Thematische Bibliographien / Corporate dividend policy

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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Corporate dividend policy“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 9. Juni 2025

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Corporate dividend policy"

Baker, H. Kent, and Rob Weigand. "Corporate dividend policy revisited." Managerial Finance 41, no. 2 (February 9, 2015): 126–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-03-2014-0077.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview and synthesis of some important literature on dividend policy, chronicle changing perspectives and trends, provide stylized facts, offer practical implications, and suggest avenues for future research. Design/methodology/approach – The authors provide a survey of literature surveys with a focus on insights for paying cash dividends. Findings – The analysis of literature surveys on dividend policy provides some stylized facts. For example, US evidence indicates that the importance of cash dividends as a part of investors’ total returns has declined over time. Share repurchases now play an increasingly important role in payout policy in countries permitting stock buybacks. The popular view is that dividend policy is important, as evidenced by the large amount of money involved and the attention that firms, security analysts, and investors give to dividends. Firms tend to follow a managed dividend policy rather than a residual dividend policy, which involves paying dividends from earnings left over after meeting investment needs while maintaining its target capital structure. Certain determinants of cash dividends are consistently important over time in shaping actual dividend policies including the stability of past dividends and current and anticipated earnings. No universal set of factors is appropriate for all firms because dividend policy is sensitive to numerous factors including firm characteristics, market characteristics, and substitute forms of dividends. Universal or one-size-fits-all theories or explanations for why companies pay dividends are too simplistic. Practical implications – The dividend puzzle remains an important topic in modern finance. Originality/value – This is the first a survey of literature surveys on cash dividends.

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Pradip, Kumar Das. "Dividend Policy and Taxation—A Review." Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management 14, no. 3 (June 17, 2020): 2703–10. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3970966.

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Indeed, corporate dividend policy and taxation is a subject of intense research. Mostly, statutory amendments in the dividend tax practice fabricate the dividend payout policy of corporate sector. At times, corporate composing substantial promoters’ securities are identified to keep a major objective to curtail their dividend payout. The study aims at analyzing the interaction between dividend policy and taxation. This paper provides a brief contribution of the diverse thoughts on the clientele effect for analyzing the impact of taxation on corporate dividend policy and finds that the temporal pattern of corporate dividend payout and dynamic dividend behavior have significant impact on taxation in variety of modalities. The findings have significant implication for companies, investors and the Government.

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Repon, Miah. "Implications of Corporate Dividend Policy on Corporate Taxation:." DIU Journal of Business and Entrepreneurship 10, no. 02 (December 30, 2016): 81–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.36481/diujbe.v010i2.wx58xg57.

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Corporate dividend policy is related with corporate tax liability. Tax liability of companies may vary depending on the payment of dividend. Effective corporate dividend policy can reduce corporate tax liability. Thus, effective corporate dividend policy can help corporations maximize shareholders’ wealth by reducing effective tax rate. Tax liability may increase or decrease depending on the dividend payment of a company. The objective of this study includes justifying the implications of Corporate Dividend Policy on Corporate Taxation in case of listed pharmaceuticals companies in Bangladesh. In this study 6 listed pharmaceuticals companies in Bangladesh have been included and it has been found that when those companies paid dividend at prescribed level as per corporate tax law, they got tax rebate on their regular tax rate. Thus, after deducting the tax rebate those companies paid tax liability at reduced rate and this eventually lessened effective tax rate. Companies may ensure payment of dividend in away, so that retained earnings can be used for future investment opportunities as well as the tax burden becomes logical. They should make balance between dividend policy and tax liability to maximize the wealth of shareholders

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Nazeem, Shuaibu, Idris Abdulwahab Anas, and Adabenege Yahaya Onipe. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy." Economics and Business Quarterly Reviews 6, no. 3 (September 29, 2023): 125–41. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8392920.

