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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Desire“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 9. November 2024

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1

LEITE, ADAM. „Second-Personal Desire“. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, Nr. 4 (2016): 597–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.2.

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ABSTRACT:This paper concerns desires with a distinctive interpersonal structure. ‘Second-personal desire’ seeks something of or from a particular person who is the irreplaceable, intrinsic object of the desire by virtue of his or her significance to the desirer as a participant in an interpersonal relationship in which what is desired carries interpersonal significance. Such desires involve a wish that the other person will experience one's desire as a reason in a way that involves positive interpersonally directed emotional responsiveness to one's desire. Second-personal desire thus renders one vulnerable to distinctive forms of disappointment and to the possibility that the other person is neither positively motivated by, nor positively emotionally responsive to, the possibility of such disappointment. A distinctive form of positive emotional regard is thus always at issue in second-personal desire. This form of regard is not always owed, despite our craving for it—a fact that considerably complicates interpersonal interaction. The paper concludes with an argument that the participant reactive attitudes cannot be understood without the notion of second-personal desire and that second-personal desire is consequently crucial for an adequate understanding of the normative structure of interpersonal interaction.

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2

Cirio, Phoebe A. „Desire and Being Desired“. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 61, Nr. 1 (Februar 2013): 135–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003065112470561.

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3

Braun, David. „Desiring, desires, and desire ascriptions“. Philosophical Studies 172, Nr. 1 (28.01.2014): 141–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0281-4.

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4

Schierbaum, Sonja. „Crusius über die Vernünftigkeit des Wollens und die Rolle des Urteilens“. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 69, Nr. 4 (01.08.2021): 607–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2021-0051.

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Abstract In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius’s conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius’s distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius’s conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper.

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Ostojić, Ljerka, Edward W. Legg, Rachael C. Shaw, Lucy G. Cheke, Michael Mendl und Nicola S. Clayton. „Can male Eurasian jays disengage from their own current desire to feed the female what she wants?“ Biology Letters 10, Nr. 3 (März 2014): 20140042. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2014.0042.

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Humans' predictions of another person's behaviour are regularly influenced by what they themselves might know or want. In a previous study, we found that male Eurasian jays ( Garrulus glandarius ) could cater for their female partner's current desire when sharing food with her. Here, we tested the extent to which the males' decisions are influenced by their own current desire. When the males' and female's desires matched, males correctly shared the food that was desired by both. When the female's desire differed from their own, the males' decisions were not entirely driven by their own desires, suggesting that males also took the female's desire into account. Thus, the male jays' decisions about their mates' desires are partially biased by their own desire and might be based upon similar processes as those found in humans.

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Fredericks, Rachel. „When Wanting the Best Is Bad“. Social Theory and Practice 44, Nr. 1 (2018): 95–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201821332.

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Here I call attention to a class of desires that I call exclusionary desires. To have an exclusionary desire is to desire something under a description such that, were the desire satisfied, it would be logically impossible for people other than the desiring subject to possess the desired object. Assuming that we are morally responsible for our desires insofar as and because they reflect our evaluative judgments and are in principle subject to rational revision, I argue that we should, morally speaking, alter both social structures and our individual psychologies to minimize, or at least substantially reduce, exclusionary desires.

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Superson, Anita M. „Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests“. Hypatia 20, Nr. 4 (2000): 109–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hyp.2005.0134.

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8

Superson, Anita. „Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests“. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 20, Nr. 4 (Oktober 2005): 109–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/hyp.2005.20.4.109.

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Superson, Anita. „Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests“. Hypatia 20, Nr. 4 (2005): 109–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2005.tb00539.x.

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The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.

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Newark, Daniel A. „Desire and pleasure in choice“. Rationality and Society 32, Nr. 2 (Mai 2020): 168–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463120921254.

