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Wu, Wenhao, und Bing Bu. „Security Analysis for CBTC Systems under Attack–Defense Confrontation“. Electronics 8, Nr. 9 (05.09.2019): 991. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics8090991.
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Communication-based train controls (CBTC) systems play a major role in urban rail transportation. As CBTC systems are no longer isolated from the outside world but use other networks to increase efficiency and improve productivity, they are exposed to huge cyber threats. This paper proposes a generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN) model to capture dynamic interaction between the attacker and the defender to evaluate the security of CBTC systems. Depending on the characteristics of the system and attack–defense methods, we divided our model into two phases: penetration and disruption. In each phase, we provided effective means of attack and corresponding defensive measures, and the system state was determined correspondingly. Additionally, a semiphysical simulation platform and game model were proposed to assist the GSPN model parameterization. With the steady-state probability of the system output from the model, we propose several indicators for assessing system security. Finally, we compared the security of the system with single defensive measures and multiple defensive measures. Our evaluations indicated the significance of the defensive measures and the seriousness of the system security situation.
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Molik, Bartosz, Natalia Morgulec-Adamowicz, Jolanta Marszałek, Andrzej Kosmol, Izabela Rutkowska, Alicja Jakubicka, Ewelina Kaliszewska et al. „Evaluation of Game Performance in Elite Male Sitting Volleyball Players“. Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly 34, Nr. 2 (April 2017): 104–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/apaq.2015-0028.
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The aims of the current study were (a) to analyze the differences in game performances of sitting volleyball athletes representing the different types of disabilities and (b) to assess whether the seated position vertical reach is one of the crucial factors in the game performance level of sitting volleyball athletes. One hundred male athletes from various national teams participating in the European Championships in Sitting Volleyball (2009) took part in this study. The athletes were categorized according to type of disability and the results of the vertical reach in a seated position. Thirtysix games were analyzed using the Game Performance Sheet for Sitting Volleyball. Twenty-three game performance parameters were studied. In addition, the sum and effectiveness of attacks, blocks, block services, services, ball receiving, and defensive actions were calculated. The main results indicated significant differences between athletes with minimal disability and athletes with single amputations from above the knee in the level of defensive performances and the summation of defensive actions. There was also a significant difference between athletes in relation to their vertical reach during activity and attacking actions, blocks, and ball receiving. In addition, there were strong relationships between the players’ vertical reach scores and their activity and effectiveness in sitting volleyball. In conclusion, the accuracy of the World Organization Volleyball for Disabled classification systems for sitting volleyball players was confirmed. There is a strong relationship between players’ vertical reach and their effectiveness in sitting volleyball.
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Tian, Changjia, Varuna De Silva, Michael Caine und Steve Swanson. „Use of Machine Learning to Automate the Identification of Basketball Strategies Using Whole Team Player Tracking Data“. Applied Sciences 10, Nr. 1 (18.12.2019): 24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app10010024.
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The use of machine learning to identify and classify offensive and defensive strategies in team sports through spatio-temporal tracking data has received significant interest recently in the literature and the global sport industry. This paper focuses on data-driven defensive strategy learning in basketball. Most research to date on basketball strategy learning has focused on offensive effectiveness and is based on the interaction between the on-ball player and principle on-ball defender, thereby ignoring the contribution of the remaining players. Furthermore, most sports analytical systems that provide play-by-play data is heavily biased towards offensive metrics such as passes, dribbles, and shots. The aim of the current study was to use machine learning to classify the different defensive strategies basketball players adopt when deviating from their initial defensive action. An analytical model was developed to recognise the one-on-one (matched) relationships of the players, which is utilised to automatically identify any change of defensive strategy. A classification model is developed based on a player and ball tracking dataset from National Basketball Association (NBA) game play to classify the adopted defensive strategy against pick-and-roll play. The methodology described is the first to analyse the defensive strategy of all in-game players (both on-ball players and off-ball players). The cross-validation results indicate that the proposed technique for automatic defensive strategy identification can achieve up to 69% accuracy of classification. Machine learning techniques, such as the one adopted here, have the potential to enable a deeper understanding of player decision making and defensive game strategies in basketball and other sports, by leveraging the player and ball tracking data.
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Gambarelli, Daniele, Gianfranco Gambarelli und Dries Goossens. „Offensive or defensive play in soccer: a game-theoretical approach“. Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports 15, Nr. 4 (25.10.2019): 261–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jqas-2017-0071.
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Abstract In many sports, such as soccer, a coach has to decide whether to adopt an “offensive” or a “defensive” approach to a match. This strategic decision depends on the strengths and weaknesses of his team with respect to the opponent, but also on the strategy chosen by the opponent’s coach. The fact that a draw also results in a point, which may be important for the ranking, further complicates this decision, as the coach must assess whether it is better to adopt a defensive team formation in order to obtain a draw, or to aim for victory despite the increased risk of defeat. We study this topic by means of a game-theoretical approach, and we develop an algorithm which allows to compute the optimal strategy. The algorithm tests the stability of the outcome with respect to uncertainty in the estimated win probabilities. Furthermore, our approach can handle in-game events, which may provoke changes in optimal strategy. Finally, our model also allows us to assess the effect of various point systems on the willingness of teams to opt for attacking play. Our method is applied to a case study, based on the match Italy – Costa Rica (World Cup 2014).
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Zhang, Cevin, Karin Pukk Härenstam, Sebastiaan Meijer und Adam S. Darwich. „Serious Gaming of Logistics Management in Pediatric Emergency Medicine“. International Journal of Serious Games 7, Nr. 1 (02.03.2020): 47–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.17083/ijsg.v7i1.334.
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Access blocks throughout the entire healthcare system and overcrowding issues are pervasive in many emergency departments where the coordination and strategic management of resources could be supported by serious games and simulations approaches. However, existing studies have not addressed the reciprocal relation between patient inflow and working systems in serious games design in order to reflect the logistical features of an emergency department and to facilitate the players improve the work performance of the system. To address the issue, this paper presents a serious game based on a multi-method simulation approach of complex healthcare processes as well as the game mechanics selected to promote understanding the logistical features of an ED, which points to the next level of conducting simulations or gaming aimed for training decision making skills in operative environments. Results of the experiment confirmed that the serious game encouraged participants to proactively manage the human resources of the emergency department. Certain managerial recommendations can be made: a patient flow multiplier of 120% could lead to a significant erosion of the system’s defensive ability; however, proactive anticipation from management is the key for making an emergency organization more resilient.