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In this paper, we have analyzed the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on dividend policy of 134 listed firms on the Main Board of the Nigerian Exchange, over fifteen (15) years (2008-2022) using the Generalized Method of Moments. Corporate governance mechanisms considered in this study are foreign ownership, institutional ownership, board size, board independence, audit committee gender, risk committee gender, and big4 audit firms. Dividend policy proxy is dividend per share. The research design is both ex post facto and correlational; the population is 156, from which 134 listed firms were selected, meaning that 22 listed firms were excluded. This paper obtained data from the annual reports and accounts of the listed firms, over the period covered. The data set was analysed using descriptive analysis, Pearson correlation analysis and GMM panel regression analysis. These analyses were carried out with STATA 15.1. The results show that foreign ownership has significant effect on dividend policy; institutional ownership has insignificant effect on dividend policy; board size has significant effect on dividend policy; board independence has significant effect on dividend policy; audit committee gender has insignificant effect on dividend policy; risk committee gender has significant effect on dividend policy; the presence of big4 is not significant with dividend policy. These results are useful to regulators, market participants, shareholders, suppliers, lenders (creditors), managers, employees, scholars and researchers. However, the findings of this paper are (I) limited by the 134 listed firms on the Main Board of the NGX (2) variables used in the study (3) period of coverage (2008-2022). Future research may wish to consider the whole 156 listed firms; expand the period of study or consider other variables of corporate governance, such as family ownership, ownership concentration, CEO ownership, board ownership, board tenure, board education, board compensation, board turnover, nomination committee gender, remuneration committee gender, joint auditors, etc.

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Hauser, Richard, and John H. Thornton Jr. "Dividend policy and corporate valuation." Managerial Finance 43, no. 6 (June 12, 2017): 663–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-05-2015-0157.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate an empirical solution to dividend policy relevance. Design/methodology/approach The paper combines measures of firm maturity in a logit regression to define a comprehensive life-cycle model of the likelihood of dividend payment. The valuation of firms that conform to the model is compared to the valuation of firms that do not fit the model. Valuation is measured by the market to book (M/B) ratio. Findings The analysis indicates that dividend policy is related to firm value. Dividend-paying firms that fit the life-cycle model have a higher median valuation than dividend-paying firms that do not fit the life-cycle model. Similarly, non-paying firms that fit the life-cycle model have a higher median valuation than non-paying firms that do not fit the life-cycle model. The results also provide evidence that the disappearing dividend phenomenon is related to shifts in valuation. Research limitations/implications This paper focuses on the payment of dividends. Stock repurchases are not considered. Practical implications The results indicate that dividend policy is related to firm value. Approximately 15 percent of sample observations have a dividend policy counter to the life-cycle model. Originality/value This paper shows that the relation between a firm’s M/B ratio and dividend policy changes over the firm’s life-cycle. It also shows that the catering motive for dividends is strongest among firms that are outliers in the life-cycle model and firms of intermediate maturity.

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Setiawan, Doddy, and Lian Kee Phua. "Corporate governance and dividend policy in Indonesia." Business Strategy Series 14, no. 5/6 (September 2, 2013): 135–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/bss-01-2013-0003.

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Purpose – This study aims at examining the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy among Indonesian companies. There are two theories of the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy: substitution and outcome theory. Substitution theory argue that corporate governance have negative effect on dividend policy, while outcome theory argue that corporate governance have positive effect on dividend policy. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy in Indonesia. This study aims at examining the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy among Indonesian companies. There are two theories of the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy: substitution and outcome theory. Substitution theory argue that corporate governance have negative effect on dividend policy, while outcome theory argue that corporate governance have positive effect on dividend policy. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy in Indonesia. Design/methodology/approach – The sample of this research comprises 248 firms from Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2004-2006. This research using Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI) to measure corporate governance in Indonesia Findings – We find that TDI are low among Indonesian firms, with a score of 32 per cent out of the maximum point. This score indicates that Indonesian corporate governance is still low. The results show that there is a negative relation between corporate governance and dividend policy in Indonesia. Thus, the Indonesian companies pay more dividends when corporate governance practice is low. This result confirms applicable of substitution theory in Indonesia. Research limitations/implications – This research focuses on manufacturing industry in Indonesia. Therefore, the conclusions of this research apply on the manufacturing companies in Indonesia Practical implications – This research shows that companies with poor corporate governance pay dividend higher than companies with better corporate governance. Thus, investor can use this information to make investment decision. Originality/value – This research provides evidence on the negative effect of corporate governance on dividend policy in Indonesia (substitution theory).