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This article considers how desire leads to pleasure through choice. A typical assumption of rational choice models is that decision makers experience pleasure or utility primarily when their desires are satisfied by decision outcomes. This article proposes that, in addition to desire yielding pleasure through its satisfaction, desiring can also yield pleasure directly during choice. Beyond the pleasures of getting what we want, there may be pleasures in the wanting. In particular, four psychological and behavioral mechanisms through which desire can yield pleasure during choosing are identified: imagining the desired object, learning about the desired object, constructing one’s self while clarifying the desired object, and pursuing the desired object. This said, although desire may, through these mechanisms, offer considerable immediate pleasure, this article posits that indulging these pleasures tends to foster subsequent disappointment with decision outcomes. The article concludes by considering the implications for decision making of this expanded view of desire’s relationship to pleasure in choice.

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Goldman, Alan H. „Desire Based Reasons and Reasons for Desires“. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44, Nr. 3 (September 2006): 469–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00014.x.

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12

Bruckner, Donald. „Quirky Desires and Well-Being“. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10, Nr. 2 (07.06.2017): 1–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/rejgre98.

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According to a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, the satisfaction of one’s desires is what promotes one’s well-being. Against this, it is frequently objected that some desires are beyond the pale of well-being relevance, for example: the desire to count blades of grass, the desire to collect dryer lint and the desire to make handwritten copies of War and Peace, to name a few. I argue that the satisfaction of such desires – I call them “quirky” desires – does indeed contribute to a desirer’s well-being, when (and only when) the desirer is able to provide what Anscombe calls a desirability characterization of the object of the desire. One successfully provides such a characterization when one is able to describe the object of desire in such a way as to make comprehensible to others what she sees as positive, worthy of pursuit, in that object. To make the case, I consider common desires such as the desires to take a walk on the beach, drink a beer or listen to music. I argue that, although the well-being relevance of such common desires normally is not questioned, their satisfactions contribute to well-being just in case the same condition is met. I then argue by analogy with common desires that quirky desires are also relevant to well-being just in case that condition is met. After sketching this solution to the problem of quirky desires, I show that this response is better than other responses that have been given by desire theorists. I then develop several aspects of this account in response to objections that can be raised against it. Among these (to name a few) are the objection that my account does not apply to the well-being of infants and other inarticulate persons; the objection that intrinsic desires, such as for pleasure, cannot be given desirability characterizations; and the objection that desirability characterizations must advert to pleasure or to objectively good properties of the object of desire, so that my account reduces either to hedonism or to an objective view of well-being.

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Sinhababu, Neil. „The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality“. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6, Nr. 1 (05.06.2017): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i1.58.

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Christine Korsgaard has argued that Humean views about action and practical rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action. According to the Humean theory of action, agents do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. According to the Humean theory of rationality, it is rational for agents to do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. Thus Humeans are committed to the impossibility of practical irrationality – an unacceptable consequence. I respond by developing Humean views to explain how we can act irrationally. Humeans about action should consider the immediate motivational forces produced by an agent's desires. Humeans about rationality should consider the agent's dispositional desire strengths. When (for example) vivid sensory or imaginative experiences of desired things cause some of our desires to produce motivational force disproportional to their dispositional strength, we may act in ways that do not maximize expected desire-satisfaction, thus acting irrationally. I argue that this way of developing Humean views is true to the best reasons for holding them.

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Lukas, Mark. „Desire Satisfactionism and the Problem of Irrelevant Desires“. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4, Nr. 2 (05.06.2017): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v4i2.42.

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Desire-satisfaction theories about welfare come in two main varieties: unrestricted and restricted. Both varieties hold that a person's welfare is determined entirely by the satisfactions and frustrations of his desires. But while the restricted theories count only some of a person’s desires as relevant to his well-being, the unrestricted theories count all of his desires as relevant. Because unrestricted theories count all desires as relevant they are vulnerable to a wide variety of counterexamples involving desires that seem obviously irrelevant. Derek Parfit offers a well-known example involving a stranger afflicted with what seems to be a fatal disease. Similar examples are offered by Thomas Scanlon, James Griffin, Shelly Kagan, and others. In this paper I defend a simple unrestricted desire-based theory of welfare from the claim that some of our desires are irrelevant to how well our lives go. I begin by introducing the theory I aim to defend. I then formulate the Irrelevant-Desires Problem and reject a few rationales for its key premise. I then consider and reject a few flawed responses to the problem. I finally offer an obvious but widely overlooked response: I bite the bullet. My overall goal is to dissuade those sympathetic to a desire-based approach to welfare from rejecting unrestricted forms of desire satisfactionism simply because some desires may seem irrelevant to how well our lives go.

