granted during the pandemic period and subsequent months, so too the effects of the current restrictive monetary policy will gradually take effect. This will allow us to expect the inflation rate to converge to 3.0% by the end of 2024 as is the BDBR’s purpose.Inflation results for January and February of this year showed declining marginal increases (13 bp and 3 bp respectively) compared to the change seen in December (59 bp). This suggests that a turning point in the inflation trend is approaching. In other Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil, Perú, and Mexico, inflation has peaked and has begun to decline slowly, albeit with some ups and downs. It is to be expected that a similar process will take place in Colombia in the coming months. The expected decline in inflation in 2023 will be due, along with other factors, to lower cost pressure from abroad as a result of the gradual normalization of supply chains, the overcoming of supply shocks caused by the weather, and road blockades in previous years. This will be reflected in lower adjustments in food prices, as has already been seen in the first two months of the year and, of course, the lagged effect of monetary policy. The process of inflation convergence to the target will be gradual and will extend beyond 2023. This process will be facilitated if devaluation pressure is reversed. To this end, it is essential to continue consolidating fiscal sustainability and avoid messages on different public policy fronts that generate uncertainty and distrust. 1 This Report to Congress includes Box 1, which summarizes the trajectory of Banco de la República over the past 100 years. In addition, under the Bank’s auspices, several books that delve into various aspects of the history of this institution have been published in recent years. See, for example: Historia del Banco de la República 1923-2015; Tres banqueros centrales; Junta Directiva del Banco de la República: grandes episodios en 30 años de historia; Banco de la República: 90 años de la banca central en Colombia. 2 This is why lower inflation has been reflected in a reduction of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient that went from 58.7 in 1998 to 51.3 in the year prior to the pandemic. 3 See Gómez Javier, Uribe José Darío, Vargas Hernando (2002). “The Implementation of Inflation Targeting in Colombia”. Borradores de Economía, No. 202, March, available at: https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5220 4 See López-Enciso Enrique A.; Vargas-Herrera Hernando and Rodríguez-Niño Norberto (2016). “The inflation targeting strategy in Colombia. An historical view.” Borradores de Economía, No. 952. https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6263 5 According to the IMF, the percentage change in consumer prices between 2021 and 2022 went from 3.1% to 7.3% for advanced economies, and from 5.9% to 9.9% for emerging market and developing economies. 6 https://www.banrep.gov.co/es/noticias/junta-directiva-banco-republica-reitera-meta-inflacion-3