Inhaltsverzeichnis
Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Disclosure of Negative Information“
Geben Sie eine Quelle nach APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard und anderen Zitierweisen an
Machen Sie sich mit den Listen der aktuellen Artikel, Bücher, Dissertationen, Berichten und anderer wissenschaftlichen Quellen zum Thema "Disclosure of Negative Information" bekannt.
Neben jedem Werk im Literaturverzeichnis ist die Option "Zur Bibliographie hinzufügen" verfügbar. Nutzen Sie sie, wird Ihre bibliographische Angabe des gewählten Werkes nach der nötigen Zitierweise (APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver usw.) automatisch gestaltet.
Sie können auch den vollen Text der wissenschaftlichen Publikation im PDF-Format herunterladen und eine Online-Annotation der Arbeit lesen, wenn die relevanten Parameter in den Metadaten verfügbar sind.
Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Disclosure of Negative Information"
Lee, Eric Y., und John R. Busenbark. „When Do Managers Disclose Negative Information? A Voluntary Disclosure Theory Perspective“. Academy of Management Proceedings 2018, Nr. 1 (August 2018): 15427. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2018.15427abstract.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAl-Jabri, Ibrahim M., Mustafa I. Eid und Amer Abed. „The willingness to disclose personal information“. Information & Computer Security 28, Nr. 2 (26.08.2019): 161–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ics-01-2018-0012.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleElgammal, Mohammed M., Khaled Hussainey und Fatma Ahmed. „Corporate governance and voluntary risk and forward-looking disclosures“. Journal of Applied Accounting Research 19, Nr. 4 (12.11.2018): 592–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jaar-01-2017-0014.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleNasser A., Alharbi Nesreen, und Yanhui Li. „Impacts of Trust in Government and Privacy Risk Concern on Willingness to Provide Personal Information in Saudi Arabia“. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 6, Nr. 2 (2020): 7–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.18775/ijmsba.1849-5664-5419.2014.62.1001.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFilzen, Joshua J. „The Information Content of Risk Factor Disclosures in Quarterly Reports“. Accounting Horizons 29, Nr. 4 (01.06.2015): 887–916. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-51175.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSuper, Sagin Oghenekowhodo, und Nikhil Chandra Shil. „Determinants of Quality Accounting Information Disclosure“. Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies 3, Nr. 1 (30.06.2017): 79–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.26710/jafee.v3i1.94.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBertomeu, Jeremy, Anne Beyer und Ronald A. Dye. „Capital Structure, Cost of Capital, and Voluntary Disclosures“. Accounting Review 86, Nr. 3 (01.05.2011): 857–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.00000037.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleShin, Hoyoung, und Hyunmin Oh. „The Effect Of Accruals Quality On The Association Between Voluntary Disclosure And Information Asymmetry In Korea“. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 33, Nr. 1 (29.12.2016): 223–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v33i1.9892.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKim, Bitna, Kyung-Shik Shin und Sangmi Chai. „How People Disclose Themselves Differently According To The Strength Of Relationship In SNS?“ Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 31, Nr. 6 (28.10.2015): 2139. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v31i6.9472.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleEkundayo, Gbenga, Ndubuisi Jeffery Jamani und Festus Odhigu. „Environmental Disclosure Modelling in a Developing Economy: Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Double Hurdle Regression Approach“. International Journal of Financial Research 12, Nr. 4 (18.03.2021): 111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v12n4p111.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDissertationen zum Thema "Disclosure of Negative Information"
Goncharenko, Roman, Juraj Hledik und Roberto Pinto. „The dark side of stress tests: Negative effects of information disclosure“. Elsevier, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2018.05.003.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAktar, Ipek. „Voluntary disclosure of negative information in corporate communication: Can companies benefit from disclosing their ethical infractions?“ Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/31883.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLa siguiente tesis se basa en la literatura sobre comunicación de responsabilidad social corporativa (RSC) de empresa. Se analizan los posibles efectos de divulgación voluntaria de información negativa en la comunicación (RSC) en contextos de empresas farmacéuticas, textiles y de chocolate. Estos estudios tienen como objetivo ayudar a identificar soluciones efectivas a cuestiones éticas al revelar los contextos donde las empresas puedan debatir de manera transparente, y ser recompensadas por responder y actuar de buena fe y con diligencia. Los resultados sugieren que las empresas pueden beneficiarse de la divulgación voluntaria de aspectos éticos negativos si también divulgan sus acciones específicas para la eliminación de tales infracciones. Además, se destaca el papel de la sensibilización del público sobre como la información negativa se evalúa por las partes interesadas. Estos estudios refuerzan la idea de que reconocer problemas éticos conduce a niveles más altos de comportamiento ético en el mundo empresarial.