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Düringer, Eva-Maria. „Desires and Fiction“. Journal of Literary Theory 12, Nr. 2 (03.09.2018): 241–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2018-0014.

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Abstract It is often claimed that we cannot desire fictional states of affairs when we are aware of the fact that we cannot interact with fictional worlds. But the experiences we have when we read an engaging novel, watch a horror film or listen to a gripping story are certainly very similar to desires: we hope that the lovers get together, we want the criminal to get caught, we long for the hero to make his fortune. My goal in this paper is to outline the reasons why we might find it difficult to call these experiences genuine desires and to argue that they are not good reasons. In the second section I look at three reasons in particular: first, the reason that, if we genuinely desired fictional outcomes, we would act in silly or dangerous ways; second, the reason that, if we genuinely desired fictional outcomes, we would change plot lines if we had the chance, which in fact, however, we would not; and third, the reason that, if we genuinely desired fictional outcomes, we would not think it impossible to interact with fictional worlds, which, however, we do. I will dismiss the first two reasons right away: depending on how we interpret the first reason, either it does not have much weight at all, because we have many desires we never act on, or it rests on a functionalist definition of desires that wrongly takes it to be the functional role of desires to bring about action. I will dismiss the second reason by arguing that, if we desire a particular fictional outcome that we could bring about by changing the plot line, whether or not we would do it turns on our assessment of the cost of interference; and this, in turn, depends on the perceived quality of the literature. There is nothing that speaks against taking both the desire for a particular fictional outcome and the desire for a work of literature to remain what it is as genuine desires. I turn to possible ways of dealing with the third and strongest reason in the third section. The claim that, if I desire that p, I must not think that there is nothing I could possibly do to bring it about that p, is plausible. And of course, I do think that there is nothing I could possibly do to bring about a fictional state of affairs. I will argue that there are three possible ways of dealing with this problem. The first is to point to partners in crime such as the desire that one is reunited with a loved one who has recently passed away. I take these to be genuine and ordinary desires, even though they are accompanied by thoughts, indeed agonising thoughts, that there is nothing we could possibly do to bring about the desired end. Secondly, I will look at Maria Alvarez’s recent account of desires as multi-track dispositions. Alvarez claims that desires are dispositions not only to actions, but also to certain thoughts, feelings, and expressive behaviours and that they need to have had at least one manifestation in order to exist. Modifying this view a little, I argue that desires need to have manifested at least once in action preparations and show how, on this picture, the thought that I can do nothing to bring about the desired end is not in unbearable tension with the existence of the desire. Finally, I will point to the distinction between physical and metaphysical possibility and argue that, even if we accept the claim that a mental attitude cannot be a desire if it is accompanied by the thought that there is nothing one could possibly do to bring about the desired end, then this is only a problem for desires about fictional states of affairs if we think that metaphysical possibility is at play. However, there is no problem for desires about fictional states of affairs if they are accompanied by thoughts about the physical impossibility of bringing them about. I begin the paper by describing in the first section how desires enter into the controversies surrounding the classic Paradox of Fiction, which is the puzzle about whether and how we can have emotions about fictional characters, and by providing some examples designed to feed the intuition that we do, indeed, have genuine desires about fictional states of affairs.

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Haigh, Matthew, und Jean-François Bonnefon. „Eye Movements Reveal How Readers Infer Intentions From the Beliefs and Desires of Others“. Experimental Psychology 62, Nr. 3 (07.05.2015): 206–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000290.

