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1
Ufen, Andreas. „Clientelist and Programmatic Factionalism Within Malaysian Political Parties“. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39, Nr. 1 (April 2020): 59–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1868103420916047.
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This article analyses factionalism within ruling and opposition parties in Malaysia, with a focus on party splits and/or the toppling or near-toppling of dominant factions at the national level. Political parties are either composed of clientelist or programmatic factions or represent hybrids that combine clientelist and programmatic factionalism. The strength and the type of factionalism depend upon policy space and the intensity of control over party groups. Programmatic factionalism is more probable if policy space is wide. Policy space is an effect of the positioning (relatively dependent or independent from other parties in the coalition) and the basic ideology of a party, that is, the major stance on religion, ethnicity, and the shape of the political system at large. If there is hardly any policy space, factionalism will be clientelistic rather than programmatic. Whether this type of factionalism arises is contingent upon the intensity of control over groups within the party and the availability of patronage goods. The control of party members is dependent upon the strength of the party leader and the centralisation of party organisation. This is demonstrated with reference to UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) (from programmatic to clientelist factionalism), some coalition partners of UMNO such as the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) (clientelist factionalism), and the Islamist PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) (programmatic clientelism). Moreover, a brief analysis of East Malaysian parties in Sabah and Sarawak helps to further elucidate the major dynamics of factionalism.
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Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter und David Szakonyi. „Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela“. World Politics 71, Nr. 04 (27.08.2019): 710–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887119000078.
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AbstractModern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common brokers worldwide, party activists and employers, arguing the latter enjoy numerous advantages along both dimensions. Using survey-based framing experiments in Venezuela and Russia, the authors find voters respond more strongly to turnout appeals from employers than from party activists. To demonstrate mechanisms, the article shows that vulnerability to job loss and embeddedness in workplace social networks make voters more responsive to clientelist mobilization by their bosses. The results shed light on the conditions most conducive to effective clientelism and highlight broker type as important for understanding why clientelism is prevalent in some countries but not others.
3
U, Eddy. „Leninist Reforms, Workplace Cleavages, and Teachers in the Chinese Cultural Revolution“. Comparative Studies in Society and History 47, Nr. 1 (Januar 2005): 106–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417505000058.
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Andrew Walder's “neo-traditional” image of Chinese socialism has profoundly shaped understanding of China before market reform. It has also influenced the broader debate on the nature of ‘actually existing socialisms.’ Walder argues that the Communist state dominated the industrial workforce through the institutionalization of organized dependence and clientelism in the workplace. State-appointed management tightly controlled access to goods, services, and positions and used these resources to reward cooperative workers and activists. Their actions created webs of clientelist relations but also a chasm on the shop floor, as ordinary workers resented the activists for acting against workers' general interest. But since ordinary workers could rarely obtain what they wanted beyond the factory, they, too, curried favors from factory officials. Walder observes that the growth of clientelist relations and personal ties within the industrial enterprise dampened workers' capacity for collective resistance and their pursuit of their personal welfare further depoliticized the working class. As a result, workers exhibited “a stable pattern of tacit acceptance and active cooperation” toward Communist political rule.
4
Busia, Kwaku Abrefa, Alice Amegah und Francis Arthur-Holmes. „Pathways of Electoral Clientelism in University Student Elections in Ghana: An Exploratory Study“. Journal for Students Affairs in Africa 9, Nr. 2 (28.12.2021): 153–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.24085/jsaa.v9i2.2204.
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Recent studies on student politics and governance have shown that electoral clientelism (EC) in university student elections is often facilitated by clientelist relations between student leaders and political parties. However, there is a dearth of empirical research investigating the various forms of electoral clientelism, as manifested through vote-buying practices in campus electoral politics in African universities. This article, therefore, investigates the multifaceted and changing dynamics of vote-buying in student electoral processes in Ghanaian universities. The study adopted a qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews with 15 student leaders, 4 university staff working with student leadership, and 4 focus group interviews involving students at the University of Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. From our finding, we argue that electoral clientelism takes place in five crucial ways in university student elections in Ghana. These include the provision of direct cash payments, exchanging electoral support for student government positions and appointments, provision of food and beverage consumables, award of student-related business contracts, and provision of educational materials and souvenirs.
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Swamy, Arun R. „Can Social Protection Weaken Clientelism? Considering Conditional Cash Transfers as Political Reform in the Philippines“. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, Nr. 1 (April 2016): 59–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500103.
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Since poverty is often believed to be a root cause of clientelism, government policies to reduce poverty should also help to reduce clientelism. However, scholars studying clientelism are more likely to view social policy as a potential resource for clientelist politicians. This article examines this paradox in the Philippine context by offering a general framework to identify when social welfare policies are likely to reduce clientelism, and by applying this framework to the Philippines, focusing on the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino conditional cash transfer programme, or Pantawid. I argue that the policies that are most likely to undercut clientelism are universal social protection policies that provide poor families with security, although these are the least acceptable to middle-class taxpayers. This is exemplified by the Philippines, which has tended to introduce social policies that increase the scope for clientelism by making discretionary allocation more likely, rather than policies that offer income security to the poor. The Pantawid programme attempts to overcome these problems by introducing a centralised targeting mechanism to identify beneficiaries and by guaranteeing the benefit to all eligible families, but like all conditional cash transfer programs falls short of guaranteed and universal social protection.
6
García, César. „PR, clientelism and economics: a comparison of southern Europe and Latin America“. Journal of Communication Management 19, Nr. 2 (05.05.2015): 133–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcom-03-2013-0026.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between clientelist relationships and economics in public relations practice in European Mediterranean countries and Latin America. It considers the cases of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses a critical-conceptual method through a re-conceptualization of themes from secondary qualitative analyses of existing qualitative data sets and reviews of published qualitative papers. Findings – The public relations practice in these two regions is similar. The characteristics of the public relations landscape in these countries must be understood in relation to a broader history of clientelism and economics emphasizing government relationships at the expense of other publics, as well as the lack of scale economies. Persuasive models are prevalent, although a number of forces – including integration in supranational organizations, democratization, and globalization – have strengthened the use of symmetrical models. Research limitations/implications – This is not an empirical survey, there is a need of quantitative studies among practitioners and government officials that can measure empirically the nature of their relationships in a number of countries. This essay opens a door for future studies and cross-cultural comparisons about the role that clientelism plays in the PR practice of cultures and countries. Practical implications – The paper offers useful background information, such as the primacy that media relations still have in the public relations practice, for foreign public relations executives, agency heads, and managers of public relations who are directly involved with or managing international public relations campaigns in these countries. Social implications – Clientelism is a cultural concept that translates to the work of organizations and consequently public relations as a form of organizational behavior. Originality/value – This paper brings to the table the importance of the concept of clientelism in the PR practice as well as the existence of a similar PR culture between countries that are on different continents.
7
Charbit, Myriam. „Shas between identity construction and clientelist dynamics: the creation of an ‘identity clientelism’“. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 9, Nr. 3 (September 2003): 102–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537110412331301495.
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Kea, Pamela. „Maintaining Difference and Managing Change: Female Agrarian Clientelist Relations in a Gambian Community“. Africa 74, Nr. 3 (August 2004): 361–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/afr.2004.74.3.361.
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AbstractThe introduction of dry-season vegetable cultivation on a large scale in Brikama, The Gambia in the early 1970s has led to the development of a new labour system amongst female farmers whereby strangers or clients are given access to land primarily in the dry season for vegetable cultivation in exchange for providing unremunerated labour for hosts for the cultivation of rice in the rainy season. Hosts, who either claim descent from the founding families or have married into founding families, have access to land and control its distribution for women's crops. This article examines the way in which social difference is played out in the acquisition of land and labour through the establishment of agrarian clientelist relations. Agrarian clientelist relations are about the maintenance of host–stranger distinctions and the management of social difference within a rapidly changing Gambian political economy. The nature of these clientelist relations is changing because of the changing relations of agrarian production, related in turn to the introduction of cooperative gardens in the region, the increasing scarcity of farming land and the increasing political power of strangers on a local and national level. The youth, particularly those who are educated, are moving out of farming altogether. Consequently, female hosts are increasingly reliant on their clients' labour. I argue that female hosts attempt to manage these processes of change out of a need to maintain the particular power relations that form the basis for host–stranger distinctions and their existing claims to land and labour. The article examines the tensions and the intra-gender struggles that emerge between female hosts and their client-strangers. In refusing to take the initiative to set up cooperative gardens, female hosts have maintained what they see as their rightful claims to their land and their clients' labour. Hegemonic notions of ‘the correctness of practices’, associated with host–stranger identities, have informed hosts' behaviour and that of their clients, and ultimately influenced the nature of resource allocation.
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Nichter, Simeon, und Michael Peress. „Request Fulfilling: When Citizens Demand Clientelist Benefits“. Comparative Political Studies 50, Nr. 8 (10.10.2016): 1086–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414016666838.
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Traditional accounts of clientelism typically focused on patron–client relations with minimal scope for citizen autonomy. Despite the heightened agency of many contemporary citizens, most studies continue to depict clientelism as a phenomenon that is firmly under elite control. The prevailing tendency is to view clientelism as a top-down process in which machines target citizens with offers of material benefits. Without denying the importance of elites, we emphasize the role of citizen demands in clientelism. Citizens often approach machines of their own volition to ask for help and may vote for a competitor if requests are unfulfilled. In response to these citizens, machines often engage in what we call “request fulfilling.” Interviews with citizens and politicians, coupled with cross-national survey data from Africa and Latin America, suggest the importance of this phenomenon. In addition, Argentine survey data in studies by Stokes and Nichter are better explained by request fulfilling than alternative explanations.
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Ristiawan, Rucitarahma, Edward Huijbens und Karin Peters. „Projecting Development through Tourism: Patrimonial Governance in Indonesian Geoparks“. Land 12, Nr. 1 (11.01.2023): 223. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/land12010223.
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Research on governance of tourism development predominantly focuses on sustainable management of a tourism destination, pinning hopes on the market and individual entrepreneurs. In Indonesia, this mission has been codified in post-reformation era (1998–2014) policies of land-use change promoting tourism and environmental conservation. One of these is the introduction of the UNESCO Geopark charter as a tool to realize the image of a modern state and “modernizing” regional economies. In this, a particular patrimonial governance arrangement appears to govern land use distribution to accrue the potential value of land from different use. This particular clientelist order will be analyzed in this article, namely by examining how finance, state power, and informal interactions between the national and regional structures of governance mesh in arranging land-use conversions for tourism purposes. Based on 4 months of ethnographic fieldwork and 32 interviews with various stakeholders in the Gunungsewu and Ciletuh UNESCO Geoparks, the paper will show how Indonesian post-reformation decentralization policies induced regional clientelism in the production of tourism destinations. This includes hierarchical relations between the local elite, private business owners, and governments representing asymmetric loyalty relations, negotiated subordination, and dominance. The more recent re-centralization attempts from the national government under Joko Widodo’s regime seem only to encourage this clientelism as a form of resistance to the state. This evidences that the Indonesian patrimonial governance and the production of tourism destinations in geoparks run counter to the ideals in governance as promoted for destination development.
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SHAMI, MAHVISH. „Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity“. American Political Science Review 106, Nr. 3 (30.07.2012): 588–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000251.
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Backed by studies finding only limited propensity for free-riding when communities have an interest in self-provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community-based development. A major caveat to the “second wave” of collective action studies, however, is that collective action often breaks down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for developing countries’ rural societies, which are often entrenched in patron-client networks. Using a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway, the article finds that clientelist relationships do not, in and by themselves, block peasant collective action. Rather, it is the interaction between clientelism and isolation that empowers patrons to block community-based projects. Peasants in connected villages face no such constraints, but instead rely on their patrons’ assistance in collective projects, making the hierarchical network an additional resource.
12
Farías, Raúl Zamorano. „Democracy on the Periphery of Modern Society: Structures, Semantics and Expectations“. Politeja 19, Nr. 6(81) (24.02.2023): 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.19.2022.81.02.
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The problem of social order in the periphery of modern society is problematized on the conceptual architecture of the General Theory of Social Systems (TGSS), tracing the semantic and expectative forms of the structures’ institutionalization, and the reproduced and parasitized artifacts in those structures which, paradoxically, construct the functional and differentiated preeminent order in the modernity of modern society. The capture of the state apparatus by particular structures has been one of the characteristics that define the articulation of order in the region. Structures (family, group, clientelistic inclusion networks) that have been stabilizing, and even define the expectations that guide the assumptions of functional differentiation, operating factually with the logic of a stratified social order, promoting clientelist relations and practices and excluding exclusivity that, rather than weakening, strengthens the ‘citizen’ experience, promoting the permanent oscillation between ‘legality’ and illegality that permeates deeply the organic and structural interstices of the social order in this periphery.
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Sheppard, Jill, Marija Taflaga und Liang Jiang. „Explaining high rates of political participation among Chinese migrants to Australia“. International Political Science Review 41, Nr. 3 (22.05.2019): 385–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512119834623.