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Akhigbe, Aigbe, and Jeff Madura. "Dividend Policy and Corporate Performance." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 23, no. 9-10 (December 1996): 1267–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00079.

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Saravanakumar, S. "Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy." Asia Pacific Business Review 7, no. 2 (April 2011): 25–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097324701100700203.

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Anderson, Mark, Muhammad Kabir, Harun Rashid, and Hussein Warsame. "Corporate Dividend Policy and Tax Avoidance." Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne 70, no. 4 (2022): 747–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2022.70.4.anderson.

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This article investigates the relation between corporate dividend policy and tax avoidance. The payment of dividends facilitates the transfer of corporate resources, usually cash, from the company to its shareholders. An important aspect of dividend policy is that it is used to address agency problems between shareholders and managers associated with free cash flow. Given that a dividend payment policy is generally considered to be a fixed commitment, and managers may be penalized for cutting dividends, managers may adopt a tax-avoidance strategy to generate additional cash flow to meet this obligation and to fund operating and investment needs. Using data for US publicly listed corporations, we first document that a higher dividend payout ratio is associated with a lower cash-payment-based effective tax rate and a higher book-tax difference, indicating a higher level of tax avoidance. We then test whether tax avoidance increased with the initiation of dividends that occurred in response to the 2003 US dividend income tax cut, and find that it did. The results support our prediction that dividend policy affects tax planning. We employ a Heckman two-stage procedure to address other endogeneities. We also show that our baseline results are robust when an extensive set of tests is applied, including alternative measures of tax avoidance and dividend payout. In addition, we find that the relation between dividend payout and measures of tax avoidance is stronger for firms that experience a non-trivial increase in the dividend payout ratio and that have low institutional ownership, high leverage, and low operating cash flow. Overall, our findings provide persuasive evidence that dividend policy affects the distribution of surplus among shareholders, managers, and the tax authority.

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Pan, Lee-Hsien, Thomas Barkley, and Shaio-Yan Huang. "Corporate Payout Policy and CEO Compensation Structure." International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting 8, no. 2 (April 25, 2018): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ijafr.v8i2.13280.

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This paper examines how corporate payout policy is affected by CEO compensation structure using data from more than 1,600 firms during 1992-2006. Specifically, it studies the effects of CEO compensation structure, firm characteristics, and dividend payout policies on dividend type and relative dividend size.It finds CEO salary is positively associated with cash dividends, share repurchases, and relative dividend size whereas CEO salary (compared to bonus) as a percentage of total compensation has negative effects on cash dividends and share repurchases. It also discovers CEO stock awards as a percentage of total compensation are positively associated with share repurchases and CEO option awards are negatively related to cash dividends.In addition, this paper shows larger firms and firms with more free cash flow distribute more cash dividends and share repurchases. On the other hand, firms with higher leverage ratio and more investment opportunities prefer to save earnings for future re-investment projects. Finally, it show dividend payout policy (either cash dividends or share repurchases) increases relative dividend size. The results of this study suggest that CEO compensation components affect CEOs’ dividend payout decisions: when CEOs’ stock award increases, they prefer to use share repurchases; when CEOs’ option award increases, they prefer not to use cash dividends.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Corporate dividend policy"

Verma, Savita. "Ownership structure and corporate dividend policy." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/31375.

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This study investigates the potential role of ownership structure as a determinant of the corporate dividend policy. A firm's dividend policy is modelled as the outcome of a voting game among groups of asymmetrically informed shareholders, who also have different marginal tax rates for dividend income. The outcome of the voting game is determined by the relative voting powers of these shareholder groups. Voting power is denned as the probability that a particular block of shares will be pivotal in determining the outcome of the voting game. Using Shapley values as instruments for shareholder groups' voting powers, data on firms which traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange during the 1976-88 period are employed to test the model's predictions. Business, Sauder School of Graduate

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Al-Malkawi, Husam-Aladin Nizar Y., University of Western Sydney, College of Law and Business, and School of Economics and Finance. "Dividend policy of publicly quoted companies in emerging markets : the case of Jordan." THESIS_CLAB_EFI_Al-Malkawi_H.xml, 2005. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/819.

