Thematische Bibliographien / Consciousness

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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Consciousness“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 29. Juli 2024

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Consciousness"

Barušs, Imants. „Metanalysis of Definitions of Consciousness“. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 6, Nr. 4 (Juni 1987): 321–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/39x2-hmul-wb7b-b1a1.

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With a resurgence of interest in human consciousness, there is a need to know what it is that the term consciousness refers to. Twenty-nine definitions of consciousness by eleven authors are examined, twenty-six of which are organized into a set ordered by ontological necessity. In addition, these definitions are grouped as either phenomenological or behavioral and passive or active. It is suggested that five meanings of the term consciousness be distinguished: consciousness1 is the characteristic of an organism in a running state which entails the registration, processing and acting upon information; behavioral consciousness2 refers to the explicit knowledge of one's situation, mental states or actions, as demonstrated by one's behavior; subjective consciousness2 refers to subjective awareness characterized by intentionality; consciousness3 refers to the sense of existence of the subject of mental acts; and conscientia refers to participation in a shared plan.

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CASTELFRANCHI, CRISTIANO. „CONSCIOUSNESS OR CONSCIOUSNESSES? MODELING FOR DISENTANGLING“. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 02, Nr. 01 (Juni 2010): 27–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793843010000254.

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Kriegel, Uriah. „Consciousness and Self-Consciousness“. Monist 87, Nr. 2 (2004): 182–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist20048725.

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Bohm, David. „Consciousness and self-consciousness“. Psychological Perspectives 19, Nr. 1 (März 1988): 44–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00332928808408768.

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Mukhopadhyay, Aju. „Consciousness Binds Consciousness Releases“. IJOHMN (International Journal online of Humanities) 4, Nr. 3 (18.06.2018): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.24113/ijohmn.v4i3.45.

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Consciousness is one which pervades the whole existence; from material to vital and mental world and beyond. Not only mind or its awareness, nor matter nor senses alone; every being, everything is replete with consciousness. Consciousness as an element may rise high above that psychological stratum to which we give the name of mentality. There is a superconscient stage as well as subconscient. Endowed with mind man is most miserable as he cannot avoid fear and anxiety but he has no clue to control his miseries. The human being is used to collective consciousness which safely guides animals without a tormenting mind but it pulls man down. Collective thought, collective suggestions are formidable influences which act constantly on individual thought with mixture of obscurities and unconsciousness. One needs to be established on his individuality.

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Kotovsky, Kenneth. „Consciousness-Raising About Consciousness“. Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 31, Nr. 8 (August 1986): 579–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/024944.

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Kenny, Michael. „Multiple Consciousness/False Consciousness?“ Transcultural Psychiatry 35, Nr. 1 (März 1998): 125–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/136346159803500107.

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Bickhard, Mark H. „Consciousness and reflective consciousness“. Philosophical Psychology 18, Nr. 2 (April 2005): 205–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080500169306.

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Owen Clark, Jonathan. „Image Consciousness, Movement Consciousness“. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 44, Nr. 1 (14.11.2019): 48–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misp.12119.

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Kim, Jae Gweon. „The Status of Manas and Its Significance in the Psychological Structure of Yogācāra system“. Korean Institute for Buddhist Studies 58 (28.02.2023): 203–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.34275/kibs.2023.58.203.

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Early Buddhism and Abhidharma Buddhism explained diverse cognitive and mental phenomena in terms of the structure of six consciousnesses, as presented through the framework of eighteen realms (dhātu), and also on the basis of the relationship between the mind and mental factors. In particular, Abhidharma Buddhism acknowledged that citta can be distinguished into three different appellations of mind, thought and consciousness according to its operative modes. Abhidharma Buddhism, however, saw these three terms as having no specifically distinct mental statuses, as it regarded them as mental modes occurring on the surface of mind. In the history of Yogācāra philosophy, this problem of mind, thought, and consciousness was set forth anew with its introduction of the structure of eight consciousnesses, which is characterized by multilayeredness and dynamicity unseen in the Abhidharma theory of mind. Thereafter, Yogācāra philosophy accepted the Mahāyāna position of cognitive and mental phenomena (caitasika), and presented the dynamic relationship between consciousness and deep consciousness (i.e., unconsciousness), as well as its epistemological and soteriological contexts―thereby revealing how the understanding of cognitive/mental phenomena underwent changes in the history of thought. In this respect, the present paper pays attention to the Yogācāra structure of eight consciousnesses, which shows the close and consecutive causal relationship between cognitive phenomena and deep consciousness in a more dynamic and multilayered fashion than the structure of six consciousnesses in the eighteen realms does. In particular, this paper aims at explicating the status and role of the seventh consciousness called manas has in epistemological and soteriological contexts from multiple perspectives. For the purpose of attaining this aim, this paper closely examines the descriptions of the ālayavijñāna and eight consciousnesses as appearing in the Saṃdhinirmocana, the “Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī” section of the Yogācārabhūmi, the Madhyāntavibhāga, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the Triṃśikā, etc. This paper thus explicates the process, in which the theory of eight consciousnesses was established, and the role and status manas has in the structure of eight consciousnesses, to a certain extent in the history of Yogācāra philosophy.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Consciousness"

Chin, Chuanfei. „Borderline consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, and artificial consciousness : a unified approach“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9c0c5009-ba8d-4fd7-bc8d-3c27c723d1ea.

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Borderline conscious creatures are neither definitely conscious nor definitely not conscious. In this thesis, I explain what borderline consciousness is and why it poses a significant epistemological challenge to scientists who investigate phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. When these scientists discover more than one overlapping kind in their samples of conscious creatures, how can they identify the kind to which all and only conscious creatures belong? After assessing three pessimistic responses, I argue that different groups of scientists can legitimately use the concept of phenomenal consciousness to refer to different kinds, in accord with their empirical interests. They can thereby resolve three related impasses on the status of borderline conscious creatures, the neural structure of phenomenal consciousness, and the possibility of artificial consciousness. The thesis has three parts: First, I analyse the concept of borderline consciousness. My analysis counters several arguments which conclude that borderline consciousness is inconceivable. Then I explain how borderline consciousness produces the multiple kinds problem in consciousness science. Second, I assess three recent philosophical responses to this problem. One response urges scientists to eliminate the concept of consciousness, while another judges them to be irremediably ignorant of the nature of consciousness. The final response concludes that scientific progress is limited by the concept's referential indeterminacy. I argue that these responses are too pessimistic, though they point to a more promising approach. Third, I propose that empirically constrained stipulation can solve the multiple kinds problem. Biologists face the same problem because of their longstanding controversy over what counts as a species. Building on new arguments for stipulating the reference of species concepts, I demonstrate that this use of stipulation in biology is neither epistemologically complacent nor metaphysically capricious; it also need not sow semantic confusion. Then I defend its use in consciousness science. My approach is shown to be consistent with our understanding of natural kinds, borderline cases, and phenomenal consciousness.

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Powell, Jonathan S. „Consciousness naturalised : an integral approach to consciousness“. Thesis, University of Reading, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.541971.

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Muzio, Isabella. „Consciousness, self-consciousness, and introspective self-knowledge“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2005. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445604/.

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We are, it seems, able to know a wide range of our own thoughts, beliefs, desires and emotions in a special immediate, authoritative way in which we are not able to know the mental states of others, nor indeed a certain range of our own such states. How is this possible What is this special way we have of knowing a certain class of our own mental states What, in fact, is the class of states of which we are able to have such knowledge, and, what is it about this class that enables us to know them in such a distinctive, authoritative way The broad aim of this thesis is to bring out, in answering these questions, an important point of intersection between issues about world-directed consciousness, self-consciousness and introspective self-knowledge. More specifically, starting from the problem of authoritative self-knowledge, the aim of the thesis is threefold: to motivate, to articulate, and to expand upon a particular Sartrian solution to this problem, based on a view of our world-directed conscious states as being in some sense at the same time states of implicit or 'pre- reflective' self-consciousness. In accordance with this threefold aim, the thesis divides into three parts as follows: Part I begins with the problem of authoritative self-knowledge and the standard solutions on offer in the literature: inferential models, perceptual models, and constitutive accounts. It then suggests how a close examination of the shortcomings of these standard approaches ultimately points towards a solution along the above Sartrian lines, ie. based on an understanding of first-order consciousness as involving already itself an implicit form of self-consciousness. Part II then focuses more narrowly on this notion of implicit self- consciousness, proceeding (a) to distinguish it first from other similar-sounding notions in the literature (ie. notions of 'non-conceptual' self-consciousness, higher- order-thought conceptions of consciousness, and constitutive accounts of self- knowledge), moving on then (b) to show how the notion introduced here, contra these others, can indeed provide the basis for a solution to the initial problem of introspective self-knowledge meeting all the desiderata on a successful such theory. Finally, Part III takes on the more concrete issue of how such a form of implicit self-consciousness might, in practice, be seen to be involved in our two main categories of world-directed states, ie. in our cognitive states on the one hand (thoughts, beliefs, perceptual experiences), and in our emotions on the other (desires, fears, hopes, etc). This section of the thesis goes beyond mere concerns about the relation between an implicit form of self-consciousness and the problem of self- knowledge, drawing on both other parts of the philosophical literature and on various parts of the current psychological literature, to make not only more concrete sense of the view of world-directed consciousness here advocated, but to thereby show it to be also plausible independently from the theoretical considerations about self-knowledge initially driving it in this thesis.

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Bieganski, Brian P. „Consciousness Restrained: Does Consciousness Have Any Adaptive Function?“ Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1522679432841333.

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Crooke, Alan 1952. „Confabulating consciousness“. Monash University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2002. http://arrow.monash.edu.au/hdl/1959.1/8532.

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Meyerson, D. „False consciousness“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.375992.

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Mauraisin, Grégoire. „Hosting Consciousness: The Implications of Voice and Consciousness in Westworld“. Thesis, Malmö universitet, Fakulteten för kultur och samhälle (KS), 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-22185.

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In this paper, I take a look at the ontological status of Westworld as a TV show and of Westworld as a theme park and move within the show’s ontological frame to analysis the theme park as a narrative medium. From this perspective, I also consider the ontological status of the hosts and examine the implications of their being on their voice. I further analyze the role of voice in relation to consciousness portrayed in Westworld. First by addressing a notion of consciousness held by one of the creators of the park and then by referring to the philosophical debate surrounding the recognition of a conscious entity. This rise to consciousness serves as a basis for a re-inspection of the hosts voice, this time outside of the realm of narratology. Finally, I see how self-consciousness is at the origin of the war between hosts and humans. I then investigate the existential implications of the hosts newly gained consciousness and reflect on the possible future outcomes of machines becoming conscious.

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Chan, Hoi-wuen Katherine, und 陳凱媛. „Consciousness of language“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2006. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B32020491.

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Norton, Jonathan Lee Gareth. „Physicalism and consciousness“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.300447.

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John, James R. 1975. „Consciousness and intentionality“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28838.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 174-180).
(cont.) having perceptual experiences, subjects can be--and usually are--directly aware of material objects.
This dissertation is about phenomenal consciousness, its relation to intentionality, and the relation of both to issues in the philosophy of perception. My principal aim is (1) to defend an account of what it is for a perceptual experience to be phenomenally conscious and (2) to develop, within the terms set forth by this account, a particular theory of perceptual phenomenal consciousness. Given the way these matters are usually understood, it probably is not obvious why I distinguish two philosophical tasks here. One might ask: "Isn't defending an account of what it is for a perceptual experience to be phenomenally conscious the same thing as developing a particular theory of perceptual phenomenal consciousness?" I argue that it is not. In addition to my principal aim, I have three subsidiary aims. First, to shed some light on what it means for a perceptual experience to be an intentional mental event, one with representational content. Many philosophers regard the notion of perceptual intentionality as utterly unproblematic. Though I accept that experiences almost always have content, I subject this claim to more scrutiny than is usual. Second, to go some way towards better understanding the relationship between perceptual phenomenal consciousness and perceptual intentionality. In particular, I examine recent attempts to explain the former in terms of the latter. My conclusion is that there can be no such explanation. Finally, to show that, by improving our understanding of perceptual phenomenal consciousness, perceptual intentionality, and the relation between them, we can make headway on some very difficult problems in the philosophy of perception. I am especially interested in defending direct realism, the view that, in
by James R. John.
Ph.D.

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Bücher zum Thema "Consciousness"

Cavanna, Andrea Eugenio, und Andrea Nani. Consciousness. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44088-9.

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Heinämaa, Sara, Vili Lähteenmäki und Pauliina Remes, Hrsg. Consciousness. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6082-3.

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Hill, Christopher S. Consciousness. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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Hill, Christopher S. Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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Hobson, J. Allan. Consciousness. New York: Scientific American Library, 1999.

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1943-, Jackson Frank, Hrsg. Consciousness. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1998.

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Maart, Rozena Eliza. The politics of consciousness: The consciousness of politics when black consciousness meets white consciousness. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1996.

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Arkansas, Greg. Consciousness Awaken: Consciousnesses Are Not Equal. Independently Published, 2020.

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Garg, Ananta. Consciousness Speaking with Consciousness. Independently Published, 2017.

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Besant, Annie Wood. Consciousness And Self-Consciousness. Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2005.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Consciousness"

Yijie, Tang. „Cultural Consciousness and Problem Consciousness1“. In Understanding Chinese and Western Cultures, 170–76. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003318088-18.

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Gallagher, Shaun, und Dan Zahavi. „Consciousness and self-consciousness“. In The Phenomenological Mind, 49–71. Third edition. | Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429319792-3.

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Steck, Andreas, und Barbara Steck. „Consciousness“. In Brain and Mind, 3–20. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21287-6_1.

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Cohen, Ronald A. „Consciousness“. In Encyclopedia of Clinical Neuropsychology, 683–88. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-79948-3_1279.

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Bickle, John. „Consciousness“. In Philosophy and Neuroscience, 163–215. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0237-0_4.

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Charet, F. X. „Consciousness“. In Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion, 492–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24348-7_129.

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Cohen, Ronald. „Consciousness“. In Encyclopedia of Clinical Neuropsychology, 1–7. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56782-2_1279-2.

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Bunge, Mario, und Rubén Ardila. „Consciousness“. In Philosophy of Psychology, 233–50. New York, NY: Springer New York, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-4696-1_11.

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Cohen, Ronald A. „Consciousness“. In Encyclopedia of Clinical Neuropsychology, 933–39. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57111-9_1279.

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Kar, Sujita Kumar, und Aditya Somani. „Consciousness“. In Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science, 1–4. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_2904-1.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Consciousness"

Anstey, Josephine, Neil Coletta, Dave Pape, Courtney Hatten, Min Young Kim, Debra Burhans und Devin Wilson. „Improvising consciousness“. In C&C '13: Creativity and Cognition 2013. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2466627.2466631.

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Anstey, Josephine, Dave Pape und Devin Wilson. „Improvising consciousness“. In C&C '13: Creativity and Cognition 2013. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2466627.2481217.

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Grunewald, Philipp, Shadrock Roberts, Mark Hedges, Paul Buchana und Anna De Liddo. „Collective Consciousness“. In C&T 2019: The 9th International Conference on Communities & Technologies - Transforming Communities. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3328320.3328412.

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Beigi, Shima, und Francis Heylighen. „Noospheric consciousness“. In WebSci '21: WebSci '21 13th ACM Web Science Conference 2021. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3462741.3466657.

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Wang, Yu-Shin, Yuan-Yao Hsu, Wei-Lin Chen, Han Chen und Rung-Huei Liang. „Craft Consciousness“. In CHI '15: CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2702613.2732803.

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Mamaeva, Elena V., und D. I. Kaminsky. „Ecological Consciousness“. In The libraries and ecological education: Theory and practice. Russian National Public Library for Science and Technology, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.33186/978-5-85638-227-2-2020-199-203.

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The «green library» status carries serious responsibility: librarians have not only to provide traditional services but also to organize reading circle, primarily for ecological discussions. Along with research projects and political reforming, ecology implies educating personal ecological consciousness. The successful experience of Children’s Library No. 215 is discussed.

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Schwarz, Eric, und Daniel M. Dubois. „On the Nature of Consciousness—On Consciousness in Nature“. In COMPUTING ANTICIPATORY SYSTEMS: CASYS ‘09: Ninth International Conference on Computing Anticipatory Systems. AIP, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.3527171.

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Docu-Axelerad, Any, und Daniel Docu-Axelerad. „The Impaired Consciousness“. In DIALOGO-CONF 2017 SSC. EDIS - Publishing Institution of the University of Zilina, Slovak Republic, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18638/dialogo.2017.3.2.13.

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Small, David, und Tom White. „Stream of consciousness“. In ACM SIGGRAPH 98 Electronic art and animation catalog. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/281388.281499.

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Kamhaji, Danny. „An indirect consciousness“. In ACM SIGGRAPH 98 Conference abstracts and applications. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/280953.289311.

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Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Consciousness"

Hanson, Erica. Thinking Through Consciousness. Portland State University Library, Juni 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/honors.37.

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Orendurff, Dody. Consciousness, neurons, and laughing gas. Portland State University Library, Januar 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/etd.837.

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Parnell, William. Space, Consciousness, and Gender in Colette. Portland State University Library, Januar 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/etd.742.

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Trogub, Illona. Communication Tools Towards a Bioregional Consciousness. Portland State University Library, Januar 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/honors.89.

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Lee, Seung-Hee, Jane Workman und Kwangho Jung. Face Consciousness, Gender, and Money Attitudes. Ames: Iowa State University, Digital Repository, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.31274/itaa_proceedings-180814-1801.

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Basu, Sayani. Hypnosis: An Altered State of Consciousness. Science Repository, Februar 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31487/sr.blog.25.

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Iwao, Mayumi, und Motoyuki Akamatsu. Driving Attitude/Workload Consciousness of Truck Drivers. Warrendale, PA: SAE International, Mai 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.4271/2005-08-0300.

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Rakhmani, Inaya. Asia: Less brain drain more global consciousness. Herausgegeben von Ria Ernunsari. Monash University, April 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54377/d5e3-a5ce.

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Harris, Tobias. Towards a new security consciousness in Japan? East Asia Forum, Juli 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1279792820.

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Dabas, Chitra Srivastava, und Lizhau Davis. Green Fashion Purchase Behavior of Hispanic Consumers in US: Role of Fashion Consciousness, Health Consciousness and Personal Norms. Ames (Iowa): Iowa State University. Library, Januar 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.31274/itaa.8797.

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