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Studies of political participation regularly observe the underrepresentation of immigrant citizens and ethnic minorities. In contrast, evidence from Australia suggests that immigrant Australians are overrepresented in certain forms of participation, including donating money and working for a party or candidate. Drawing on major theories of ethnic political participation (including socialisation, recruitment and clientelism), this study uses 2013 Australian Election Study data to show that China-born migrants to Australia participate at higher rates than native-born and other migrant citizens. The study finds support for two explanatory theories: (a) that contributions of money by recently-arrived migrants are an aspect of clientelist relationships between migrants and legislators; and (b) that political interest in and knowledge of the host country’s political system are not necessary, and indeed perhaps even depress participation among newly-arrived migrants. These findings suggest an under-explored vein of transactional politics within established democratic systems.
14
Paik, Wooyeal. „Local Village Workers, Foreign Factories and Village Politics in Coastal China: A Clientelist Approach“. China Quarterly 220 (28.11.2014): 955–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741014001489.
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AbstractIn market reform China, contentious and unfair labour relations between vulnerable migrant workers and exploitative foreign factory owners are one of the most critical issues of the political economy. This article analyses another group of workers – non-migrant local village workers – who protect themselves from foreign employers using two political resources: collective land-use rights and local political organizations, such as village governments, affective networks and physical forces, during their suburban village's industrialization. Based on intensive ethnographic fieldwork in Shandong (Qingdao) and other coastal regions in 2007, 2008 and 2011–2013, this article attempts to answer the questions of how local village workers protect their labour rights without reliable trade unions or rigorous governmental protection. How can villagers protect, if not maximize, their interests in their relations with the foreign factories in their villages? It also contrasts local labour relations in Qingdao with migrant labour relations in other coastal regions.
15
Holden, Robert H. „Constructing the Limits of State Violence in Central America: Towards a New Research Agenda“. Journal of Latin American Studies 28, Nr. 2 (Mai 1996): 435–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x00013067.
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AbstractThis analysis of the historically high level of state-sponsored violence in Central America, typically explained in terms of ‘authoritarianism’ or ‘civil-military relations’, argues for according it a more independent research status. Three historic dimensions of state-sponsored violence – the mechanisms by which caudillo violence was displaced upward in the late 19th century, the level of subaltern collaboration with the agents of state violence as a function of clientelist politics, and the intrusion of US military power after 1940 – are proposed. The implications for the utility of political culture theory and for a reevaluation of the literature on civil-military relations are developed.
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Meny-Gibert, Sarah. „‘Mutual Accommodation’: Clientelist Politics in South African School Education“. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 110, Nr. 1 (2022): 62–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/trn.2022.a905643.
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ABSTRACT: Whilst most post-apartheid public schools in South Africa remain significantly underfunded, the education budget nevertheless provides a significant injection of jobs and public spending into the provinces–into rural provinces with small economies especially. Based on research in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces, I show how a particular form of clientelist politics has taken root in the post-apartheid school education system–one locally organised around ‘promotional’ posts in schools, and disconnected from a clear state, party, or other organisational ‘centre’. Groups of locally organised unionists operate to secure preferential access to these posts, sometimes through the use or threat of violence, sometimes through collusion with district education officials, or with community members who might benefit from access to meagre school budgets. Attempts by residents to secure livelihood strategies in the context of poverty intersect with local strategies of upward mobility on the part of ordinary teachers, and in turn connect loosely, via patterns of ‘mutual accommodation’ with strategies of elite accumulation amongst senior politicians, administrators, and union leaders. In the case of the education sectors in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces at least, on which this article focuses, this constitutes a fragmented yet interlocking system of unstable governance. In this sense, I suggest that there is much in the dynamics of education governance that offers insight into wider patterns of state-society relations around the local state in South Africa.
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Meny-Gibert, Sarah. „‘Mutual Accommodation’: Clientelist Politics in South African School Education“. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 110, Nr. 1 (2022): 62–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/trn.2022.a905641.