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Pizarro, David, Alba Práxedes, Bruno Travassos, Bruno Gonçalves und Alberto Moreno. „How Informational Constraints for Decision-Making on Passing, Dribbling and Shooting Change With the Manipulation of Small-Sided Games Changes in Futsal“. Perceptual and Motor Skills 128, Nr. 4 (22.05.2021): 1684–711. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00315125211016350.
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In this study, we explored how manipulating floaters’ positions in small-sided futsal games (SSGs) promote changes in the informational constraints that support decision-making (DM) for passing, dribbling and shooting tactics. We made changes in four experimental 3 vs 3 small-sided game conditions with 30 male futsal players (U19 age category): (a) Floaters Off (FO), (b) Final Line Floaters (FLF), (c) Lateral Floaters own field sideline (LFofsl) and (d) Lateral Floaters full field sideline (LFffsl). We assessed players’ activity with WIMU PRO™ software during the SSGs, using the Game Performance Evaluation Tool (GPET) to analyze a total of 1,635 decisions. DM for dribbling was generally based on the interpersonal distance between the ball carrier and direct opponent, considering the defensive team length and the offensive team area. Shooting decisions were constrained, by certain attacking-defending teams’ spatial-temporal relations with regard to playing space and team balance as affected by manipulating floaters’ positions. The coaches’ decisions to change the floaters’ positions during SSGs may change informational variables sustaining the dribbling decision, but no changes in SSG variables affected passing DM.
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Guedea Delgado, Julio Cesar, Raúl Josué Nájera Longoria, Oscar Núñez Enríquez, Ramón Candía Luján und Gabriel Gastélum Cuadras. „Sistemas tácticos y resultados de competición del Mundial de Fútbol Asociación de Rusia 2018.Tactical systems and matches results from the Football Association Worldcup Rusia 2018.“ Retos, Nr. 36 (06.06.2019): 503–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.47197/retos.v36i36.69296.
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Sistemas tácticos y resultados de competición del Mundial de Fútbol Asociación de Rusia 2018Tactical systems and match results from FIFA Worldcup Rusia 2018Julio Cesar Guedea Delgado, Raúl Josué Nájera Longoria, Oscar Núñez Enríquez, Ramón Candía Luján, Gabriel Gastélum CuadrasUniversidad Autónoma de Chihuahua (México) Resumen. Los sistemas tácticos dentro del fútbol soccer son elementales tanto a la ofensiva como a la defensiva. El presente estudio consiste en el analizar los sistemas tácticos y resultados de juego de Mundial de Rusia 2018. Se analizaron los 64 partidos, cuyos datos se extrajeron de la Web oficial de la Federación Internacional de Fútbol Asociación (FIFA, www.fifa.com) y registros que se obtuvieron del programa de Sky SPORTS® del canal 1535, los datos se confirmaron mediante el Sky SPORTS® que ofrece una toma táctica aérea en el canal 1536. Los resultados más sobresalientes son el sistema más utilizado el 1-4-2-3-1, donde los dos equipos del 1ro Francia y 2do lugar Croacia lo utilizaron con mayor frecuencia, así mismo el 1-3-5-2 y 1-3-4-3 que son más ofensivos, en los equipos del 3ro lugar Bélgica y 4to lugar Inglaterra. Estos sistemas en ocasiones a la defensiva cambian, dependiendo del rival y las circunstancias, así como la táctica del entrenador. Hoy en día, los sistemas de juego y las metodologías de entrenamiento marcan una pauta específica para los entrenadores, buscando futbolistas que dominen los aspectos técnico-tácticos, que entiendan el sistema y la filosofía de juego que plantea el entrenador y que defiendan y ataquen con la misma intensidad independientemente de la posición que asuman.Abstract. Tactical systems within football (soccer) are either used in offense and defense. This study aims at analyzing match results and tactical systems during the Russia 2018 World Cup. All 64 matches were analyzed, data being extracted from the official website of the International Federation (FIFA, www.fifa.com), whereas records from the Sky SPORTS® channel 1535. Data was confirmed with Sky SPORTS® since it offers a sky view in their channel 1536. The most used lineup system was 1-4-2-3-1, with teams such as France (1st) and Croatia (2nd) using it more frequently, as well the lineup 1-3-5-2 and 1-3-4-3, which are more offensive, used by teams such as Belguim (3rd) and England (4th). These lineup systems, together with the coaching tactics, occasionally changed defensive wise, upon rival and circumstances. Currently, game systems and training methodologies set the pace for coaches, who look for football players who dominate technical-tactics aspects, understand the systems, their game philosophy, and being tough offensive and defensive players regardless of their field position.
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Praça, Gibson Moreira, Hugo Folgado, André Gustavo Pereira de Andrade und Pablo Juan Greco. „Comportamento tático coletivo em Pequenos Jogos no Futebol: influência de jogadores adicionais“. Brazilian Journal of Kinanthropometry and Human Performance 18, Nr. 1 (16.03.2016): 62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1980-0037.2016v18n1p62.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1980-0037.2016v18n1p62 The aim of this study was to compare the collective tactical behavior between numerically balanced and unbalanced small-sided soccer games. Eighteen male soccer players (mean age 16.4 years) participated in the study. Polar coordinate analysis was performed using positional data obtained with a 15-Hz GPS device. Collective variables including length, width, centroid distance (average point between teammates), and length per width ratio (LPWratio) were collected. Data were analyzed using Friedman’s test. The results showed greater length and width values in 4vs.3 games, while a higher LPWratiowas observed in 3vs.3+2 games compared to the other configurations. In games with an additional player (4vs.3), ball circulation and the increase in effective game space were alternatives to overcome the more concentrated defensive systems near the goal. On the other hand, 3vs.3+2 games allowed more actions in the length axis and a fast reach of the opponent’s goal.
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Montgomery, Paul G., David B. Pyne und Clare L. Minahan. „The Physical and Physiological Demands of Basketball Training and Competition“. International Journal of Sports Physiology and Performance 5, Nr. 1 (März 2010): 75–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/ijspp.5.1.75.