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We examine how the beliefs and desires of a protagonist are used by readers to predict their intentions as a narrative vignette unfolds. Eye movement measures revealed that readers rapidly inferred an intention when the protagonist desired an outcome, even when this inference was not licensed by the protagonist’s belief state. Reading was immediately disrupted when participants encountered a described action that contradicted this inference. During intermediate processing, desire inferences were moderated by the protagonist’s belief state. Effects that emerged later in the text were again driven solely by the protagonist’s desires. These data suggest that desire-based inferences are initially drawn irrespective of belief state, but are then quickly inhibited if not licensed by relevant beliefs. This inhibition of desire-based inferences may be an effortful process as it was not systematically sustained in later steps of processing.

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17

Ellis, Fiona. „Insatiable Desire“. Philosophy 88, Nr. 2 (25.03.2013): 243–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819113000041.

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Last night I had a desire for a glass of wine. Luckily I had a bottle in the fridge and could satisfy my desire. Earlier in the day I had a desire to run on the heath and I satisfied this desire too. And today, tired of reading yet more stuff on desire, I satisfied my desire to start writing. So desires can be satisfied. Not that they are guaranteed to be satisfied – the bottle in my fridge might have failed to materialize, and something might have prevented me from going for a run or getting down to writing – but that they can be satisfied. Witness C.S. Lewis: Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for those desires exists. A baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food. A duckling wants to swim: well, there is such a thing as water. Men feel sexual desire: well, there is such a thing as sex.

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Mkwashapi, Denna, Jim Todd, Michael Mahande, John Changalucha, Mark Urassa, Milly Marston und Jenny Renju. „No association between fertility desire and HIV infections among men and women: Findings from community-based studies before and after implementation of an early antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation program in the rural district of North-western Tanzania“. Open Research Africa 5 (14.09.2022): 30. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openresafrica.13432.1.

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Background: Fertility is associated with the desire to have children. The impacts of HIV and antiretroviral therapy (ART) on fertility are well known, but their impacts on the desire for children are less well known in Tanzania. We used data from two studies carried out at different periods of ART coverage in rural Tanzania to explore the relationship between HIV infection and fertility desires in men and women. Methods: We conducted secondary data analysis of the two community-based studies conducted in 2012 and 2017 in the Magu Health and Demographic system site, in Tanzania. Information on fertility desires, HIV status, and social–economic and demographic variables were analyzed. Fertility desire was defined as whether or not the participant wanted to bear a child in the next two years. The main analysis used log-binomial regression to assess the association between fertility desire and HIV infection. Results: In the 2012 study, 43% (95% CI 40.7-45.3) of men and 33.3% (95% CI 31.8 - 35.0) women wanted another child in the next two years. In 2017 the percentage rose to 55.7% (95% CI 53.6 - 57.8) in men and 41.5% (95% CI 39.8 - 43.1) in women. Although fertility desire in men and women were higher in HIV uninfected compared to HIV infected, age-adjusted analysis did not show a statistical significance difference in both studies (2012: PR=1.02, 95%CI 0.835 - 1.174, p<0.915 and 2017: PR = 0.90 95%CI 0.743 - 1.084 p= 0.262). Discussion: One-third of women and forty percent of men desired for fertility in 2012, while forty percent of women and nearly half of men desired for fertility in 2017. The data showed fertility desire, in 2012 and 2017 were not related to HIV infection in both periods of ART coverage.

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Mani, Preetha. „Feminine Desire Is Human Desire“. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 36, Nr. 1 (2016): 21–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-3482087.

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Cheng, Shaozhe, Minglu Zhao, Ning Tang, Yang Zhao, Jifan Zhou, Mowei Shen und Tao Gao. „Intention beyond desire: Spontaneous intentional commitment regulates conflicting desires“. Cognition 238 (September 2023): 105513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105513.

