Bücher zum Thema „Dry Goods Economist“

The period covered by this volume, roughly 800-1450, was one of enormous change in the way people lived in their houses. Medieval people could call a grand castle, a humble thatched hut, or anything in between home, but houses were more than physical spaces. They changed according to technological developments, climatic needs, geological limitations and economic resources. They were also moral units that were themselves symbolic, economic, gendered, and social. At the beginning of our period, the movement of people, goods, and ideas, and the need for defense against some of this movement had an impact on how and where people lived. The codification of laws shaped how people understood the physical integrity of their homes, the reception they should give to those who wanted to enter, and their identification with the house itself. As European economies expanded in the twelfth century, householders increasingly had access to items that changed their day-to-day lives within their houses. This volume argues that through a house and its uses, occupants created, sustained, and understood their relationship to each other and their society.

E. J. Mishan, an iconoclastic economist who has taught at such schools as the London School of Economics and the New School for Social Research, is in this volume a provocateur, smashing staunchly held beliefs of the right (free trade and common markets are good for the economy), and the left (local jobs are always lost when factories close down, pay disparity between men and women signifies discrimination). He also pokes holes in the accepted wisdom held by all, arguing for example that economic growth does not necessarily improve lives. Those who believe the fallacies Mishan exposes to the light of reason in this book are, however, neither ignorant nor careless. The fallacies are all plausible, and intelligent people can be forgiven for believing them. Mishan simply wants readers to see these thirteen popular, persistent fallacies for what they are: Humbug. Mishan’s scintillating text is apolitical. In arguing that immigration does not benefit a country's economy, for example, he is not arguing in favor of restricting immigration. Rather, his goal is to test the assumptions behind the dearly held positions of both the left and the right or to expose what he calls the breathtaking fatuity that counts as wisdom these days. Mishan wants to interject common sense and logic into today's debates over the economy and, especially, the political arguments that translate into legislation that has a negative impact on people. Mishan’s ideas breathe new life into debates gone stale by ideology. As he notes, the fallacies in this volume travel in the highest circles, from debates in Congress to the pages of the Wall Street Journal, Time, and The Economist. Most are things everybody knows. He hopes, therefore, to expose the concerned citizen to the shock-treatment of discovering that much of what passes for conventional economic wisdom is in fact fallacious. As the Economist pointed out in its glowing review of the first edition of this book, Dr. Mishan has written the perfect book for anyone wishing to start the study of economics.

Despite social and economic advances around the world, poverty and disease persist, exacerbated by the mounting challenges of climate change, natural disasters, political conflict, mass migration, and economic inequality. While governments commit to addressing these challenges, traditional public and philanthropic dollars are not enough. Here, innovative finance has shown a way forward: by borrowing techniques from the world of finance, we can raise capital for social investments today. Innovative finance has provided polio vaccines to children in the DRC, crop insurance to farmers in India, pay-as-you-go solar electricity to Kenyans, and affordable housing and transportation to New Yorkers. It has helped governmental, commercial, and philanthropic resources meet the needs of the poor and underserved and build a more sustainable and inclusive prosperity. Capital and the Common Good shows how market failure in one context can be solved with market solutions from another: an expert in securitization bundles future development aid into bonds to pay for vaccines today; an entrepreneur turns a mobile phone into an array of financial services for the unbanked; and policy makers adapt pay-for-success models from the world of infrastructure to human services like early childhood education, maternal health, and job training. Revisiting the successes and missteps of these efforts, Georgia Levenson Keohane argues that innovative finance is as much about incentives and sound decision-making as it is about money. When it works, innovative finance gives us the tools, motivation, and security to invest in our shared future.

During the nineteenth century, Americans sought the cultural transformation and the physical displacement of American Indian nations. Native people resisted these efforts. Though this process is often understood as a clash of rival economic systems or racial ideologies, it was also a profound spiritual struggle. The conflict over Indian Country sparked crises for both Natives and Americans. In the end, the experience of intercultural encounter and conflict over land produced religious transformations on both sides. This book focuses on Kiowa Indians during Americans’ hundred-year effort to acquire, explore, and seize their homeland between 1803 and 1903. Kiowas had known struggle and dislocation before. But the forces bearing down on them in the form of soldiers, missionaries, and government representatives were unrelenting. Under increasing pressure, Kiowas adapted their rituals in the hopes of using sacred power more effectively. They drew on a wide range of sources and shifted significantly as circumstances demanded. With Indian Country under assault, Kiowas exercised creative improvisation to sustain their lands and people. Against Kiowas stood Protestants and Catholics who hoped to remake Indian Country. These activists asserted the primacy of white Christian civilization and the need to transform the lives of Native peoples. They also saw themselves as the Indian’s friend, teacher, and protector. But as Kiowas resisted their plans, these Christian representatives supported policies that broke treaties and appropriated Native lands. They argued that the benefits of Christianity and civilization outweighed the costs. In order to secure Indian Country and control indigenous populations, they sanctified the economic and racial hierarchies of their day.

This chapter analyzes existing U.S. Supreme Court case law with respect to, on the one hand, antitrust’s minimum resale price maintenance plans, bundling and tying practices, as well as refusals to deal, and, on the other hand, trademark law’s dilution, postsale, sponsorship, and initial interest confusion doctrines, including design patent and selected areas of copyright law. It demonstrates that courts, based on the free riding hypothesis, have come to protect increasing amounts of artificial shortage of everyday consumer goods and services and corresponding incentives to innovate. Through the preservation of such values, antitrust and intellectual property laws have evolved into “dilution laws” and have focused, almost exclusively, on the refurbishment of the technological supply side of our present-day digital economies rather than also on the human demand side of “creative consumption.”

Almost all Americans would be better off if none of the federal welfare-state policies of the last century—including Social Security—had ever been enacted. So argues economist Edgar Browning, and with good reason: In 1900, government played a very small role in the day-to-day activities of American citizens. There was no income tax. No Social Security. No federal welfare programs. No minimum wage laws. No federal involvement in education. Government was small, spending well under 10 percent of our incomes. But now, federal, state, and local governments spend more than 33 percent of our incomes. Why has government grown so much over the past century? The answer, in Browning's devastating critique of the modern welfare state, is simple: the rise of egalitarian ideology—an ideology that has not just harmed the economy but made us all poorer. This book examines all facets of the welfare state in the U.S. and its egalitarian underpinnings. Egalitarians claim, for instance, that markets are unfair and that we must have redistributive policies to produce social justice. This reasoning supposedly justifies the two-thirds of federal spending that simply robs Peter to pay Paul. We are stealing from each other. Browning's research and trenchant analysis show that: -Almost all U.S. citizens are harmed by the welfare state—even many of its apparent beneficiaries. -Welfare-state policies have large hidden costs which all told have reduced the average income of Americans by about 25 percent. -There is much less inequality and poverty than is commonly believed. -Most taxpayers will receive less back from Social Security than they put in. Provocative? Indeed. But such conclusions result from the most thoroughgoing economic analysis of the modern welfare state yet written. Written for a general audience,Stealing from Each Othercovers everything informed citizens need to know about inequality, poverty, welfare, Social Security, taxation, and the true costs of government redistributive policies.

This book details effective strategies for promoting a library beyond the building level in order to make an impact with the influential individuals who make the key decisions that directly affect the school district and library program. Make a Big Impact @ Your School Board Meeting was inspired by the authors' experiences speaking at local and national library conferences on the topic of making presentations to school boards and forging relationships with key administrators. It became clear that many librarians are unsure how to create a comprehensive marketing plan, and are simply too busy with their day-to-day tasks to tackle this daunting project. This book is written specifically for K–12 librarians in the field. It can also serve as an instructional tool for school library certification programs. It spotlights the importance of ongoing advocacy and leadership, teaches school librarians how to demonstrate the tremendous value of their library programs and how they directly impact student achievement, and showcases library-specific marketing techniques that can be used during good and poor economic times. By using the straightforward methods and tools provided, librarians will greatly improve their ability to avoid detrimental budget cuts to their programs.

It was the Era of Good Feelings, but all was not well with the young Republic. From 1825 to 1849, presidents John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, William Henry Harrison, John Tyler, and James K. Polk grappled with the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine, Indian removal, territorial expansion, the National Bank, tariffs, economic depressions, War with Mexico, near war with Great Britain, and the place of slavery in the growing nation. As one would expect from confident citizens of the burgeoning young country, conflicting arguments swirled around the hot-button issues of the day. This rich resource of primary documents enables students to read these arguments first hand, and feel the passions and study the logic driving their often forceful positions. All of the primary documents are annotated and placed into historical context. A thorough index concludes the work.