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Purpose:To characterize the physical and physiological responses during different basketball practice drills and games.Methods:Male basketball players (n = 11; 19.1 ± 2.1 y, 1.91 ± 0.09 m, 87.9 ± 15.1 kg; mean ± SD) completed offensive and defensive practice drills, half court 5on5 scrimmage play, and competitive games. Heart rate, VO2 and triaxial accelerometer data (physical demand) were normalized for individual participation time. Data were log-transformed and differences between drills and games standardized for interpretation of magnitudes and reported with the effect size (ES) statistic.Results:There was no substantial difference in the physical or physiological variables between offensive and defensive drills; physical load (9.5%; 90% confidence limits ±45); mean heart rate (-2.4%; ±4.2); peak heart rate (-0.9%; ±3.4); and VO2 (–5.7%; ±9.1). Physical load was moderately greater in game play compared with a 5on5 scrimmage (85.2%; ±40.5); with a higher mean heart rate (12.4%; ±5.4). The oxygen demand for live play was substantially larger than 5on5 (30.6%; ±15.6).Conclusions:Defensive and offensive drills during basketball practice have similar physiological responses and physical demand. Live play is substantially more demanding than a 5on5 scrimmage in both physical and physiological attributes. Accelerometers and predicted oxygen cost from heart rate monitoring systems are useful for differentiating the practice and competition demands of basketball.
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Zhang, Jing, Shifei Shen und Rui Yang. „The impacts of adaptive attacking and defending strategies on mitigation of intentional threats“. Kybernetes 39, Nr. 5 (15.06.2010): 825–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03684921011043279.
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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.Design/methodology/approachA stochastic game‐theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker‐defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification‐patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.FindingsThe result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.Originality/valueThis paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker‐defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.
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King, Sheila M., Caroline Dykeman, Peter Redgrave und Paul Dean. „Use of a Distracting Task to Obtain Defensive Head Movements to Looming Visual Stimuli by Human Adults in a Laboratory Setting“. Perception 21, Nr. 2 (April 1992): 245–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/p210245.
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Defensive responses to looming visual stimuli have been obtained in a wide variety of species, including human infants as young as one week. This phenomenon has not, however, been formally demonstrated for adults under laboratory conditions. In this paper it is reported that similar responses, namely avoidance movements of the head, can be obtained in most human adults provided that they are suitably distracted by playing a computer tracking game. Such behaviours were not obtained when subjects were not so distracted. The use of control conditions also ruled out the possibility that simple movement cues from stimuli presented on a noncollision trajectory are sufficient stimulus to obtain defensive responses. It is of interest to note that latencies for avoidance movements were significantly shorter than those for orienting movements in the same situation, but were no different from the latencies for orienting movements when subjects were not distracted. It is argued that these findings are consistent with the proposition that defensive head movements to looming stimuli, like orienting movements to novel peripheral stimuli, represent a basic visual competence that is normally suppressed (or subsumed) by higher competences. The decision to avoid is probably based on the computation of time to contact, and may reflect the operation of a subcortical system for elementary analysis of optic flow.
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Xia, Zhuoqun, Zhenwei Fang, Fengfei Zou, Jin Wang und Arun Kumar Sangaiah. „Research on Defensive Strategy of Real-Time Price Attack Based on Multiperson Zero-Determinant“. Security and Communication Networks 2019 (16.07.2019): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6956072.
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The smart grid solves the growing load demand of electrical customers through two-way real-time communication of electricity supply and demand sides and home energy management system (HEMS). However, these technical features also bring network security risks to the real-time price signal of the smart grid. The real-time price attack (RTPA) can maliciously raise the real-time price in smart meter, resulting in an increase in electrical customers load demand, causing the extensive damage to the power transmission lines due to overload. In this paper, we based on the behavioral relationship between load demand of electrical customers and real-time price of electricity suppliers (ES), defined the game relationship between RTPA, ES, and electrical customers, established a price elasticity of electricity demand (PEED) model, and proposed a defensive strategy of real-time price attack based on multiperson zero-determinant strategy (MPZDS). The experimental results show that the combination of MPZDS to some extent cut the expected load demand of electrical customers and protect the safety of power transmission lines.
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Shan, Xiaojun, und Jun Zhuang. „Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender–attacker game“. European Journal of Operational Research 228, Nr. 1 (Juli 2013): 262–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.029.
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Odhiambo, Edwin, und Jane Wanjira. „Strategic Positioning and Competitive Advantage of Commercial Banks in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya“. International Journal of Current Aspects 3, Nr. II (24.04.2019): 83–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.35942/ijcab.v3iii.8.
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Strategic positioning has been identified as an important weapon to manage the competition in the business environment. However, despite the use of strategic positions, many banks in the country are facing challenges from the competition destabilizing the position they hold. Thus, the sole reason of the project was to establish how strategic positioning affects competitive advantage of banks in Uasin Gishu County Kenya. The specific objectives were; to examine the effects of mono-segment positioning, multi-segment positioning, standby positioning, adaptive positioning and defensive positioning on competitive advantage of commercial banks in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The study was guided by Resource-Based-View, The Game Theory, Market Based View Theory and Open Systems Theory. Explanatory research design was used in this study. The unit of analysis was commercial banks in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya and the unit of observation was 748 employees in 25 banks. A stratified random sample was used as a significant blend of categorization and randomization. A sample of 173 employees was selected. Questionnaires were used in collection of data. Descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis were used to analyse data. The study established a positive and significant relationship between mono-segment positioning, multi-segment positioning, standby positioning, adaptive positioning and defensive positioning on organizational competitive advantage. The study concludes that through mono-segment Commercial banks are free to devote all of their resources to attracting a single, narrowly defined type of customer with a specific need it can fulfill better than other companies. Through multi segment Commercial banks can analyze various customer groups and targeting specific products to meet their demands. Through standby positioning, commercial banks can base their strategy completely on a new segment which increases its focus and profitability. Through adaptive the brand loyalty of commercial banks definitely increases and also market segmentation increases competitiveness of a firm from a holistic view and defensive positioning leads to customer retention throughout customer life cycle. The study recommends that commercial banks in Uasin Gishu County implementing mono segment should concentrate all their efforts in a single segment with a single marketing mix so as to avoid confrontation with financial institutions. On multi segment, commercial banks should categorize their customers along demographic, geographic, behavioral, or psychographic lines or a combination of them. This will enable them offer products and services effectively by understanding distinctive needs of the groups. On standby positioning strategy, commercial banks should only opt execute a mono-segment positioning strategy only during unavoidable situations. To minimize response time, the banks should prepares a standby plan that specify the product(s) and their attributes as well as details of the marketing program(s) that would be used to position the new product. On adaptive positioning, commercial banks should aim at changing or reforming a bank’s marketing mix to suit to the particular geography in which the bank is operating. This will enable the banks to effectively tailor their products and service in rapid and unparalleled ways to meet their customers’ interests and needs. On defensive positioning, commercial banks should resort to position defense to ensure a new bank’s market entry does not impact or weaken their brand. They may also opt to preempt competitive strategies by introducing an additional brand in a similar position for the same segment.