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Ulya, Afriani, und Pujiharto Pujiharto. „HASRAT PENGARANG DALAM NOVEL A THOUSAND SPLENDID SUNS: PERSPEKTIF LACANIAN“. ATAVISME 21, Nr. 2 (24.12.2018): 133–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.24257/atavisme.v21i2.475.133-149.

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This study reveals the author's desire in Khaled Hosseini's A Thousand Splendid Suns, which represents the author's desires as a subject who lacks and desires to obtain identity. This study will answer two questions: (1) How does Khaled Hosseini's desire manifested in A Thousand Splendid Suns; (2) What is Khaled Hosseini’s "desire-to-be" and "desire-to-have" that manifested in A Thousand Splendid Suns. This study was conducted using theory and method of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacanian psychoanalysis discusses human desire through language (signifier) with metaphor and metonymy mechanisms. The results prove that A Thousand Splendid Suns is a manifestation of desires and lack that exist in Khaled Hosseini as the author through desire to exist (narcissistic) and desire to possess (anaclitic)

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Shaw, Ashley. „Desire and Satisfaction“. Philosophical Quarterly 70, Nr. 279 (03.10.2019): 371–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz068.

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Abstract Desire satisfaction has not received detailed philosophical examination. Yet intuitive judgments about the satisfaction of desires have been used as data points guiding theories of desire, desire content, and the semantics of ‘desire’. This paper examines desire satisfaction and the standard propositional view of desire. Firstly, I argue that there are several distinct concepts of satisfaction. Secondly, I argue that separating them defuses a difficulty for the standard view in accommodating desires that Derek Parfit described as ‘implicitly conditional on their own persistence’, a problem posed by Shieva Kleinschmidt, Kris McDaniel, and Ben Bradley. The solution undercuts a key motivation for rejecting the standard view in favour of more radical accounts proposed in the literature.

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Riggs, Ninal E. „Desire“. Antioch Review 62, Nr. 2 (2004): 322. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4614649.

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Kim, Nancy Jooyoun. „Desire“. Amerasia Journal 27, Nr. 2 (Januar 2001): 135–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.17953/amer.27.2.apg0364757473326.

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Zhu, Yifan, Lu Chen, Yunjun Gao, Baihua Zheng und Pengfei Wang. „DESIRE“. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment 15, Nr. 10 (Juni 2022): 2121–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.14778/3547305.3547317.

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Similarity search finds similar objects for a given query object based on a certain similarity metric. Similarity search in metric spaces has attracted increasing attention, as the metric space can accommodate any type of data and support flexible distance metrics. However, a metric space only models a single data type with a specific similarity metric. In contrast, a multi-metric space combines multiple metric spaces to simultaneously model a variety of data types and a collection of associated similarity metrics. Thus, a multi-metric space is capable of performing similarity search over any combination of metric spaces. Many studies focus on indexing a single metric space, while only a few aims at indexing multi-metric space to accelerate similarity search. In this paper, we propose DESIRE, an efficient dynamic cluster-based forest index for similarity search in multi-metric spaces. DESIRE first selects high-quality centers to cluster objects into compact regions, and then employs B + -trees to effectively index distances between centers and corresponding objects. To support dynamic scenarios, efficient update strategies are developed. Further, we provide filtering techniques to accelerate similarity queries in multi-metric spaces. Extensive experiments on four real datasets demonstrate the superior efficiency and scalability of our proposed DESIRE compared with the state-of-the-art multi-metric space indexes.

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Rathmann, Andrew, und Frank Bidart. „Desire“. Chicago Review 43, Nr. 4 (1997): 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25304225.

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Yongming, Zhai, und Andrea Lingenfelter. „Desire“. Chicago Review 39, Nr. 3/4 (1993): 296. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25305780.

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Cohn, Robert Greer. „Desire“. Philosophy Today 33, Nr. 4 (1989): 318–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday19893343.

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Oser, Lee, und Frank Bidart. „Desire“. World Literature Today 72, Nr. 3 (1998): 628. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40154130.