This chapter argues that the plots and characters of eighteenth-century English fiction can be illuminated by an awareness of property law and the customary disposition of property within families. That material greed as well as rivalries and competitions springing from even more primitive sources should be represented as occurring within families in the fiction of the day should surprise no one who has ever lived in a family. What is noteworthy are the excesses of innocence on the one hand and of rapaciousness on the other. One finds good characters who seek nothing for themselves and are generous to a fault, and bad characters whom nothing can touch but their ruthless desire for material wealth. Ultimately, in the fiction from 1750 to 1820, one can still read the human responses to material inequities that tore families apart and made them accomplices of an economic system that put property before family loyalty.

The book explains the politics of regionalism in South Asia from the vantagepoint of International Relations (IR). It engages three major IR theoretical approaches – Neorealism, institutionalism and constructivism - to explain the complex dynamics of South Asian regionalism – its origin, evolutionary process, outcome and effects. The study traces the origins and evolution of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) from its inception to the present day. Using comparative perspectives based on the experiences of similar regional organisations, the book provides an in-depth analysis of the performance of SAARC and its challenges and limits. The study divides the evolution of SAARC into two distinct phases. In the formative phase, the organisation primarily focussed on, based on the neo-functional idea of ‘spillover’ – low level issue areas for cooperation. In the second phase from 1993 onward, cooperation was initiated in the core economic areas, i.e. trade in goods and services, finance, investment etc. While the organisation achieved some tangible and intangible successes, its failures are more glaring. Terming the formation of SAARC essentially as a political project, the book argues that the patterns of regional international relations have primarily determined the outcome of regionalism in South Asia. While the socio-economic development constituted the key rationale for the formation of SAARC, its modus operandi was politico-strategic which led to its gradual erosion. Notwithstanding its limits, the book asserts that SAARC will have to be called back at a future date due to the persistence of the compelling rationale for which it was created.

Robots may one day rule the world, but what is a robot-ruled Earth like? Many think the first truly smart robots will be brain emulations or ems. Scan a human brain, then run a model with the same connections on a fast computer, and you have a robot brain, but recognizably human. Train an em to do some job and copy it a million times: an army of workers is at your disposal. When they can be made cheaply, within perhaps a century, ems will displace humans in most jobs. In this new economic era, the world economy may double in size every few weeks. Some say we can't know the future, especially following such a disruptive new technology, but Professor Robin Hanson sets out to prove them wrong. Applying decades of expertise in physics, computer science, and economics, he uses standard theories to paint a detailed picture of a world dominated by ems. While human lives don't change greatly in the em era, em lives are as different from ours as our lives are from those of our farmer and forager ancestors. Ems make us question common assumptions of moral progress, because they reject many of the values we hold dear. Read about em mind speeds, body sizes, job training and career paths, energy use and cooling infrastructure, virtual reality, aging and retirement, death and immortality, security, wealth inequality, religion, teleportation, identity, cities, politics, law, war, status, friendship and love. This book shows you just how strange your descendants may be, though ems are no stranger than we would appear to our ancestors. To most ems, it seems good to be an em.

A definitive contemporary political, economic, and cultural history from a leading international expert, this is the first single-volume work to survey and analyze Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian history since 1953 as the basis for understanding the nation today. Ukraine dominated international headlines as the Euromaidan protests engulfed Ukraine in 2013–2014 and Russia invaded the Crimea and the Donbas, igniting a new Cold War. Written from an insider's perspective by the leading expert on Ukraine, this book analyzes key domestic and external developments and provides an understanding as to why the nation's future is central to European security. In contrast with traditional books that survey a millennium of Ukrainian history, author Taras Kuzio provides a contemporary perspective that integrates the late Soviet and post-Soviet eras. The book begins in 1953 when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin died during the Cold War and carries the story to the present day, showing the roots of a complicated transition from communism and the weight of history on its relations with Russia. It then goes on to examine in depth key aspects of Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian politics; the drive to independence, Orange Revolution, and Euromaidan protests; national identity; regionalism and separatism; economics; oligarchs; rule of law and corruption; and foreign and military policies. Moving away from a traditional dichotomy of "good pro-Western" and "bad pro-Russian" politicians, this volume presents an original framework for understanding Ukraine's history as a series of historic cycles that represent a competition between mutually exclusive and multiple identities. Regionally diverse contemporary Ukraine is an outgrowth of multiple historical Austrian-Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and especially Soviet legacies, and the book succinctly integrates these influences with post-Soviet Ukraine, determining the manner in which political and business elites and everyday Ukrainians think, act, operate, and relate to the outside world.

On March 11, 2011, a massive undersea earthquake off Japan's coast triggered devastating tsunami waves that in turn caused meltdowns at three reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Ranked with Chernobyl as the worst nuclear disaster in history, Fukushima will have lasting consequences for generations. Until 3.11, Japan's Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, had supported the use of nuclear power. His position would undergo a radical change, however, as Kan watched the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 Power Plant unfold and came to understand the potential for the physical, economic, and political destruction of Japan. This book offers a fascinating day-by-day account of the Prime Minister's actions in the harrowing week after the earthquake struck. He records the anguished decisions he had to make as the scale of destruction became clear and the threat of nuclear catastrophe loomed ever larger—decisions made on the basis of information that was often unreliable. For example, frustrated by the lack of clarity from the executives at Tepco, the company that owned the power plant, Kan decided to visit Fukushima himself, despite the risks, so he could talk to the plant's manager and find out what was really happening on the ground. As the text details, a combination of extremely good fortune and hard work just barely prevented a total meltdown of all of Fukushima's reactor units, which would have necessitated the evacuation of the thirty million residents of the greater Tokyo metropolitan area.

A compelling explanation of how conservatism is no longer what its founders intended and how it has been transformed into a tool of materialist economics and emptied of much of its original meaning. During America’s 19th-century Gilded Age, free-enterprise capitalist ideas distorted and deeply obscured traditional political conservatism. Conservatism today, argues distinguished historian Mario R. DiNunzio, is a grotesque version of the ideology crafted by its founders, including John Adams in America and Edmund Burke in England. This compelling book provides a survey of conservative thought and its transformation that originated in the late 19th century, exposing the influence of that transformed conservatism on 20th-century American politics—from Hoover to Goldwater to Reagan and on to the Tea Party. It explains the historical foundations of conservative thought and the radical transformation of conservatism into a vastly different ideology primarily concerned with the defense of unfettered capitalism and extreme rights of individuals, as opposed to the values of traditional conservatism: community, good order, tempered change, and enduring values. DiNunzio challenges conservatives and scholars of conservatism to confront the differences between what passes for conservatism in modern-day American politics and the tenets of the original conservative tradition.

This book advances the theory that a potential leading export sector—in this case, the oil sector—is capable of inducing economic growth even in peripheral countries where the product line is primary in nature. In Venezuela the oil sector has contributed directly and indirectly to the development of the country’s overall economy, particularly from 1936 to 1973, when that sector met the criteria of a leading sector, i.e., one that expands rapidly and obtains a large specific size relative to the economy as a whole. Oil investment in Venezuela contributed to the fiscal sector, the foreign sector, GDP, income, backward and forward linkages, the multiplier and accelerator effects, and the retained value of total expenditures. In spite of recent efforts to diversify the production and export mix, the Venezuelan economy continues to remain heavily dependent on oil production for export. During the midcentury decades of solid growth, it became evident that government oversight was needed to ensure that the numerous contributions flowing from the oil sector would be put to good use. Overall, it appears that the contributions were well utilized by the Venezuelan government, although there was plenty of room for improvement. Income distribution problems and other social inequities continued to beset the development process, leaving the economy rigid and inflexible. Consequently, when the oil sector faltered (1974 to 2000), Venezuela was unable to shift into other product lines. Political disarray soon followed, and with it a pervasive aura of economic uncertainty that persists to this day.

During most of the twentieth century, the production of America’s consumer culture was centralized in New York to an extent unparalleled in the history of the modern United States. Within a few square miles were the headquarters of broadcast networks like NBC and CBS, the editorial offices of book and magazine publishers, major newspapers, and advertising and design agencies. Every day tens of thousands of writers, editors, artists, performers, technicians, secretaries, and other white-collar workers made advertisements, produced media content, and enhanced the appearance of goods in order to boost sales. While this center of creativity has often been portrayed as a smoothly running machine, within these offices many white-collar workers challenged the managers and executives who directed their labor. This book examines these workers and New York’s culture industries throughout the twentieth century. As manufacturers and retailers competed to attract consumers’ attention, their advertising expenditures financed the growth of enterprises engaged in the production of culture. With the shock of the Great Depression, employees in these firms organized unions to improve their working conditions; launched alternative media and cultural endeavors supported by public, labor, or cooperative patronage; and fought in other ways to expand their creative autonomy. As blacklisting and attacks on unions undermined these efforts after the Second World War, workers in advertising, design, publishing, and broadcasting found themselves constrained in their ability to respond to economic dislocations and to combat discrimination on the basis of gender and race in these fields of cultural production.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.