This is an open-access article published and distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License of United States unless otherwise stated. Access, citation and distribution of this article is allowed with full recognition of the authors and the source.
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Yang, Agnes, Young Jin Kwon und Sang-Yong Tom Lee. „The impact of information sharing legislation on cybersecurity industry“. Industrial Management & Data Systems 120, Nr. 9 (13.08.2020): 1777–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/imds-10-2019-0536.
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PurposeThe objective of this paper is to investigate how firms react to cybersecurity information sharing environment where government organizations disseminate cybersecurity threat information gathered by individual firms to the private entities. The overall impact of information sharing on firms' cybersecurity investment decision has only been game-theoretically explored, not giving practical implication. The authors therefore leverage the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) to observe firms' attitudinal changes toward investing in cybersecurity.Design/methodology/approachThe authors design a quasi-experiment where they set US cybersecurity firms as an experimental group (a proxy for total investment in cybersecurity) and nonsecurity firms as a control group to measure the net effect of CISA on overall cybersecurity investment. To enhance the robustness of the authors’ difference-in-difference estimation, the authors employed propensity score matched sample test and reduced sample test as well.FindingsFor the full sample, the authors’ empirical findings suggest that US security firms' overall performance (i.e. Tobin's Q) improved following the legislation, which indicates that more investment in cybersecurity was followed by the formation of information sharing environment. Interestingly, big cybersecurity firms are beneficiaries of the CISA when the full samples are divided into small and large group. Both Tobin's Q and sales growth rate increased for big firms after CISA.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors’ findings shed more light on the research stream of cybersecurity and information sharing, a research area only explored by game-theoretical approaches. Given that the US government has tried to enforce cybersecurity defensive measures by building cooperative architecture such as CISA 2015, the policy implication of this study is far-reaching.Originality/valueThe authors’ study contributes to the research on the economic benefits of sharing cybersecurity information by finding the missing link (i.e. empirical evidence) between “sharing” and “economic impact.” This paper confirms that CISA affects the cybersecurity industry unevenly by firm size, a previously unidentified relationship.
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Liu, Xiaohu, Hengwei Zhang, Yuchen Zhang, Lulu Shao und Jihong Han. „Active Defense Strategy Selection Method Based on Two-Way Signaling Game“. Security and Communication Networks 2019 (29.11.2019): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/1362964.
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Most network security research studies based on signaling games assume that either the attacker or the defender is the sender of the signal and the other party is the receiver of the signal. The attack and defense process is commonly modeled and analyzed from the perspective of one-way signal transmission. Aiming at the reality of two-way signal transmission in network attack and defense confrontation, we propose a method of active defense strategy selection based on a two-way signaling game. In this paper, a two-way signaling game model is constructed to analyze the network attack and defense processes. Based on the solution of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a defense strategy selection algorithm is presented. The feasibility and effectiveness of the method are verified using examples from real-world applications. In addition, the mechanism of the deception signal is analyzed, and conclusions for guiding the selection of active defense strategies are provided.
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Yang, Yu, Bichen Che, Yang Zeng, Yang Cheng und Chenyang Li. „MAIAD: A Multistage Asymmetric Information Attack and Defense Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory“. Symmetry 11, Nr. 2 (13.02.2019): 215. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym11020215.
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With the rapid development and widespread applications of Internet of Things (IoT) systems, the corresponding security issues are getting more and more serious. This paper proposes a multistage asymmetric information attack and defense model (MAIAD) for IoT systems. Under the premise of asymmetric information, MAIAD extends the single-stage game model with dynamic and evolutionary game theory. By quantifying the benefits for both the attack and defense, MAIAD can determine the optimal defense strategy for IoT systems. Simulation results show that the model can select the optimal security defense strategy for various IoT systems.
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Stilman, Boris, Vladimir Yakhnis und Oleg Umanskiy. „Linguistic Geometry: The Age of Maturity“. Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 14, Nr. 6 (20.09.2010): 684–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/jaciii.2010.p0684.
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This paper describes the current status of research and applications of Linguistic Geometry (LG), a type of game theory scalable to the level of real life defense systems. LG is compared to conventional gaming approaches with respect to their applicability to real world problems. LG generates winning strategies for all sides in a conflict in real time by constructing them out of a limited set of blocks called zones. Several examples of zones are introduced. The paper describes the process of discovery of new zones essential for various types of military operations, which represent different classes of abstract board games. We also included a brief explanation of scalability of the LG applications. This paper describes a universal tool kit, LG-PACKAGE, which allows a user to build his/her own applications of LG. This tool kit includes GDK (Game Development Kit), GIK (Game Integration Kit), GRT (Game Resource Tool), GST (Game Solving Tool), GNS (Game Network Services) and GMI (Game Mobile Interface). In the end we included a description of the most advanced experiments with the LG applications conducted by DARPA and US Army and assessments of these experiments by military experts.
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Noor, Ahmed K. „Game Changers“. Mechanical Engineering 136, Nr. 09 (01.09.2014): 30–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/1.2014-sep-1.