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Baron, Henry J., Hugo Claus und Stacey Knecht. „Desire“. World Literature Today 73, Nr. 1 (1999): 163. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40154577.

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Price, Elizabeth. „Desire“. Iowa Review 19, Nr. 1 (Januar 1989): 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.17077/0021-065x.3697.

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Tate, James. „Desire“. Iowa Review 24, Nr. 3 (Oktober 1994): 142. http://dx.doi.org/10.17077/0021-065x.4777.

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Loomis, Jon. „Desire“. Iowa Review 27, Nr. 3 (Dezember 1997): 189. http://dx.doi.org/10.17077/0021-065x.4862.

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Moore, Louise. „Desire“. Harrington Lesbian Fiction Quarterly 2, Nr. 1 (01.01.2001): 39–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j161v02n01_05.

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Nyong'o, Tavia. „Desire“. Contemporary Theatre Review 23, Nr. 1 (Februar 2013): 19–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10486801.2013.765104.

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King, Matthew W. „Desire“. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 87, Nr. 3 (15.08.2019): 625–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfz056.

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Schroeder, Tim. „Desire“. Philosophy Compass 1, Nr. 6 (November 2006): 631–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00047.x.

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Swinburne, Richard. „Desire“. Philosophy 60, Nr. 234 (Oktober 1985): 429–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100042492.

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There is a natural contrast often made in ordinary language between the actions which we do because we want or desire to do them, and the actions which we do although we do not want to do them. It is a contrast which has been ignored by much modern philosophy of mind which has seen desire as a component of all actions, and the reasons for all actions as involving desires of various kinds. The ignoring of the distinction between desire and the active component in every action (call it ‘trying’ or ‘seeking’ or ‘having a volition’) leads a man to suppose that he can no more help doing what he does than he can help his desires. But ‘desires’, in the normal ordinary language sense of the word, are natural inclinations to actions of certain sorts with which we find ourselves. We cannot (immediately) help our natural inclinations but what we can do is choose whether to yield to them, or resist them and do what we are not naturally inclined to do.

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Henri, Kelli. „Desire“. Teaching Philosophy 19, Nr. 4 (1996): 397–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199619454.

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Friedman, Jeff. „Desire“. Missouri Review 16, Nr. 1 (1993): 160–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mis.1993.0049.

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Hofmann, Wilhelm, und Lotte Van Dillen. „Desire“. Current Directions in Psychological Science 21, Nr. 5 (Oktober 2012): 317–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721412453587.

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Flores, Fulvio Torres, und Fabiano Tadeu Grazioli. „Desire, desire, desire: uma paródia de Christopher Durang ao teatro estadunidense“. Aletria: Revista de Estudos de Literatura 29, Nr. 1 (29.03.2019): 91–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.17851/2317-2096.29.1.91-109.

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A peça em um ato Desire, desire, desire (1995), de Christopher Durang, parodia uma série de peças do teatro estadunidense, algumas já consideradas clássicas como Um bonde chamado desejo e Gata em telhado de zinco quente, de Tennessee Williams, e outras bastante conhecidas, como O homem de gelo, de Eugene O’Neill, Boa noite, mãe, de Marsha Norman, O sucesso a qualquer preço, de David Mamet, e Meu amigo Harvey, de Mary Chase. Todas essas peças foram adaptadas para o cinema e fazem parte, em menor ou maior medida, do repertório cultural da população. Com base em textos que tratam de intertextualidade e paródia, procuramos demonstrar como Durang cria a sua paródia e como sua peça responde a discussões pertinentes no final do século XX, que não estavam postas ou eram apenas incipientes nas décadas em que tais textos foram criados.

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Barber, Jennifer S., Karen Benjamin Guzzo, Jamie Budnick, Yasamin Kusunoki, Sarah R. Hayford und Warren Miller. „Black-White Differences in Pregnancy Desire During the Transition to Adulthood“. Demography 58, Nr. 2 (19.02.2021): 603–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00703370-8993840.

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Abstract This article explores race differences in the desire to avoid pregnancy or become pregnant using survey data from a random sample of 914 young women (ages 18–22) living in a Michigan county and semi-structured interviews with a subsample of 60 of the women. In the survey data, desire for pregnancy, indifference, and ambivalence are very rare but are more prevalent among Black women than White women. In the semi-structured interviews, although few women described fatalistic beliefs or lack of planning for future pregnancies, Black and White women did so equally often. Women more often described fatalistic beliefs and lack of planning when retrospectively describing their past than when prospectively describing their future. Using the survey data to compare prospective desires for a future pregnancy with women's recollections of those desires after they conceived, more Black women shifted positive than shifted negative, and Black women were more likely to shift positive than White women—that is, Black women do not differentially retrospectively overreport prospectively desired pregnancies as having been undesired before conception. Young women's consistent (over repeated interviews) prospective expression of strong desire to avoid pregnancy and correspondingly weak desire for pregnancy, along with the similarity of Black and White women's pregnancy plans, lead us to conclude that a “planning paradigm”—in which young women are encouraged and supported in implementing their pregnancy desires—is probably appropriate for the vast majority of young women and, most importantly, is similarly appropriate for Black and White young women.

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Pralat, Robert. „Desire “to Have” and Desire “to Be”“. Dialogue and Universalism 20, Nr. 5 (2010): 101–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du2010205/649.

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박채윤. „Desire, Disguise, and Disguised Desires in William Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night“. Shakespeare Review 55, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2019): 793–810. http://dx.doi.org/10.17009/shakes.2019.55.4.008.

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Dumouchel. „Desiring Machines: Machines That Are Desired and Machines That Desire“. Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 28 (2021): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.14321/contagion.28.2021.0099.

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Eastwood, John D., Carolina Cavaliere, Shelley A. Fahlman und Adrienne E. Eastwood. „A desire for desires: Boredom and its relation to alexithymia“. Personality and Individual Differences 42, Nr. 6 (April 2007): 1035–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.08.027.

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Tully, Ian. „Depression and the Problem of Absent Desires“. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11, Nr. 2 (07.06.2017): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v11i2.110.

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I argue that consideration of certain cases of severe depression reveals a problem for desire-based theories of welfare. I first show that depression can result in a person losing her desires and then identify a case wherein it seems right to think that, as a result of very severe depression, the individuals described no longer have any desires whatsoever. I argue that the state these people are in is a state of profound ill-being: their lives are going very poorly for them. Yet desire theories get this case wrong. Because no desires are being frustrated, the desire theorist has no grounds for ascribing ill-being; indeed, because the individuals described seem utterly without desire, the desire theorist has no grounds for treating these people as subjects of welfare ascription at all. I argue that these results are unacceptable; therefore, we should reject desire-based theories of wellbeing and ill-being.

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Farokhi Kakesh, Hadis. „Desire satisfaction and its discontents“. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 38, Nr. 2 (26.10.2023): 173–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.24081.

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According to a well-established view of desire satisfaction, a desire that p is satisfied iff p obtains. Call this the 'standard view'. The standard view is purely semantic, which means the satisfaction condition of desires is placed in the truth of the embedded proposition that indicates the content of the desire. This paper aims to defend the standard view against two frequently discussed problems: the problem of underspecification and desires conditional on their own persistence. The former holds that the standard view cannot capture the specific ways of desire satisfaction. The latter holds that the standard view does not provide sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of desires conditional on their own persistence. To address the first problem, I will disambiguate different interpretations of desire ascriptions using de re/de dicto distinction. My argument to address the second problem rests on the disambiguation of different senses of satisfaction: semantic and agent.

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Goto, Takayuki, Mai Kobayashi, Yuka Ozaki und Takashi Kusumi. „Desires for approach and avoidance (1): The differences in the strength of desire and conflict across various desire domains“. Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association 78 (10.09.2014): 2PM—1–006–2PM—1–006. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/pacjpa.78.0_2pm-1-006.

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