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The determinants of corporate dividend policy remain controversial despite half a century of active research. Over that time a number of competing theories of dividend policy have been proposed, but no consensus has been reached about their explanatory power. This thesis examines the determinants of dividend policy of publicly quoted companies in Jordan as a case study of an emerging market. The study uses a firm-level panel data set of all publicly traded firms on the Ammam Stock Exchange between 1989 and 2000. Nine research hypotheses are developed, which are used to represent the main theories of corporate dividends. The results of studies conducted in this thesis suggest that the proportion of stocks held by insiders and state ownership significantly affect the amount of dividends paid, but not the decision to pay dividends. Larger, mature, profitable firms with less investment opportunities are more likely to pay dividends. These factors are found to also positively affect the level of dividends. Results provide no support for the signalling hypothesis. The thesis concludes with a discussion of some of the implications of all results and suggestions for further research. Doctor of Philosophy (Finance)

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Farinha, Jorge Bento Ribeiro Barbosa. "Dividend policy, corporate governance and managerial entrenchment." Thesis, Lancaster University, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.310531.

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Galiakhmetova, Ramilya <1985&gt. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2013. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/5657/1/Galiakhmetova_Ramilya_tesi.pdf.

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This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

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Lawrence, Stephen Caleb. "Essays in empirical corporate finance." Thesis, Boston College, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/591.

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Thesis advisor: Edith Hotchkiss Chapter one of this dissertation provides new evidence on the existence of dividend clienteles for institutional investors. We directly examine individual institutions' preferences for dividend paying stocks based on the characteristics of stocks held in their portfolio. Many institutions follow persistent investment styles, maintaining relatively high or low dividend yield portfolios over time. Institutions which hold portfolios of higher yielding stocks are significantly more likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase or sell their stock in response to a decrease. For a subset of institutions, we directly observe the proportion of their portfolio managed on behalf of taxable clients. Consistent with tax-induced dividend clienteles, institutions with more taxable clients are less likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase. Finally, we show that stock price reactions to announcements of dividend increases are related to characteristics of the institutions holding the stock. Our results suggest that tax status, as well as other factors are important in explaining observed clientele behavior. Chapter two explores the determinants of heterogeneity in institutional investor portfolio preferences and the relationship between institutions and the clients they serve. I find that the characteristics of an institution's clients and the characteristics of the institution itself are both important determinants of portfolio preferences and trading behavior. Specifically, I find that institutions traditionally subject to prudent investor laws are more likely to invest in high quality stocks, although, institutions sub-managing money for pension funds are less prudent than pension managers themselves. In addition, I find that institutions with taxable clients are likely to avoid unnecessary dividend taxation and turn over their portfolios less frequently. More generally, institutions exhibit systematic shifts in their exposure to common risk factors that may be explained in part by the levels and changes in client composition. While evidence for a causal link between client shifts and institutional preferences is limited to mutual funds, contemporaneous changes in clients and portfolio characteristics suggest that the dynamics of institutional investment are closely related to the nature of the clients served Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2007 Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management Discipline: Finance

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Silva, Domingos Luis Correia da. "Corporate control and financial policy : an empirical investigation of dividend policy in Germany." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.389744.

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Pan, Lee-Hsien. "Two essays on dividend policy, managerial compensation, and corporate governance." Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2009. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.

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Pan, Carrie H. "Two essays in corporate finance." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1186166338.

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Truong, Thanh, and thanh truong@rmit edu au. "Corporate Ownership, Equity Agency Costs and Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis." RMIT University. Economics, Finance and Marketing, 2008. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20080528.094747.

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Equity agency costs are important to the firm and the management of these costs is a critical element of corporate governance, yet empirical research that focuses on the magnitude and impact of agency costs is limited. This thesis sets out to furnish empirical evidence in the area of corporate ownership with a particular focus on the magnitude of equity agency costs as well as the relation that exists between the largest shareholder in a firm and equity agency costs and between the largest shareholder and the dividend policy that a firm adopts. This thesis provides an empirical analysis of the effect of corporate ownership, together with other governance mechanisms on equity agency conflicts for the largest 500 Australian listed firms. The results from this analysis provide strong support for the view that equity agency costs are related to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a significant non-linear relation between inside ownership and the proxies for agency costs. Further, the results demonstrate that other governance mechanisms, particularly board size, board leadership and short-term debt financing, are effective in improving the use of firm assets, yet they do not seem to restrain firm management from incurring excessive discretionary operating expenses. This thesis also extends the investigation of the corporate ownership-equity agency cost relation by focusing on the largest shareholder for 9,165 listed firms drawn from 43 countries around the world. The results suggest that cross-sectional variation in equity agency costs can be partly attributable to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a statistically significant non-linear relation between the shareholding of the largest shareholder and the agency cost proxies. The type of the largest shareholder, i.e. whether the largest shareholder is an insider or a financial institution, is also important in analysis of this relation. Further, debt financing, dividend policy and legal origin vary in their impact on the agency cost proxies. This thesis also investigates the interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy for 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries around the world. Consistent with previous studies, the results suggest that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited, or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions. Together, the results imply that equity agency costs vary with corporate ownership though this relation remains, of course, the subject of continuing investigation in finance. A major contribution of this thesis is demonstrating that corporate ownership, particularly the largest shareholder, plays a pivotal role in controlling agency costs. Accordingly, this suggests the following policy implication: by improving the legal environment and regulatory constraints imposed on large shareholders as well as legal protection for minority shareholders, the efficiency gains generated from large shareholder control can be translated into higher firm valuation to the benefit of all shareholders in the firm.

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Bücher zum Thema "Corporate dividend policy"

Baker, H. Kent. Dividends and Dividend Policy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2009.

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1963-, Mahapatra Khiroda Chandra, ed. Corporate dividend policy. New Delhi: Sonali Publications, 2004.

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Shukla, Omparakash. Dividend policy & corporate sector. Jaipur: Paradise Publishers, 2012.

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Khurana, P. K. Corporate dividend policy in India. New Delhi: Panchsheel Publishers, 1985.

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1968-, Goergen Marc, and Renneboog Luc, eds. Dividend policy and corporate governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

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Bernheim, B. Douglas. Optimal money burning: Theory and application to corporate dividend policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.

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C, Lease Ronald, ed. Dividend policy: Its impact on firm value. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 2000.

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Jeremy, Edwards, and Institute for Fiscal Studies, eds. The effects of taxation on corporate dividend policy in the U.K. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1986.

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Byrne, Derek A. The dynamic relationship between agency theory and corporate dividend policy: A UK industry analysis. Dublin: University College Dublin, Graduate School of Business, 1997.

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Batool, Zubaida. Dividend policy and role of corporate governance in manufacturing sector of Pakistan. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2014.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Corporate dividend policy"

Anwer, Zaheer, Shamsher Mohamad Ramadili Mohamad, Mohamed Eskandar Shah Mohamed Rasid, M. Kabir Hassan, and Andrea Paltrinieri. "Dividend policy." In Islamic Corporate Finance, 147–70. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351061506-8.

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Dutta, Shantanu, and Samir Saadi. "Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance." In Dividends and Dividend Policy, 447–62. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118258408.ch25.

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Manos, Ronny, Keith Parker, and D. R. Myddelton. "Capital Structure and Dividend Policy." In Corporate Finance for Business, 173–202. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92419-5_8.

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Yanagi, Ryohei. "Optimal Dividend Policy Based on Optimal Capital Structure." In Corporate Governance and Value Creation in Japan, 141–66. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8503-1_6.

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Handayani, Tri, Hesti Widianti, Dwi Retna Sulistyawati, and Rita Andini. "Literature Review: Dividend Policy, Agency Theory and Corporate Governance." In Proceedings of the Tegal International Conference on Applied Social Science & Humanities (TICASSH 2022), 117–23. Paris: Atlantis Press SARL, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/978-2-494069-09-1_16.