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This article discusses the recent development in “cognitive computing” technology. Unlike expert systems of the past, which required inflexible hard-coded expert rules, cognitive computers interpret unstructured data (sensory information, images, voices, and numbers), navigate through vast amounts of information, learn by experience, and participate in dialogues with humans using natural language to solve extremely complex problems. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is funding a program called SyNAPSE (Systems of Neuromorphic Adaptive Plastic Scalable Electronics) to develop machine technology that will function like biological neural systems. IBM, Hughes Research Labs, and several universities are working on this program. The aim is to build an electronic system that matches a mammalian brain in function, size, and power consumption. It would recreate 10 billion neurons and 100 trillion synapses, consume one kilowatt (same as a small electric heater), and measure less than 2,000 cubic centimeters. Several other projects are also under way to apply cognitive technology to robotics, cars, and production systems.
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Hu, Yongjin, Han Zhang, Yuanbo Guo, Tao Li und Jun Ma. „A Novel Attack-and-Defense Signaling Game for Optimal Deceptive Defense Strategy Choice“. Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2020 (12.10.2020): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8850356.
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Increasingly, more administrators (defenders) are using defense strategies with deception such as honeypots to improve the IoT network security in response to attacks. Using game theory, the signaling game is leveraged to describe the confrontation between attacks and defenses. However, the traditional approach focuses only on the defender; the analysis from the attacker side is ignored. Moreover, insufficient analysis has been conducted on the optimal defense strategy with deception when the model is established with the signaling game. In our work, the signaling game model is extended to a novel two-way signaling game model to describe the game from the perspectives of both the defender and the attacker. First, the improved model is formally defined, and an algorithm is proposed for identifying the refined Bayesian equilibrium. Then, according to the calculated benefits, optimal strategies choice for both the attacker and the defender in the game are analyzed. Last, a simulation is conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed model and to demonstrate that the defense strategy with deception is optimal for the defender.
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Tan, Jing-lei, Heng-wei Zhang, Hong-qi Zhang, Cheng Lei, Hui Jin, Bo-wen Li und Hao Hu. „Optimal Timing Selection Approach to Moving Target Defense: A FlipIt Attack-Defense Game Model“. Security and Communication Networks 2020 (09.06.2020): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/3151495.
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The centralized control characteristics of software-defined networks (SDNs) make them susceptible to advanced persistent threats (APTs). Moving target defense, as an effective defense means, is constantly developing. It is difficult to effectively characterize an MTD attack and defense game with existing game models and effectively select the defense timing to balance SDN service quality and MTD decision-making benefits. From the hidden confrontation between the actual attack and defense sides, existing attack-defense scenarios are abstractly characterized and analyzed. Based on the APT attack process of the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC), a state transition model of the MTD attack surface based on the susceptible-infective-recuperative-malfunctioned (SIRM) infectious disease model is defined. An MTD attack-defense timing decision model based on the FlipIt game (FG-MTD) is constructed, which expands the static analysis in the traditional game to a dynamic continuous process. The Nash equilibrium of the proposed method is analyzed, and the optimal timing selection algorithm of the MTD is designed to provide decision support for the selection of MTD timing under moderate security. Finally, the application model is used to verify the model and method. Through numerical analysis, the timings of different types of attack-defense strategies are summarized.
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Zhang, Yuchen, und Jing Liu. „Optimal Decision-Making Approach for Cyber Security Defense Using Game Theory and Intelligent Learning“. Security and Communication Networks 2019 (23.12.2019): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3038586.
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Existing approaches of cyber attack-defense analysis based on stochastic game adopts the assumption of complete rationality, but in the actual cyber attack-defense, it is difficult for both sides of attacker and defender to meet the high requirement of complete rationality. For this aim, the influence of bounded rationality on attack-defense stochastic game is analyzed. We construct a stochastic game model. Aiming at the problem of state explosion when the number of network nodes increases, we design the attack-defense graph to compress the state space and extract network states and defense strategies. On this basis, the intelligent learning algorithm WoLF-PHC is introduced to carry out strategy learning and improvement. Then, the defense decision-making algorithm with online learning ability is designed, which helps to select the optimal defense strategy with the maximum payoff from the candidate strategy set. The obtained strategy is superior to previous evolutionary equilibrium strategy because it does not rely on prior data. By introducing eligibility trace to improve WoLF-PHC, the learning speed is further improved and the defense timeliness is significantly promoted.
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Liu, Xiaohu, Hengwei Zhang, Yuchen Zhang und Lulu Shao. „Optimal Network Defense Strategy Selection Method Based on Evolutionary Network Game“. Security and Communication Networks 2020 (28.10.2020): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/5381495.
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The basic hypothesis of evolutionary game theory is that the players in the game possess limited rationality. The interactive behavior of players can be described by a learning mechanism that has theoretical advantages in modeling the network security problem in a real society. The current network security evolutionary game model generally adopts a replicator dynamic learning mechanism and assumes that the interaction between players in the group conforms to the characteristics of uniform mixed distribution. However, in an actual network attack and defense scenario, the players in the game have limited learning capability and can only interact with others within a limited range. To address this, we improved the learning mechanism based on the network topology, established the learning object set based on the learning range of the players, used the Fermi function to calculate the transition probability to the learning object strategy, and employed random noise to describe the degree of irrational influence in the learning process. On this basis, we built an attack and defense evolutionary network game model, analyzed the evolutionary process of attack and defense strategy, solved the evolution equilibrium, and designed a defense strategy selection algorithm. The effectiveness of the model and method is verified by conducting simulation experiments for the transition probability of the players and the evolutionary process of the defense group strategy.
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Xu, Xiaotong, Gaocai Wang, Jintian Hu und Yuting Lu. „Study on Stochastic Differential Game Model in Network Attack and Defense“. Security and Communication Networks 2020 (08.06.2020): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/3417039.
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In recent years, evolutionary game theory has been gradually applied to analyze and predict network attack and defense for maintaining cybersecurity. The traditional deterministic game model cannot accurately describe the process of actual network attack and defense due to changing in the set of attack-defense strategies and external factors (such as the operating environment of the system). In this paper, we construct a stochastic evolutionary game model by the stochastic differential equation with Markov property. The evolutionary equilibrium solution of the model is found and the stability of the model is proved according to the knowledge of the stochastic differential equation. And we apply the explicit Euler numerical method to analyze the evolution of the strategy selection of the players for different problem situations. The simulation results show that the stochastic evolutionary game model proposed in this paper can get a steady state and obtain the optimal defense strategy under the action of the stochastic disturbance factor. In addition, compared with other kinds of literature, we can conclude that the return on security investment of this model is better, and the strategy selection of the attackers and defenders in our model is more suitable for actual network attack and defense.