Fejes, Sara, und Aleksandra Nikolova. „Avslöjandet av negativ information i förhållande till företagsspecifika faktorer : En kvantitativ innehållsanalys på statligt ägda bolag i Sverige“. Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för samhällsvetenskaper, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-45946.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSince 2007, State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) must produce sustainability reports in accordance with GRI or another international framework. This is to increase the companies' transparency for its’ stakeholders and society. In the state's ownership policy, it is of great importance for the companies to appear transparent, which means that both positive and negative information must be included in the sustainability reports. The purpose of this study has been to investigate the extent to which Swedish State-Owned Enterprises report negative information and which company-specific factors can affect negative disclosures. The theoretical framework that has been used to explain this phenomenon is Stakeholder Theory, Legitimacy Theory, Consumer Skepticism and Two-Sided CSR. The methodological approach is based on a content analysis which was further analyzed with the support of correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis to find connections between the study variables. The results showed that State-Owned Enterprises report negative information to a greater extent in Social Aspects, where the Environmental Aspects came closely behind. The study states that the company-specific factor Number of pages could demonstrate a statistical significance to the disclosure of negative information.
Guraieb, Duenas Marlene. „Information, Disclosure, and Accountability“. Thesis, New York University, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10618922.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDemocratic regimes have developed numerous institutions to enhance accountability through procedures that formally and informally probe public officials’ actions. The ongoing expansion of public evidence available to citizens has strengthened their ability to judge the performance of public officials. However, this increase in “investigative power” cannot be analyzed without regard for the structural cost of searching, sorting, and putting information to work to adjudicate open inquiries. Political accountability is tested in increasingly more sophisticated strategic settings where the principal's success in scrutinizing the agents depends both on the evidence made available and on the effort expended on investigation.
This work analyzes some of the main mechanisms that underlie these institutions. In chapter 2, I develop a model of endogenous information acquisition where politicians can choose how much evidence to disclose after taking a suspicious action. The model focuses on the effects of the open-ended nature of political investigations – they may uncover misdeeds related or unrelated to the event that triggered them – and sheds light on the previously unexplained nature of cover-up in political settings, including the presence of incentives for good incumbents to withhold as much information as possible from the investigative bodies. Chapter 3 studies the behavioral plausibility of these findings in a laboratory setting.
Chapter 4 is focused more on informal probing institutions, such as the continuous scrutiny of politicians through and by the media. The model explicitly differentiates between the quality of information (linked to the likelihood of producing dispositive results) and the cost associated with processing this information (linked to the resources needed to put it to use). One of the main results of this analysis is that citizens of democracies with lower cost of information may optimally choose to be less informed.
Nath, Atanu. „The determinants of online information disclosure“. Licentiate thesis, Luleå, 2005. http://epubl.luth.se/1402-1757/2005/91.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleNakamura, Tomoya. „Essays on economics of information disclosure“. Kyoto University, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/142154.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleTakusagawa, Ken 1978. „Negative information for motif discovery“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87900.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAbed, Suzan. „Disclosure of forward-looking information : UK evidence“. Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2010. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=158300.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAbdul, Rahman Azhar Bin. „Disclosure of corporate financial information in Malaysia“. Thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/10443/168.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleQuigley, Daniel Hugh. „Essays in the economics of information disclosure“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648766.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBücher zum Thema "Disclosure of Negative Information"
O'Reilly, James T. Federal information disclosure. 3. Aufl. [St. Paul]: West Group, 2000.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenO'Reilly, James T. Federal information disclosure. 2. Aufl. [St. Paul, Minn.]: West Group, 1990.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenJōhō kōkaihō jōhō kōkai jōrei: Information disclosure law and information disclosure ordinances. Tōkyō: Yūhikaku, 2001.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenGroote, X. de. Information disclosure and technology choice. Fontainebleau, France: INSEAD, 1992.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBank, Asian Development. Confidentiality and disclosure of information. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2000.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenDivision, United States General Accounting Office General Government. Information on states' lobbying disclosure requirements. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1997.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBoard, Financial Accounting Standards. Disclosure of information about capital structure. Norwalk, Conn: FASB, 1997.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenCross, John A. Flood hazard information disclosure by realtors. (Boulder (Colo.)): (University of Colorado), 1985.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenCrosby, Rachel T. Improving real property tax information disclosure. Albany, N.Y. (16 Sheridan Ave., Albany 12210-2714): State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 1993.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenParliament, Great Britain. Television Licences (Disclosure of Information) Bill. London: Stationery Office, 2000.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBuchteile zum Thema "Disclosure of Negative Information"