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Abdurrozaq, Sumbaga Bimas, Farah Margaretha Leon, Siti Rahimah Widyaty, Wahyuni Rusliyana Sari, M. D. Mahmudul Alam, and Putra Pratama. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in Indonesian Manufacturing Companies." In Proceedings of the International Conference on Entrepreneurship, Leadership and Business Innovation (ICELBI 2022), 657–65. Dordrecht: Atlantis Press International BV, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-350-4_65.

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Dimitropoulos, Panagiotis, and Konstantinos Koronios. "Corporate Environmental Responsibility, Cash Holding and Dividend Policy Decisions." In CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance, 177–96. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72773-4_9.

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Bista, Nar B., Nitesh Raj Bartaula, Om Shrestha, Pooja Gnawali, Poshan Lamichhane, and Pratiksha Parajuli. "Impact of Corporate Governance on Dividend Policy of Nepalese Enterprises." In Business Governance and Society, 377–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94613-9_21.

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Pradinsha, E. T., and R. Reshmi. "Mapping Trend in Corporate Dividend Policy: Review and Bibliometric Analysis." In Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics, 167–84. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6242-2_9.

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Lestari, Tri Utami, and Muhammad Zahran Ramadhan. "Does Green Accounting, Intellectual Capital, and Dividend Policy Affect Corporate Value?" In Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, 387–407. Dordrecht: Atlantis Press International BV, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-558-4_23.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Corporate dividend policy"

Gong, Jaisik. "The Corporate Governance Structure and Dividend Policy." In Business 2015. Science & Engineering Research Support soCiety, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/astl.2015.84.24.

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Ogorodnikova, Elena Petrovna. "Behavioural Corporate Finance And The Firm'S Dividend Policy." In International Scientific Congress «KNOWLEDGE, MAN AND CIVILIZATION». European Publisher, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2021.05.158.

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Thamrin, K. M. Husni, Sulastri, Mukhlis, Abdul Bashir, Hilda Tri Lestari, and Isnurhadi. "Financing Decision and Dividend Policy to Corporate Value." In 5th Sriwijaya Economics, Accounting, and Business Conference (SEABC 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200520.039.

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Kim, Jinhwa, Chaehwan Won, and Jae Kwon Bae. "A Corporate Dividend Policy UJsing Human Knowledge Process Model." In 2008 Third International Conference on Convergence and Hybrid Information Technology (ICCIT). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccit.2008.78.

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Gunawan, Kania Ester, Werner R. Murhadi, and Arif Herlambang. "The effect of good corporate governance on dividend policy." In Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Management (INSYMA 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/insyma-19.2019.15.

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Mengyu, Qu. "The Impact of Differential Cash Dividend Policy on Corporate Cash Dividends - An Analysis Based on Corporate Life Cycle." In 2022 7th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2022). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220405.056.

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Husni, Tafdil, Rida Rahim, and Riyadi Aprayuda. "Cash Compensation, Corporate Governance, Ownership, and Dividend Policy on Banking Performance." In 6th Annual International Conference on Management Research (AICMaR 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200331.046.

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Sari, Dita, and Mega Metalia. "Tax Avoidance and Dividend Policy, with Corporate Governance as Moderating Variable." In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference of Economics, Business, and Entrepreneurship, ICEBE 2023, 13-14 September 2023, Bandar Lampung, Indonesia. EAI, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.13-9-2023.2341133.

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Gürünlü, Meltem. "Foreign ownership as a corporate governance mechanism affecting the firm value." In Corporate governance: Participants, mechanisms and performance. Virtus Interpress, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgpmpp10.

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This study examines the effect of foreign ownership on firm value by affecting corporate policies as a corporate governance monitoring mechanism and contributes to the literature on the role of foreign shareholdings which are especially important for emerging markets in three stands: increased level of board independence which serves to eliminate the conflicts of interest among different stakeholders within a company, a dividend policy disciplining the management of free cash flows and an investment policy focusing on more research and development (innovation), enabling high growth opportunities and profitable investments.