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Liang, Li, Fang Deng, Zhihong Peng, Xinxing Li und Wenzhong Zha. „A differential game for cooperative target defense“. Automatica 102 (April 2019): 58–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2018.12.034.
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Shi, Leyi, Xiran Wang und Huiwen Hou. „Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory“. Mathematics 9, Nr. 8 (08.04.2021): 805. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math9080805.
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Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers.
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Shinar, J., und G. Silberman. „A discrete dynamic game modelling anti-missile defense scenarios“. Dynamics and Control 5, Nr. 1 (Januar 1995): 55–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01968535.
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Von Moll, Alexander, und Zachariah Fuchs. „Attacker Dispersal Surface in the Turret Defense Differential Game“. IFAC-PapersOnLine 53, Nr. 2 (2020): 15659–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2020.12.2549.
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He, Fei, Jun Zhuang und Nageswara S. V. Rao. „Discrete game-theoretic analysis of defense in correlated cyber-physical systems“. Annals of Operations Research 294, Nr. 1-2 (21.09.2019): 741–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03381-1.
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Mi, Yan, Hengwei Zhang, Hao Hu, Jinglei Tan und Jindong Wang. „Optimal Network Defense Strategy Selection Method: A Stochastic Differential Game Model“. Security and Communication Networks 2021 (21.08.2021): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5594697.
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In a real-world network confrontation process, attack and defense actions change rapidly and continuously. The network environment is complex and dynamically random. Therefore, attack and defense strategies are inevitably subject to random disturbances during their execution, and the transition of the network security state is affected accordingly. In this paper, we construct a network security state transition model by referring to the epidemic evolution process, use Gaussian noise to describe random effects during the strategy execution, and introduce a random disturbance intensity factor to describe the degree of random effects. On this basis, we establish an attack-defense stochastic differential game model, propose a saddle point equilibrium solution method, and provide an algorithm to select the optimal defense strategy. Our method achieves real-time defense decision-making in network attack-defense scenarios with random disturbances and has better real-time performance and practicality than current methods. Results of a simulation experiment show that our model and algorithm are effective and feasible.
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Flores-Rodríguez, José, und Gonzalo Ramírez-Macías. „Pedagogía no lineal en balonmano. Defensa zonal de una y dos líneas en partidos reducidos (Non-linear pedagogy in handball. One and two lines zone defence in small-sided games)“. Retos, Nr. 39 (07.09.2020): 604–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.47197/retos.v0i39.79640.
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La pedagogía no lineal presenta diferencias importantes respecto a los modelos de enseñanza tradicionalmente empleados en balonmano. La ausencia de investigaciones sobre el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje en balonmano desde la pedagogía no lineal motivó el presente trabajo. El objetivo fue conocer la influencia ejercida por dos constreñimientos introducidos en una tarea: defensa zonal de una línea (LI1) y defensa zonal de dos líneas con defensor avanzado (LI2), en los comportamientos, ofensivos y defensivos, realizados por jugadores de balonmano. Estos constreñimientos, representativos de los sistemas defensivos más utilizados en balonmano, se aplicaron en la disputa de 16 partidos reducidos, durante las ocho sesiones en las que se desarrolló el estudio. Se utilizó un diseño observacional puntual/nomomético/multidimendional para registrar los comportamientos de 14 jugadores (M=14.6 años y SD=0.4) de categoría cadete masculino, que se dividieron en dos grupos para la disputa de los partidos. El análisis de coordenadas polares permitió conocer la influencia ejercida por ambos constreñimientos a nivel general, analizando los comportamientos de ambos equipos conjuntamente y, también, de manera específica para cada equipo. Así, se encontraron relaciones significativas de activación mutua entre: (1) LI1 y fijación impar, lanzamiento en penetración, lanzamiento a distancia, bloqueo, cambio de oponente, ayudas y contrabloqueo; y (2) entre LI2 y desmarques, deslizamiento e interceptación. Conocer la influencia ejercida por los constreñimientos aplicados en las tareas (comportamientos que facilitan e inhiben) es clave en la aplicación de la pedagogía no lineal, de esta manera se podrán seleccionar aquellos que ayuden a conseguir los objetivos propuestos.
Abstract. Non-linear pedagogy presents important differences regarding the teaching approaches traditionally used in handball. The absence of research that addresses the teaching-learning process in handball from nonlinear pedagogy motivated the present work. The objective was to analyse the influence of certain task constraints: zonal defense of one line (LI1) and zonal defense of two lines with advanced defender (LI2), in the behaviour patterns, offensive and defensive ones, performed by handball players. These constraints, representative of the most used defensive handball systems, were applied in 16 small-sided games, during the eight sessions in which the study was developed. A nomothetic/punctual/monitoring observational design was used to register the behaviours performed by 14 players (M = 14.6 years and SD = 0.4), members of a team that competes in the male cadet category, who were divided into two groups for the matches. The analysis of polar coordinates allowed to know the influence exerted by both constraints at a general level, analyzing jointly the behaviors of both teams and, also, specifically for each team. Thus, significant relationships of mutual activation were found between: (1) LI1 and odd fixation, penetration throw, distance throw, block, opponent change, assist and counter block; and (2) between LI2 and uncheck, slip and intercept. Knowing the influence exerted by the task constraints (behaviors that facilitate and inhibit) is key in the application of non-linear pedagogy, in this way those that help to achieve the proposed objectives can be selected.
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Lins, Isis Didier, Paulo Renato Alves Firmino, Diogo de Carvalho Bezerra, Márcio das Chagas Moura, Enrique López Droguett, Leandro Chaves Rêgo und Carlos Renato dos Santos. „DEFENSE-ATTACK INTERACTION OVER OPTIMALLY DESIGNED DEFENSE SYSTEMS VIA GAMES AND RELIABILITY“. Pesquisa Operacional 34, Nr. 2 (August 2014): 215–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-7438.2014.034.02.0215.
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Degterev, D. A., und E. A. Stepkin. „American Assistance to Israel: Origins, Structure, Dynamics“. MGIMO Review of International Relations, Nr. 3(30) (28.06.2013): 92–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2013-3-30-92-99.