Pajarinen, Mika. „Information Disclosure“. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1–3. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_253-1.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePajarinen, Mika. „Information Disclosure“. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1–3. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_253-2.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePajarinen, Mika. „Information Disclosure“. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1143–45. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_253.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBenson, Edward. „Disclosure of Information“. In The Law of Industrial Conflict, 111–26. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08802-7_9.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAudet, Cristelle. „Negative Consequences of Self-Disclosure: A Result of the Practitioner and Not the Technique“. In Therapist Self-Disclosure, 205–12. New York, NY : Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203730713-26.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMallesh, Nayantara, und Matthew Wright. „The Reverse Statistical Disclosure Attack“. In Information Hiding, 221–34. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16435-4_17.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKadomatsu, Narufumi, und Joel Rheuben. „Japanese Information Disclosure Law“. In The Right of Access to Public Information, 449–83. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55554-5_12.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleArmando, Alessandro, Michele Bezzi, Nadia Metoui und Antonino Sabetta. „Risk-Aware Information Disclosure“. In Data Privacy Management, Autonomous Spontaneous Security, and Security Assurance, 266–76. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17016-9_17.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleGevers, Steven, und Bart De Decker. „Privacy Friendly Information Disclosure“. In On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems 2006: OTM 2006 Workshops, 636–46. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11915034_87.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBöttcher, Stefan, und Rita Steinmetz. „Information Disclosure by XPath Queries“. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 160–74. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11844662_12.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKonferenzberichte zum Thema "Disclosure of Negative Information"
Chandak, Sheetal, Snehamoy Dhar und S. K. Barik. „Islanding disclosure for grid interactive PV-VSC system using negative sequence voltage“. In 2015 IEEE Power, Communication and Information Technology Conference (PCITC). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pcitc.2015.7438216.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleA. Buzzetto-More, Nicole, Robert Johnson und Muna Elobaid. „Communicating and Sharing in the Semantic Web: An Examination of Social Media Risks, Consequences, and Attitudinal Awareness“. In InSITE 2015: Informing Science + IT Education Conferences: USA. Informing Science Institute, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.28945/2150.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAligaeva, N. N. „Selg-regulation of aggressive behavior of convicted persons with disabilities“. In INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL ONLINE CONFERENCE. Знание-М, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.38006/907345-50-8.2020.768.776.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleChang, Daphne, Erin L. Krupka, Eytan Adar und Alessandro Acquisti. „Engineering Information Disclosure“. In CHI'16: CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858346.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMakovkina, Elizaveta, und Zinaida Nesterova. „The Privacy Paradox and Social Media: Why Users Disclose Their Personal Data“. In The Public/Private in Modern Civilization, the 22nd Russian Scientific-Practical Conference (with international participation) (Yekaterinburg, April 16-17, 2020). Liberal Arts University – University for Humanities, Yekaterinburg, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.35853/ufh-public/private-2020-63.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMozafari, Nika, Welf H. Weiger und Maik Hammerschmidt. „Resolving the Chatbot Disclosure Dilemma: Leveraging Selective Self-Presentation to Mitigate the Negative Effect of Chatbot Disclosure“. In Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2021.355.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSayin, Muhammed O., und Tamer Basar. „Dynamic Information Disclosure for Deception*“. In 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2018.8619281.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLi, Huiyun, Jing Shi und Shaoyan Fu. „Institutional investors and information disclosure“. In 2018 International Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3226116.3226139.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCheng Ming-e. „Research on environmental information disclosure“. In 2010 2nd International Conference on Information Science and Engineering (ICISE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icise.2010.5689201.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleZhang, Lei, Sushil Jajodia und Alexander Brodsky. „Information disclosure under realistic assumptions“. In the 14th ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1315245.1315316.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBerichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Disclosure of Negative Information"
Martin, Fernando M., und David Andolfatto. Information Disclosure and Exchange Media. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2012.012.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBae, Hyunhoe, Peter Wilcoxen und David Popp. Information Disclosure Policy: Do States' Data Processing Efforts Help More than the Information Disclosure Itself? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Oktober 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14409.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleOstrovsky, Michael, und Michael Schwarz. Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Januar 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13766.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFaria-e-Castro, Miguel, Joseba Martinez und Thomas Philippon. Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Mai 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21201.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleGomes, Armando, Gary Gorton und Leonardo Madureira. SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information, and the Cost of Capital. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Juni 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10567.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleStiglitz, Joseph, Jungyoll Yun und Andrew Kosenko. Bilateral Information Disclosure in Adverse Selection Markets with Nonexclusive Competition. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27041.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleZivin, Joshua Graff, und Matthew Neidell. Days of Haze: Environmental Information Disclosure and Intertemporal Avoidance Behavior. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14271.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleJung, Sojin, Hyeon Jeong Cho und Byoungho Jin. Price Fairness and Brand Credibility by Effective Disclosure of Cost Information. Ames: Iowa State University, Digital Repository, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.31274/itaa_proceedings-180814-1858.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHotz, V. Joseph, und Mo Xiao. Strategic Information Disclosure: The Case of Multi-Attribute Products with Heterogeneous Consumers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Januar 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11937.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAoki, Reiko, und Thomas Prusa. Product Development and the Timing of Information Disclosure under U.S.and Japanese Patent Systems. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, März 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5063.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle