Thematische Bibliographien / Earnings management

Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Earnings management“

Autor: Grafiati
Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021
Zuletzt aktualisiert am 11. März 2023

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Inhaltsverzeichnis

  1. Zeitschriftenartikel
  2. Dissertationen
  3. Bücher
  4. Buchteile
  5. Konferenzberichte

Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Earnings management":

1

Johanes Simamora, Alex. „EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND FUTURE EARNINGS“. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia 16, Nr. 2 (31.12.2019): 141–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.21002/jaki.2019.08.

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Abstract This research is aimed to examine the moderating effect of the cost of earnings management on the relationship between earnings management and future earnings. Research samples are manufacture companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 2013-2015. The cost of accruals earnings management is auditor quality, while the costs of real earnings management are the market share and financial health. Based on the fixed effect regression test, auditor quality strengthens the positive effect of accruals earnings management on future performance, while market share and financial health weaken the negative effect of real earnings management on future earnings. It indicates that in the context of efficient contracting, high quality auditor provide better signal for earnings prediction compared to the low quality auditor. In addition, higher market share and higher financial health limit opportunistic real earnings management to reduce future earnings.
2

Delkhosh, Mohammad, und Mohammad Sadeghi. „The effect of accounting conservatism and earn-ings management on earnings quality“. International Journal of Accounting and Economics Studies 5, Nr. 2 (07.11.2017): 157. http://dx.doi.org/10.14419/ijaes.v5i2.8454.

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The net income has been always one of the important issues that had always been a favorite among financial statement's user, and the quality and management of it have always been the focus of attention of investors and creditors. The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of conservatism and earning management in earning quality. For this purpose, the Givoly and Hayn (2000) index were used as conservative measurement criteria and the modified Jones model (1995) was used as a measure of earning's management measurement, and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) index were used as a measure of the quality of earning (earnings sustainability) of the company. The statistical population of this study is 123 companies that listed on Tehran Stock Exchange between 2009 and 2014. For testing the research hypothesis a multivariate regression analysis was used. The results of the research indicate a significant negative (invert) relation between accounting conservatism and earning's management on the quality of earnings.
3

Surifah. „The effect of the type of controlling shareholders and corporate governance on real and accruals earnings management“. Corporate Ownership and Control 13, Nr. 1 (2015): 917–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i1c8p10.

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This research investigates the relationship between corporate governance and preference of earnings management selected by Indonesian banking controlling shareholders. This study uses all banks listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2006 until 2011 as samples. The result shows higher real earning managements and lower accruals discretionary in family-controlled banks and private institution compared to government-controlled banks. Government-controlled banks prefer accrual-based earnings management and real activity-based earnings management through operating cash flow. In the other hand, family-controlled banks and private institutions prefer real earnings management through interest expense and discretionary expenses. Foreign-controlled- banks choose earnings management through discretionary expenses. The implementation of corporate governance in Indonesia banking is high and giving negative impacts both to accrual and real-based earnings management. Concentrated ownership gives positive influences toward the accrual earning management and real earning management through discretionary expenses. The bank size has a positive and significant influence on accrual earnings management, yet its effect is negative and significant on real earning management through interest expenses. The findings contribute to the development of financial accounting literatures because there are small numbers of previous research on accrual discretionary on family-owned companies. Company does not indicate the increase of earnings quality, but it is indeed indicating that controlling family pays more attention on choosing the real activity-based earnings management to cover the expropriation. Accrual discretionary-based earnings management is intra-period reversely thus it cannot cover the permanent expropriation of controlling owners. The research also contributes to the studies of real-based earnings management measurement in banking system which has not been become a concern of research on previous studies.
4

Lim, Setiadi Alim. „Studi Earning Management Dari Waktu Ke Waktu“. BIP's JURNAL BISNIS PERSPEKTIF 4, Nr. 1 (31.01.2012): 90–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.37477/bip.v4i1.146.

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Prior studies suggests that earnings management can be distinguished on beneficial earning management or efficient earning management and opportunistic earning management. Although there is a positive motivation of earning management activity, that is the attempt manager to convey private information to shareholders and debtholders in order to reduce the informationgap that occurs in asymmetric information (beneficial or efficient earnings management , but the overall motivation of earnings management tends to be viewed negatively and is triggered by the interests of managers to maximize the interests of himself or the interests of business entities in order to maintain the market price of the stock at a specified value or the particular provisions ofa contract that is likely to prejudice the interests of external users of financial statements (opportunistic earnings management). Various manipulations of accounting scandals such as the case of Enron, WorldCom and others have influenced the way the public thinks, so begin to form the opinion that all the earnings management activities is a negative activity intended to defraud and must be fought. Earnings management can be performed with accrual oraccounting earnings management and real earnings management. Accrual or accounting earnings management have only a consequence of the accruals and will not affect cash flow. While real earnings management will affect cash flow and in some cases also affect accruals. There are some things you can do to reduce the practice of earnings management, which stricter accounting standards, the employment of an external auditor of a public accounting firm that has high integrity with long history and implementing good corporate governance practices. To detect accrual or accounting earnings management can be used several models in which one is best according to Dechow et al. (1995) is amodified Jones models. But Aminul Islam et al. (2011)stated that the Jones model of modification is not effective when applied in Korea and Bangladesh. Meanwhile, to detect the presence of real earnings management can use such a model of Roychowdhury (2006).
5

Cinthya, Cut Nessa, und Mirna Indriani. „ARUS KAS, KOMITE AUDIT DAN MANAJEMEN LABA STUDI KAUSALITAS PADA PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR INDONESIA“. Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis 2, Nr. 2 (21.06.2016): 167–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.24815/jdab.v2i2.4216.

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AbstractThis study aims to examine the influence of free cash flow, audit committees for earning managemen by using discretionary accruals as a proxy of earning management. The samples of this research were the manufacturing firms listed in BEI (Indonesia Stock Exchange) between 2010 and 2014. The samples wereselectedby using purposive sampling on 52 companies with 260 observations. The Data were collected from annual report and data analyzed by multiple regression analysis.The results of this study shows that free cash flow has negative influence for earnings management, size of audit committee has no influence for earnings management, and the number of audit committee meetings has negative influence for earnings management. Keywords: Free Cash Flow, Size of Audit Committee, Number of Audit Committee Meeting, Earnings Management.
6

Raka, Raka, und Sugi Suhartono. „KEMAMPUAN KEPEMILIKAN INSTITUSIONAL MEMODERASI PENGARUH EARNING POWER, LEVERAGE, DAN UKURAN PERUSAHAAN TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA“. Jurnal Bina Akuntansi 5, Nr. 2 (31.07.2018): 164–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.52859/jba.v5i2.8.

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This study aims to determine whether earnings power, leverage, and firm size affect earnings management and whether institutional ownership moderate the effect of earning power, leverage, and size of the company on earnings management. The theory underlying this research is agency theory and positive accounting theory. Based on both theories, the conflict of interest that occurs between the owner and the manager where each will tend to emphasize personal interests or certain parties. The sample in this study consists of 93 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2014-2016. Sampling was done by purposive sampling method. The data analysis technique used to test the hypothesis is Moderated Regression Analysis. The results of this study indicate earnings power, leverage, and firm size have a positive effect on earnings management. Institutional ownership weakens the effect of earning power on earnings management. Keywords : Earning management, earning power, leverage, company size
7

Lisnawati, Chyntya, und Nurzi Sebrina. „Perilaku Manajemen Laba Berdasarkan Siklus Hidup Perusahaan“. JURNAL EKSPLORASI AKUNTANSI 1, Nr. 3 (22.08.2019): 1307–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.24036/jea.v1i3.144.

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This study aims to examine earnings management behavior is based on the company life cycle. This study is classified as comparative research. The population in this study are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange period of 2013 to 2017. By using purposive sampling method, there were 61 companies as the research’s sample. Earning managements is measured through accrual earnings management and real earning management. Company life cycle is measured using the company cash flow. The type of data used is secondary data obtained from www.idx.co.id and used is descriptive analysis. The results of this study indicate that:1) company in the start up, growth, mature and decline stages tend to use real earning management, 2)there is no decrease in earnings management as the life cycle changes from start up, growth, mature and decline stages
8

Maria Djojo, Vania, und Christina Dwi Astuti. „The Effect of Tax Planning, Capital Intensity and Earning Power On Earning Management with Institutional Ownership As A Moderating Variable“. Devotion Journal of Community Service 4, Nr. 2 (14.02.2023): 534–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.36418/devotion.v4i2.406.

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The purpose of this research is to examine the factors that influence earnings management in consumer goods manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. These factors are Tax Planning, Capital Intensity, Earning Power and Institutional Ownership as moderating variables. The population used in this research is all consumer goods industry companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2018 to 2021. The sample in this study is 116 data that match the criteria. Samples were selected using purposive sampling method. The results of this study indicate that tax planning has a positive effect on earnings management, capital intensity has a negative effect on earnings management and institutional ownership weakens the effect of tax planning on earnings management. Meanwhile, the variables of earning power, financial leverage and firm age have no effect on earnings management and institutional ownership cannot weaken the effect of capital intensity and earning power on earnings management
9

Wardani, Dewi Kusuma, und Indra Wijaya Kusuma. „Is Earnings Management Informational or Opportunistic? Evidence from ASEAN Countries“. Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business 14, Nr. 1 (01.01.2012): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/gamaijb.5437.

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This study explores the informational and opportunistic characteristics of earnings management in ASEAN countries. Earnings management has an impact on the profitability of the companies. A positive relation between earnings management and future profitability reveals that earnings management is informational. However, negative a relation between earnings management and future profitability indicates that earnings management is opportunistic. This study uses data from the OSIRIS database. Four hundred and eighty five (485) companies from the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are used as a sample. This study focuses on 2 types of earnings management: (1) accrual earnings management and (2) real earning management. Modified Jones model is used for the accrual earnings management. Real earnings management follows Roychowdury (2006). The results show that the characteristics of earnings management are not consistent. Real earnings management is informational in Thailand, but opportunistic in Indonesia. Accruals earnings management is informational in the Philippines, but opportunistic in Malaysia. Country factors such as culture may explain the inconsistency of the results in ASEAN.Keywords: accruals earnings management; ASEAN countries; future profitability; informational; opportunistic; real earnings management
10

Goncalves, Tiago, Cristina Gaio und Pedro Ramos. „Earnings management and impression management: European evidence“. Problems and Perspectives in Management 20, Nr. 1 (01.04.2022): 459–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.20(1).2022.37.

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This study explores the relationship between Earnings Management and Impression Management in the context of some European listed companies. The analysis focuses on the readability of annual reports, measured by the file size. Earnings management is assessed using the modified Jones model. The sample consists of 2,953 listed companies from 17 industries of 24 European countries between 2012 and 2018 resulting in 13,020 firm-year observations. It has been found that one standard deviation increase in financial reports file size increases discretionary accruals in around 4%. These results are robust across different sample specifications in terms of firms’ size, industry and country. The findings show that increased intensity in the use of discretionary accruals is obfuscated by the disclosure of less readable annual reports, implying that Earnings Management and Impression Management are used complementarily. The conclusions have impact both for investment management and for policy, preventing inefficient allocation of capital budgeting and providing additional information that improves regulation on financial reporting transparency. AcknowledgmentThe authors are grateful to financial support from FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (Portugal), national funding through research grant (UID/SOC/04521/2020).
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Zeitschriftenartikel Dissertationen Bücher

Dissertationen zum Thema "Earnings management":

1

Cervantes, Paul Francisco. „Earnings management intensity and earning surprises: persistence and market pricing“. Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/192301.

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Malikov, Kamran. „Essays in earnings management“. Thesis, University of Essex, 2016. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/17918/.

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This thesis examines three essays in earnings management using UK-based data samples. The first essay implements a first test of the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK. The results indicate that firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants engage in higher levels of RAM relative to firms far from violation. Mandatory IFRS adoption does not change the use of RAM for firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage covenants. However, it increases the propensity for employing RAM for firm close to default of their debt to EBITDA covenants. The second essay examines the effect of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the debt covenant hypothesis. It finds that the use of RAM to avoid the possibility of interest coverage covenant violations decreases from the pre-issue period to the post-issue period. The results also show that the decrease in the use of RAM in the post SEO period to avoid the likelihood of breaching interest coverage covenant is more pervasive among SEO firms with low market to book ratios or high financial leverage. The third and final essay investigates revenue reclassification as an earnings management tool. More specifically, it examines whether firms use revenue reclassification by shifting other revenues to core revenues. The results establish that firms engage in revenue reclassification to inflate core revenues. They indicate that the period following mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in this practice as IRFS offers more latitude for revenue reclassification. Further tests reveal that revenue reclassification is more pervasive among firms with high incentives for earnings management such as those conducting seasoned equity offerings, those in financial distress, those with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and those reporting low core earnings or small increases in core earnings.
3

Öhlund, Wiola, und Martin Örnryd. „Earnings Management : En studie om earnings management förekommer vid stock-for-stock-förvärv“. Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-202442.

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Denna studie undersöker ifall det förekommer earnings management (EM) vid stock-for-stock-förvärv på den svenska marknaden. Tidigare forskning har gett tydliga tecken på att EM sker inför företagsförvärv och det finns starka incitament att använda sig utav det. Detta undersöks genom att studera om det sker en ökning av diskretionära periodiseringar, som mäts genom Modified Jones Model, åren innan förvärvet till skillnad från tidigare år. Studien undersöker även om målföretagets relativa storlek har en påverkan på EM. Undersökningens resultat från första hypotesprövningen indikerar att EM förekommer i svenska bolag redan tre år innan stock-for-stock-förvärv. Resultatet från den andra hypotesprövningen visade ingen signifikant skillnad mellan grupperna Små förvärv och Stora förvärv medan resultatet från den tredje visade att storleksförhållandet mellan företagen har en inverkan på användningen av EM. Detta visades genom att företagen med de tio största förvärven har en signifikant högre summa diskretionära periodiseringar än de med de tio minsta förvärven.
4

Acito, Andrew Alexei. „Does quarterly earnings guidance increase or reduce earnings management?“ Diss., University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1116.

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This study adds to the earnings guidance debate by investigating whether quarterly guidance is related to two forms of earnings management: (1) benchmark beating and (2) accounting irregularities. Using a post-Regulation Fair Disclosure sample, I find that firms regularly issuing earnings guidance display a discontinuity around zero in their distribution of management forecast errors and a larger discontinuity in their distribution of analyst forecast errors compared to non-guiding firms. Multivariate tests reveal that guiding firms recognize large abnormal accruals to beat their own guidance, but not to beat analyst forecasts, whereas non-guiding firms do recognize large abnormal accruals to beat analyst forecasts. Overall, guiding firms and non-guiding firms use similar levels of abnormal accruals to beat benchmarks. I also find no statistical relation between quarterly guidance and the likelihood of accounting irregularities. In sum, the evidence shows that while guiding firms and non-guiding firms manage earnings to different benchmarks, they are similar in terms of their aggregate earnings management.
5

Bjurman, Albin, und Erik Weihagen. „How reliable are earnings? : A study about real activities manipulation and accrual-based management in Europe“. Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-73307.

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Background & Subject discussion: Financial reporting and earnings affect stakeholders’ decisions and is a vital component in firm’s information disclosure. Management possesses considerable influence over financial reports. Earnings consist of a cash-flow and accrual component. Earnings can be affected by managers’ judgment and decision either by accrual-based earnings management or real activities manipulation. Earnings management affects the relevance and reliability of financial reporting and is widely researched. Europe is consolidating and accounting and audit standards are harmonizing. Real activities manipulation is unobserved in Europe. Increased attention and regulations of earnings management are inducing more creative methods to alter earnings, such as stock repurchases. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to investigate if real activities manipulation can be observed in Europe and to what extent in relationship to accrual-based activities to avoid reporting small losses. An underlying purpose is to study different methods of RAM, including some newer approaches to detect hypothesized RAM by stock repurchases. An additional purpose is to evaluate the different utilized detection methods to clarify effectiveness. The final purpose is to consider possible effects of EM on reliability and relevance of financial reporting. Conclusion: The result concludes that earnings management are performed by real activities manipulation. Stock repurchases, decreased discretionary expenses and production cost all indicate earnings management to avoid reporting earnings below a specific benchmark. The result questions the reliability and relevance of reported earnings.
6

Smith, Kevin R. „Earnings Management Constraints and Market Reactions to Subsequent Earnings Surprises“. Diss., Tucson, Arizona : University of Arizona, 2005. http://etd.library.arizona.edu/etd/GetFileServlet?file=file:///data1/pdf/etd/azu%5Fetd%5F1051%5F1%5Fm.pdf&type=application/pdf.

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7

Bondegård, Michael, und La David. „Earnings Management using Classification Shifting“. Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Business Studies, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-125152.

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8

Ge, Wen Xia. „Essays on Real Earnings Management“. Thesis, McGill University, 2009. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=66691.

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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the economic consequences of and constraints on real earnings management. My thesis consists of two essays. In the first essay, I examine the association between real earnings management and the cost of new corporate bond issues. Three types of real earnings management are considered: sales manipulation, overproduction and abnormal reduction of discretionary expenditures. Using the sample from 1993 to 2004, I find that cost of debt is negatively related to the proxies for sales manipulation, abnormal reduction of discretionary expenses and the overall real earnings management for firms without using stock options to compensate their managers. When managerial compensation is linked to option awards, however, the negative association between real earnings management and cost of debt is attenuated. Overproduction does not show a significant effect on bond yield spread. Overall, these results suggest that, in the primary bond market, mispricing of real earnings management exists, especially for firms that do not have executive stock option plans. In the second essay, I investigate the effect of quality board and takeover protection on real earnings management. Four types of real earnings management are considered in this essay: sales manipulation, overproduction, abnormal reduction of R&D expenses and abnormal reduction of discretionary expenditures (other than R&D). Using panel data from U.S. public firms in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act period (2004-2006), I find that the level of real earnings management (abnormal decline in R&D expenses and other discretionary expenses) increases with better board governance and decreases with higher takeover protection. The effects of these two governance factors on sales manipulation and overproduction cost are weak. Overall, the results suggest that the monitoring role of boards may put short-term market pressure on managers,
Cette thèse à pour objectif d'examiner les conséquences économiques autant que les contraintes sur la vraie gestion de revenus. Ma thèse se compose de deux essais. Dans le premier essai, j'ai examiné la relation entre la vraie gestion de revenus et le coût des nouveaux emprunts obligataires d'une entreprise. Trois scénarios de vraie gestion de revenus sont considérés : la manipulation de ventes, l'effect de surproduction et enfin, la réduction anormale de dépenses discrétionnaires. En utilisant l'échantillon provenant de l'an 1993 à 2004, j'ai constaté que le coût de la dette est négativement relié aux procurations de la manipulation de ventes, de la réduction anormale de dépenses discrétionnaires et de la vraie gestion globale de revenus pour les sociétés qui n'emploient pas les options d'achat d'actions comme méthodes compensatoires exécutifs. Cependant, quand la compensation gestionnaire est reliée aux récompenses d'option, l'association négative entre de vrais revenus gestion et le coût de dette est diminuée. Dans ce cas, la surproduction ne cause pas d'effet significatif sur la diffusion de rendement en esclavage. De façon générale, ces résultats suggèrent que, sur le marché des obligations primaire des obligations, l'évaluation erronée de la vraie gestion de revenus existe encore, particulièrement pour les sociétés qui n'ont pas les plans d'options sur titres exécutifs.Dans le deuxième essai, j'ai étudié l'effet d'avoir accès à un conseil de qualité et de la protection de changement sur la vraie gestion de revenus. Quatre scénarios de vraie gestion de revenus sont considérés dans cette rédaction: la manipulation de ventes, la surproduction, la réduction anormale de R & D et la réduction anormale de dépenses discrétionnaires (autre que R&D). En utilisant des données de panneau des sociétés publiques établies dans la période du Sarbane
9

Mashoka, Tareq Zaki. „Earnings management and loss reversal“. Thesis, Brunel University, 2010. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/4619.

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This research aims to detect and measure earnings management using a newly modified version of the standard Jones model (Jones, 1991). The standard model is extended to include a measure of discretionary accruals as an additional regressor instead of using the residuals. The variable used to measure discretionary accruals is a composite variable that consists of two components, one that represents the incentive and the other represents the tool of manipulation. The model is applied to detect earnings management in loss reversal companies for listed companies in Jordan and examine the market reaction to the loss reversal. The model is also applied on loss reversal companies for listed companies in the UK and the US. In chapter three, the new model is applied on listed companies in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The ASE is structured into two markets: the first market and the second market. Companies are motivated to be listed or remain listed in the first market since it only lists profitable companies. Companies reporting losses more frequently are listed in the second market. Results provide evidence of earnings management for companies listed in the first market. Companies that report a loss in a previous period manipulate in the following period to report profits. As a result of loss reversal, they preserve their place in the first market and avoid dropping back to the second market. This research conducts statistical simulation tests to compare the extended Jones model with the standard model. Results show that the extended model detects earnings management better than the standard one. This new model also separates discretionary accruals from measurement error (i.e. residuals) and makes it possible to accurately measure the whole amount of manipulation. Chapter four examines the investor reaction to the manipulation taking place in the first market. Results show that the market is pricing the discretionary accruals (the manipulation) as a component of net income, although they result only from earnings management. In chapter five, the model is applied on loss reversal firms listed in the UK and in the US. Results show that the companies manipulate to reverse losses and the manipulation depends on to the presence of R&D activities and the changing level in these activities.
10

柴麗萍 und Lai-ping Mary Chai. „Earnings management by late reporters“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1999. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31238154.

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Bücher zum Thema "Earnings management":

1

El Diri, Malek. Introduction to Earnings Management. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62686-4.

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2

McKee, Thomas E. Earnings management: An executive perspective. Mason, Ohio: Thomson, 2005.

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Wójtowicz, Piotr. Wiarygodność sprawozdań finansowych wobec aktywnego kształtowania wyniku finansowego. Kraków: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie, 2010.

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Franceschetti, Bruno Maria. Financial Crises and Earnings Management Behavior. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54121-1.

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Dou, Yiwei. Labor unemployment insurance and earnings management. Boston]: Harvard Business School, 2014.

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Chapman, Craig J. An investigation of earnings management through marketing actions. 2. Aufl. [Boston]: Harvard Business School, 2009.

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Jennings, Robert H. Reaction of financial analysts to management earnings forecasts. Charlottesville, Va. (P.O. Box 3665, Charlottesville 22903): Financial Analysts Research Foundation, 1985.

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Polachek, S. W. Earnings over the life cycle: The Mincer earnings function and its applications. Boston: Now Publishers, 2008.

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Gottardo, Pietro, und Anna Maria Moisello. Capital Structure, Earnings Management, and Risk of Financial Distress. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00344-9.

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Koch, Adam Stuart. Financial distress and the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Ann Arbor, Mich: UMI Dissertation Services, 2003.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Earnings management":

1

Brooks, Leonard J. „Earnings Management“. In Finance Ethics, 457–73. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118266298.ch24.

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Dang, Sophia. „Earnings Management“. In Controlling und Rechnungslegung - Managerial and Financial Accounting, 37–55. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37247-7_3.

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Menicucci, Elisa. „Earnings Quality and Earnings Management“. In Earnings Quality, 53–82. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36798-5_3.

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Franceschetti, Bruno Maria. „Earnings Management: Origins“. In Financial Crises and Earnings Management Behavior, 15–74. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54121-1_2.

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El Diri, Malek. „Motives of Earnings Management“. In Introduction to Earnings Management, 63–108. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62686-4_4.

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El Diri, Malek. „Introduction“. In Introduction to Earnings Management, 1–4. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62686-4_1.

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El Diri, Malek. „Definitions, Activities, and Measurement of Earnings Management“. In Introduction to Earnings Management, 5–44. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62686-4_2.

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El Diri, Malek. „Theoretical Framework“. In Introduction to Earnings Management, 45–61. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62686-4_3.

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El Diri, Malek. „Summary“. In Introduction to Earnings Management, 109–10. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62686-4_5.

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Chorafas, Dimitris N. „Creative Accounting, EBITDA, and Core Earnings“. In Management Risk, 40–57. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403948106_3.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Earnings management":

1

Cui, Gang, und Yaowen Wang. „Quarterly Earnings Distribution and Earnings Management“. In 2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icee.2010.627.

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Yang, Zhonghai, Sun Ying und Qianqian Zhang. „Management Motivation and Earnings Management Methods“. In 2013 International Conference on Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cyberc.2013.55.

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Im, Chae Chang, Jeong Ho Kim und Min Kyung Choi. „Dividend Policy and Earnings Management: Based on Discretionary Accruals and Real Earnings Management“. In Business 2015. Science & Engineering Research Support soCiety, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/astl.2015.114.07.

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Gao, Shuang, und Jie Gao. „Earnings Management: A Literature Review“. In 2016 International Seminar on Education Innovation and Economic Management (SEIEM 2016). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/seiem-16.2016.48.

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Shiah-Hou, Shin-Rong, und Yen-Ju Huang. „Analyst Characteristics and Earnings Management“. In 3rd Annual International Conference on Accounting and Finance (AF 2013). Global Science and Technology Forum Pte Ltd, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.5176/2251-1997_af13.33.

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Wang, Xiangfeng, und Xine Zhao. „Corporate Strategy and Earnings Management“. In 2018 International Conference on Advances in Social Sciences and Sustainable Development (ASSSD 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/asssd-18.2018.51.

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Li, Wenyao, und Qin Li. „Board Composition and Earnings Management“. In 2008 4th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wicom.2008.2348.

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Lidsa, Ignasia Ruvina, und Julisar Julisar. „Factors Influencing Earnings Management Practices“. In Tenth International Conference on Entrepreneurship and Business Management 2021 (ICEBM 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220501.003.

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Zhou, Jingying. „Earnings Growth Potential Implicit in Price-Earnings Ratio“. In 2017 3rd International Conference on Economics, Social Science, Arts, Education and Management Engineering (ESSAEME 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/essaeme-17.2017.26.

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Zhiping Zhang und Guangxin Fu. „Internal control and earnings persistence“. In 2012 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2012.6339942.

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