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This article provides an analysis of the U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It shows the evolution, structure and key trends of aid flows in 1949-2012. Particular emphasis is placed on military assistance to Israel, aimed to provide Qualitative military edge (QME) of the country in the Middle East and to ensure regional stability. The game-theoretic analysis in particular the repeated games is applied in order to understand the mechanisms of the effect of U.S. military assistance to Middle Eastern countries. The basic directions of U.S. aid (development of missile defense systems in Israel and financing of a number of civil programs) are shown. The main point of critic of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel, as well as an assessment of the influence of the «Arab Spring» and the global economic crisis on aid flows are provided.
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Hasan, Saqib, Abhishek Dubey, Gabor Karsai und Xenofon Koutsoukos. „A game-theoretic approach for power systems defense against dynamic cyber-attacks“. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems 115 (Februar 2020): 105432. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.105432.
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HAUSKEN, KJELL. „GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TWO-PERIOD-DEPENDENT DEGRADED MULTISTATE RELIABILITY SYSTEMS“. International Game Theory Review 13, Nr. 03 (September 2011): 247–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911002988.
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A system of two components is analyzed as a two-period game. After period 1 the system can be fully operational, in two states of intermediate degradation, or fail. Analogously to changing failure rates in dependent systems analyzed with Markov analysis, unit costs of defense and attack, and contest intensities, change in period 2. As the values of the two intermediate states increase from zero which gives the series system, towards their maxima which gives the parallel system, the defender becomes more advantaged, and the attacker more disadvantaged. Simulations illustrate the players' efforts in the two time periods and utilities dependent on parametric changes. The defender withdraws from defending the system when the values of both degraded states are very low. The attacker withdraws from attacking the system when the values of both degraded states are very high. In the benchmark case the defender prefers the one-period game and the attacker prefers the two-period game, but if the attacker's unit cost of attack is large for one component, and the value of the degraded system with this component operational is above a low value, the defender prefers the two-period game to obtain high utility in period 2 against a weak attacker. When the values of the degraded states are above certain low values, the players exert higher efforts in period 1 of a two-period game than in a one-period game, as investments into the future to ensure high versus low reliability in period 2.
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Boudko, Svetlana, Peder Aursand und Habtamu Abie. „Evolutionary Game for Confidentiality in IoT-Enabled Smart Grids“. Information 11, Nr. 12 (14.12.2020): 582. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info11120582.
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We applied evolutionary game theory to extend a resource constrained security game model for confidentiality attacks and defenses in an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), which is a component of IoT-enabled Smart Grids. The AMI is modeled as a tree structure where each node aggregates the information of its children before encrypting it and passing it on to its parent. As a part of the model, we developed a discretization scheme for solving the replicator equations. The aim of this work was to explore the space of possible behaviors of attackers and to develop a framework where the AMI nodes adaptively select the most profitable strategies. Using this model, we simulated the evolution of a population of attackers and defenders on various cases resembling the real life implementation of AMI. We discuss in depth how to enhance security in AMI using evolutionary game theory either by a priori analysis or as a tool to run dynamic and adaptive infrastructure defense.
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Xiao, Kaiming, Cheng Zhu, Junjie Xie, Yun Zhou, Xianqiang Zhu und Weiming Zhang. „Dynamic Defense against Stealth Malware Propagation in Cyber-Physical Systems: A Game-Theoretical Framework“. Entropy 22, Nr. 8 (15.08.2020): 894. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e22080894.
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Stealth malware is a representative tool of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, which poses an increased threat to cyber-physical systems (CPS) today. Due to the use of stealthy and evasive techniques, stealth malwares usually render conventional heavy-weight countermeasures inapplicable. Light-weight countermeasures, on the other hand, can help retard the spread of stealth malwares, but the ensuing side effects might violate the primary safety requirement of CPS. Hence, defenders need to find a balance between the gain and loss of deploying light-weight countermeasures, which normally is a challenging task. To address this challenge, we model the persistent anti-malware process as a shortest-path tree interdiction (SPTI) Stackelberg game with both static version (SSPTI) and multi-stage dynamic version (DSPTI), and safety requirements of CPS are introduced as constraints in the defender’s decision model. The attacker aims to stealthily penetrate the CPS at the lowest cost (e.g., time, effort) by selecting optimal network links to spread, while the defender aims to retard the malware epidemic as much as possible. Both games are modeled as bi-level integer programs and proved to be NP-hard. We then develop a Benders decomposition algorithm to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium of SSPTI, and design a Model Predictive Control strategy to solve DSPTI approximately by sequentially solving an 1+δ approximation of SSPTI. Extensive experiments have been conducted by comparing proposed algorithms and strategies with existing ones on both static and dynamic performance metrics. The evaluation results demonstrate the efficiency of proposed algorithms and strategies on both simulated and real-case-based CPS networks. Furthermore, the proposed dynamic defense framework shows its advantage of achieving a balance between fail-secure ability and fail-safe ability while retarding the stealth malware propagation in CPS.
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Close, Kevin, und Audrey Amrein-Beardsley. „Learning from what doesn’t work in teacher evaluation“. Phi Delta Kappan 100, Nr. 1 (27.08.2018): 15–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0031721718797115.
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Recent lawsuits reveal common mistakes plaguing current teacher evaluation systems. Drawing on arguments in court documents for prominent cases, the authors find that evaluation systems using value-added measures (VAM) suffer from a) inconsistent and unreliable teacher ratings, b) bias toward and against teachers of certain types of students, c) easy opportunities for administrators to game the system, and d) a lack of transparency. They urge others to engage with these (and other) arguments to design better, more valid, more useful, and ultimately more defensible teacher evaluation systems.
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Wang, Kun, Miao Du, Dejun Yang, Chunsheng Zhu, Jian Shen und Yan Zhang. „Game-Theory-Based Active Defense for Intrusion Detection in Cyber-Physical Embedded Systems“. ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems 16, Nr. 1 (03.11.2016): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2886100.
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Xiang, Yingmeng, und Lingfeng Wang. „A game-theoretic study of load redistribution attack and defense in power systems“. Electric Power Systems Research 151 (Oktober 2017): 12–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2017.05.020.
