Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Coarse correlated equilibria“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Coarse correlated equilibria"
Ray, Indrajit, und Sonali Sen Gupta. „Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games“. International Journal of Game Theory 42, Nr. 2 (06.12.2012): 541–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0360-8.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBorowski, Holly P., Jason R. Marden und Jeff S. Shamma. „Learning to Play Efficient Coarse Correlated Equilibria“. Dynamic Games and Applications 9, Nr. 1 (10.03.2018): 24–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0244-z.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFarina, Gabriele, Tommaso Bianchi und Tuomas Sandholm. „Coarse Correlation in Extensive-Form Games“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, Nr. 02 (03.04.2020): 1934–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5563.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAwaya, Yu, und Vijay Krishna. „Communication and cooperation in repeated games“. Theoretical Economics 14, Nr. 2 (2019): 513–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3049.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAnagnostides, Ioannis, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina und Tuomas Sandholm. „Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence beyond the Minty Property“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, Nr. 9 (24.03.2024): 9451–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28799.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFeng, Zhe, Guru Guruganesh, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta und Abhishek Sethi. „Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctions“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, Nr. 6 (18.05.2021): 5399–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16680.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePaccagnan, Dario, Rahul Chandan, Bryce L. Ferguson und Jason R. Marden. „Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games“. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 9, Nr. 3 (30.09.2021): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3457168.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFeldman, Michal, und Galia Shabtai. „Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, Nr. 6 (18.05.2021): 5391–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16679.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBarman, Siddharth, und Katrina Ligett. „Finding any nontrivial coarse correlated equilibrium is hard“. ACM SIGecom Exchanges 14, Nr. 1 (12.11.2015): 76–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2845926.2845929.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleGeorgalos, Konstantinos, Indrajit Ray und Sonali SenGupta. „Nash versus coarse correlation“. Experimental Economics 23, Nr. 4 (20.02.2020): 1178–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09647-x.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDissertationen zum Thema "Coarse correlated equilibria"
Sen, Gupta Sonali. „Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games“. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2014. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleΒουδούρης, Αλέξανδρος Ανδρέας. „Μελέτη της απόδοσης μηχανισμών κατανομής διαιρέσιμων πόρων“. Thesis, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10889/8413.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleIn this thesis, we use notions and techniques from Game Theory in order to analyze the performance of divisible resource allocation mechanisms focusing mainly on the proportional allocation mechanism. According to this mechanism, a set of users are competing for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth of a communication link -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to the user's bid and collects an amount equal to the bid as payment. Users aim to maximize their individual utility and act strategically in order to achieve their goal. Hence, the mechanism defines a proportional allocation game. We cover previously known results from the related literature and present new bounds on the price of anarchy with respect to the social welfare over coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full and incomplete information settings, respectively. In particular, we prove a lower bound of $1/2$ for the price of anarchy over both equilibrium concepts, significantly improving the previously best known lower bound, presented by Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013). Furthermore, we study for the first time the scenario where users have budget constraints and present lower bounds on the price of anarchy using the effective welfare (which takes budgets into account) as an objective function.
Buchteile zum Thema "Coarse correlated equilibria"
Feldman, Michal, Brendan Lucier und Noam Nisan. „Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions“. In Web and Internet Economics, 131–44. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKonferenzberichte zum Thema "Coarse correlated equilibria"
Bennis, M., S. M. Perlaza und M. Debbah. „Learning coarse correlated equilibria in two-tier wireless networks“. In ICC 2012 - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2012.6364308.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAnagnostides, Ioannis, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Andrea Celli und Tuomas Sandholm. „Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria“. In EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538288.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBarman, Siddharth, und Katrina Ligett. „Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard“. In EC '15: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764497.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKoh, Heeyuen, und Shigeo Maruyama. „Measuring Thermal Energy From Cross Correlated Modulation in Single Walled Carbon Nanotubes“. In ASME 2022 Heat Transfer Summer Conference collocated with the ASME 2022 16th International Conference on Energy Sustainability. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ht2022-83352.
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