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Darmawan, Akhmad, Bima Pratama, Yudhistira Aryoko, and Dinda Vistyan. "The Effect of Profitability, Debt Policy, And Liquidity on Corporate Values with Dividend Policy as Moderating Variables." In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference of Business, Accounting and Economics, ICBAE 2020, 5 - 6 August 2020, Purwokerto, Indonesia. EAI, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.5-8-2020.2301130.

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Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Corporate dividend policy"

Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Lee Redding. Optimal Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate Dividend Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5682.

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Morck, Randall. How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups - The Double Taxation of Inter-Corporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10944.

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Adam, Isabelle, Mihály Fazekas, Alfredo Hernandez Sanchez, Peter Horn, and Nóra Regös. Integrity Dividends: Procurement in the Water and Sanitation Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean. Edited by Marcello Basani and Jacopo Gamba. Inter-American Development Bank, January 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004688.

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Public procurement represents a large portion of government expenditure, more so in developing economies. Inefficiencies in public expenditures thus place a heavy burden on society. The Water and Sanitation (W&S) sector is especially vulnerable to public procurement inefficiencies due to the capital-intensive and complex nature of large-scale projects such as sewage, pipelines, and general maintenance. Recent studies have found that quality of corporate governance and transparency of water utilities as well as regulatory and supervisory agencies are key drivers of the sectors performance. To support better policies in the W&S sector, this report conducts a sectoral measurement of public procurement integrity using government administrative data and identifies effective interventions for improving the performance of utilities. The following questions are explored: Which types of integrity risk carry the highest economic costs? What are effective policy solutions? Which address the most impactful risks effectively? What are the price savings and project-delay-reducing impacts of such solutions? To this effect, the study analyzes data for six countries in the Latin American & Caribbean region. Several regression models were run to assess which indicators of integrity are good predictors of improved outcomes in terms of price (unit or relative) and quality (delays) of public purchases in the sector.

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Lazonick, William. Investing in Innovation: A Policy Framework for Attaining Sustainable Prosperity in the United States. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, March 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp182.

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“Sustainable prosperity” denotes an economy that generates stable and equitable growth for a large and growing middle class. From the 1940s into the 1970s, the United States appeared to be on a trajectory of sustainable prosperity, especially for white-male members of the U.S. labor force. Since the 1980s, however, an increasing proportion of the U.S labor force has experienced unstable employment and inequitable income, while growing numbers of the business firms upon which they rely for employment have generated anemic productivity growth. Stable and equitable growth requires innovative enterprise. The essence of innovative enterprise is investment in productive capabilities that can generate higher-quality, lower-cost goods and services than those previously available. The innovative enterprise tends to be a business firm—a unit of strategic control that, by selling products, must make profits over time to survive. In a modern society, however, business firms are not alone in making investments in the productive capabilities required to generate innovative goods and services. Household units and government agencies also make investments in productive capabilities upon which business firms rely for their own investment activities. When they work in a harmonious fashion, these three types of organizations—household units, government agencies, and business firms—constitute “the investment triad.” The Biden administration’s Build Back Better agenda to restore sustainable prosperity in the United States focuses on investment in productive capabilities by two of the three types of organizations in the triad: government agencies, implementing the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and household units, implementing the yet-to-be-passed American Families Act. Absent, however, is a policy agenda to encourage and enable investment in innovation by business firms. This gaping lacuna is particularly problematic because many of the largest industrial corporations in the United States place a far higher priority on distributing the contents of the corporate treasury to shareholders in the form of cash dividends and stock buybacks for the sake of higher stock yields than on investing in the productive capabilities of their workforces for the sake of innovation. Based on analyzes of the “financialization” of major U.S. business corporations, I argue that, unless Build Back Better includes an effective policy agenda to encourage and enable corporate investment in innovation, the Biden administration’s program for attaining stable and equitable growth will fail. Drawing on the experience of the U.S. economy over the past seven decades, I summarize how the United States moved toward stable and equitable growth from the late 1940s through the 1970s under a “retain-and-reinvest” resource-allocation regime at major U.S. business firms. Companies retained a substantial portion of their profits to reinvest in productive capabilities, including those of career employees. In contrast, since the early 1980s, under a “downsize-and-distribute” corporate resource-allocation regime, unstable employment, inequitable income, and sagging productivity have characterized the U.S. economy. In transition from retain-and-reinvest to downsize-and-distribute, many of the largest, most powerful corporations have adopted a “dominate-and-distribute” resource-allocation regime: Based on the innovative capabilities that they have previously developed, these companies dominate market segments of their industries but prioritize shareholders in corporate resource allocation. The practice of open-market share repurchases—aka stock buybacks—at major U.S. business corporations has been central to the dominate-and-distribute and downsize-and-distribute regimes. Since the mid-1980s, stock buybacks have become the prime mode for the legalized looting of the business corporation. I call this looting process “predatory value extraction” and contend that it is the fundamental cause of the increasing concentration of income among the richest household units and the erosion of middle-class employment opportunities for most other Americans. I conclude the paper by outlining a policy framework that could stop the looting of the business corporation and put in place social institutions that support sustainable prosperity. The agenda includes a ban on stock buybacks done as open-market repurchases, radical changes in incentives for senior corporate executives, representation of workers and taxpayers as directors on corporate boards, reform of the tax system to reward innovation and penalize financialization, and, guided by the investment-triad framework, government programs to support “collective and cumulative careers” of members of the U.S. labor force. Sustained investment in human capabilities by the investment triad, including business firms, would make it possible for an ever-increasing portion of the U.S. labor force to engage in the productive careers that underpin upward socioeconomic mobility, which would be manifested by a growing, robust, and hopeful American middle class.