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Coughlin, P. J. „Pure strategy equilibria in a class of systems defense games“. International Journal of Game Theory 20, Nr. 3 (September 1992): 195–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01253775.
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Li, Yapeng, Ye Deng, Yu Xiao und Jun Wu. „Attack and Defense Strategies in Complex Networks Based on Game Theory“. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity 32, Nr. 6 (Dezember 2019): 1630–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11424-019-7420-0.
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Musman, Scott, und Andrew Turner. „A game theoretic approach to cyber security risk management“. Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology 15, Nr. 2 (20.03.2017): 127–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1548512917699724.
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This paper describes the Cyber Security Game (CSG). Cyber Security Game is a method that has been implemented in software that quantitatively identifies cyber security risks and uses this metric to determine the optimal employment of security methods for any given investment level. Cyber Security Game maximizes a system’s ability to operate in today’s contested cyber environment by minimizing its mission risk. The risk score is calculated by using a mission impact model to compute the consequences of cyber incidents and combining that with the likelihood that attacks will succeed. The likelihood of attacks succeeding is computed by applying a threat model to a system topology model and defender model. Cyber Security Game takes into account the widespread interconnectedness of cyber systems, where defenders must defend all multi-step attack paths and an attacker only needs one to succeed. It employs a game theoretic solution using a game formulation that identifies defense strategies to minimize the maximum cyber risk (MiniMax). This paper discusses the methods and models that compose Cyber Security Game . A limited example of a Point of Sale system is used to provide specific demonstrations of Cyber Security Game models and analyses.
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Cărăbaş, Ionică. „Aspects regarding the pivot player tasks in the handball game“. Timisoara Physical Education and Rehabilitation Journal 7, Nr. 13 (01.12.2014): 123–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/tperj-2015-0021.
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Abstract Evolution of the handball game has brought a different approach in terms of the pivot player game. Since the main task of delaying the lateral movement of defenders to create opportunities for the back players or receive the ball and score against defending 6:0, was reached to the much more varied tasks and responsibilities imposed by the much larger spaces offered by the new defense systems. Many of the game actions are based to the pivot player movements, finding an optimal solution to score by the back or wing player being the result of her screening and sliding. To achieve more efficient realisation of this tasks the pivot player must have qualities such as: motor skills, power, speed and a good mental balance.
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Qi, Chao, Jiangxing Wu, Guozhen Cheng, Jianjian Ai und Shuo Zhao. „Security Analysis of Dynamic SDN Architectures Based on Game Theory“. Security and Communication Networks 2018 (2018): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/4123736.
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Security evaluation of SDN architectures is of critical importance to develop robust systems and address attacks. Focused on a novel-proposed dynamic SDN framework, a game-theoretic model is presented to analyze its security performance. This model can represent several kinds of players’ information, simulate approximate attack scenarios, and quantitatively estimate systems’ reliability. And we explore several typical game instances defined by system’s capability, players’ objects, and strategies. Experimental results illustrate that the system’s detection capability is not a decisive element to security enhancement as introduction of dynamism and redundancy into SDN can significantly improve security gain and compensate for its detection weakness. Moreover, we observe a range of common strategic actions across environmental conditions. And analysis reveals diverse defense mechanisms adopted in dynamic systems have different effect on security improvement. Besides, the existence of equilibrium in particular situations further proves the novel structure’s feasibility, flexibility, and its persistent ability against long-term attacks.
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Zhao, Jinxiong, Xun Zhang, Fuqiang Di, Sensen Guo, Xiaoyu Li, Xiao Jing, Panfei Huang und Dejun Mu. „Exploring the Optimum Proactive Defense Strategy for the Power Systems from an Attack Perspective“. Security and Communication Networks 2021 (12.02.2021): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6699108.
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Proactive defense is one of the most promising approaches to enhance cyber-security in the power systems, while how to balance its costs and benefits has not been fully studied. This paper proposes a novel method to model cyber adversarial behaviors as attackers contending for the defenders’ benefit based on the game theory. We firstly calculate the final benefit of the hackers and defenders in different states on the basis of the constructed models and then predict the possible attack behavior and evaluate the best defense strategy for the power systems. Based on a real power system subnet, we analyze 27 attack models with our method, and the result shows that the optimal strategy of the attacker is to launch a small-scale attack. Correspondingly, the optimal strategy of the defender is to conduct partial-defense.
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Wang, Kun, Li Yuan, Toshiaki Miyazaki, Yuanfang Chen und Yan Zhang. „Jamming and Eavesdropping Defense in Green Cyber–Physical Transportation Systems Using a Stackelberg Game“. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics 14, Nr. 9 (September 2018): 4232–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tii.2018.2841033.
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Kujawski, Edouard. „A Probabilistic Game-Theoretic Method to Assess Deterrence and Defense Benefits of Security Systems“. Systems Engineering 19, Nr. 6 (November 2016): 549–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sys.21376.
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Liu, Zhaoxi, und Lingfeng Wang. „FlipIt Game Model-Based Defense Strategy Against Cyberattacks on SCADA Systems Considering Insider Assistance“. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 16 (2021): 2791–804. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2021.3065504.
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Mecheva, Teodora, und Nikolay Kakanakov. „Cybersecurity in Intelligent Transportation Systems“. Computers 9, Nr. 4 (13.10.2020): 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/computers9040083.
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Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are emerging field characterized by complex data model, dynamics and strict time requirements. Ensuring cybersecurity in ITS is a complex task on which the safety and efficiency of transportation depends. The imposition of standards for a comprehensive architecture, as well as specific security standards, is one of the key steps in the evolution of ITS. The article examines the general outlines of the ITS architecture and security issues. The main focus of security approaches is: configuration and initialization of the devices during manufacturing at perception layer; anonymous authentication of nodes in VANET at network layer; defense of fog-based structures at support layer and description and standardization of the complex model of data and metadata and defense of systems, based on AI at application layer. The article oversees some conventional methods as network segmentation and cryptography that should be adapted in order to be applied in ITS cybersecurity. The focus is on innovative approaches that have recently been trying to find their place in ITS security strategies. These approaches includes blockchain, bloom filter, fog computing, artificial intelligence, game theory and ontologies. In conclusion, a correlation is made between the commented methods, the problems they solve and the architectural layers in which they are applied.