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Carpenter, Marie, and William Lazonick. The Pursuit of Shareholder Value: Cisco’s Transformation from Innovation to Financialization. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, February 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp202.

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Once the global leader in telecommunication systems and the Internet, over the past two decades the United States has fallen behind global competitors, and in particular China, in mobile communication infrastructure—specifically 5G and Internet of Things (IoT). This national failure, with the socioeconomic and geopolitical tensions that it creates, is not due to a lack of US government investment in the knowledge required for the mobility revolution. Nor is it because of a dearth of domestic demand for the equipment, devices, and applications that can make use of this infrastructure. Rather, the problem is the dereliction of key US-based business corporations to take the lead in making the investments in organizational learning required to generate cutting edge communication-infrastructure products. No company in the United States exemplifies this deficiency more than Cisco Systems, the business corporation founded in Silicon Valley in 1984 that had explosive growth in the 1990s to become the foremost global enterprise-networking equipment producer in the Internet revolution. This paper provides in-depth analysis of Cisco’s organizational failure, attributing it ultimately to the company’s turn from innovation in the last decades of 20th century to financialization in the early decades of the 21st century. Since 2001, Cisco’s top management has chosen to allocate corporate cash to open-market share repurchases— aka stock buybacks—for the purpose of giving manipulative boosts to the company stock price rather than make the investments in organizational learning required to become a world leader in communication-infrastructure equipment for the era of 5G and IoT. From October 2001 through October 2022, Cisco spent $152.3 billion—95 percent of its net income over the period—on stock buybacks for the purpose of propping up its stock price. These funds wasted in pursuit of “maximizing shareholder value” were on top of the $55.5 billion that Cisco paid out to shareholders in dividends, representing an additional 35 percent of net income. In this paper, we trace how Cisco grew from a Silicon Valley startup in 1984 to become, through its innovative products, the world leader in enterprise-networking equipment over the next decade and a half. As the company entered the 21st century, building on its dominance of enterprise-networking, Cisco was positioned to upgrade its technological capabilities to become a major infrastructureequipment vendor to service providers. We analyze how and why, when the Internet boom turned to bust in 2001, the organizational structure that enabled Cisco to dominate enterprise networking posed constraints related to manufacturing and marketing on the company’s growth in the more sophisticated infrastructure-equipment segment. We then document how from 2002 Cisco turned from innovation to financialization, as it used its ample profits to do stock buybacks to prop up its stock price. Finally, we ponder the larger policy implications of Cisco’s turn from innovation to financialization for the competitive position of the US information-and-communication technology (ICT) industry in the global economy.

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