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ABSTRACT: Whilst most post-apartheid public schools in South Africa remain significantly underfunded, the education budget nevertheless provides a significant injection of jobs and public spending into the provinces–into rural provinces with small economies especially. Based on research in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces, I show how a particular form of clientelist politics has taken root in the post-apartheid school education system–one locally organised around ‘promotional’ posts in schools, and disconnected from a clear state, party, or other organisational ‘centre’. Groups of locally organised unionists operate to secure preferential access to these posts, sometimes through the use or threat of violence, sometimes through collusion with district education officials, or with community members who might benefit from access to meagre school budgets. Attempts by residents to secure livelihood strategies in the context of poverty intersect with local strategies of upward mobility on the part of ordinary teachers, and in turn connect loosely, via patterns of ‘mutual accommodation’ with strategies of elite accumulation amongst senior politicians, administrators, and union leaders. In the case of the education sectors in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces at least, on which this article focuses, this constitutes a fragmented yet interlocking system of unstable governance. In this sense, I suggest that there is much in the dynamics of education governance that offers insight into wider patterns of state-society relations around the local state in South Africa.
18
Wyatt, Andrew. „Combining clientelist and programmatic politics in Tamil Nadu, South India“. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 51, Nr. 1 (Februar 2013): 27–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2013.749674.
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Fukuoka, Yuki. „Indonesia's ‘democratic transition’ revisited: a clientelist model of political transition“. Democratization 20, Nr. 6 (Oktober 2013): 991–1013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.669894.
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Li, Huaiyin. „Everyday Power Relations in State Firms in Socialist China: A Reexamination“. Modern China 43, Nr. 3 (14.10.2016): 288–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0097700416671878.
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Drawing on interviews with 97 retirees from different cities, this article reinterprets power relations in state-owned enterprises during the Mao era, centering on an analysis of day-to-day interactions between factory cadres and workers and between the elites and the ordinary among workers. The main issues addressed in this study include how cadres exercised discretion in administrative activities that directly affected workers’ material and nonmaterial interests, such as wage raises, housing allocations, party membership, promotions, and political awards; to what extent workers developed personal dependence on their supervisors; and whether or not workers were split into two antagonistic groups of activists and nonactivists. Without denying the instances of favoritism and personal dependence in cadre-worker relations under certain circumstances, which became increasingly noticeable in the early reform years, this study underscores the constraints of formal and informal institutions on cadres and questions the validity of the clientelist model in explaining micro-political realities on the factory floor in Chinese industry before the reform era.
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Kera, Gentiana, und Armanda Hysa. „Influencing votes, winning elections: clientelist practices and private funding of electoral campaigns in Albania“. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20, Nr. 1 (02.01.2020): 123–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1709698.
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Mabweazara, Hayes Mawindi, Cleophas Taurai Muneri und Faith Ndlovu. „News “Media Capture”, Relations of Patronage and Clientelist Practices in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Interpretive Qualitative Analysis“. Journalism Studies 21, Nr. 15 (20.09.2020): 2154–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1461670x.2020.1816489.
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Smilde, David. „Contradiction without Paradox: Evangelical Political Culture in the 1998 Venezuelan Elections“. Latin American Politics and Society 46, Nr. 1 (2004): 75–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2004.tb00266.x.
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AbstractVenezuelan Evangelicals' responses to candidates in that country's 1998 presidential election seem to confirm the view that their political culture is inconsistent, contradictory, and paradoxical. Not only were they just as likely to support nationalist ex–coup leader Hugo Chávez as was the larger population, they also rejected Venezuela's one Evangelical party when it made a clientelist pact with the infamous candidate of Venezuela's discredited Social Democratic party. This article uses concepts from recent cultural theory to analyze qualitative data from these two cases and make sense of the contradictory nature of Evangelical politics.
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Calimbahin, Cleo Anne A. „Varieties of Clientelism in Comparative Democracies: Power, State Formation and Citizenship in the Philippines, Bosnia and Herzegovina“. Bandung 8, Nr. 2 (03.09.2021): 233–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/21983534-08020005.
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Abstract Clientelism in comparative democracies have evolved through time within informal and formal institutions. Using the book by Brkovic, that follows the tradition of challenging the unidimensional view of clientelism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this essay provides the Philippine case as contrast and comparison. The article examines how both countries’ experience can open new avenues for us to understand the durability of clientelism and its relationship with formal and informal institutions. Brokovic’s agency and personhood within clientelistic relationships accounts for the endurance of this practice in democratic societies that experienced transition. Clientelism persists in part due to the reliability of personal relations over the ability of public institutions to deliver. This review article will probe clientelism, as it manifests in the politics of the Philippines and its democratic institutions. Among the multiple types of clientelistic relationship in the Philippines, some emphasize the role of machine politics, corruption, and coercion. Brković’s book provides a new lens of analysis by looking at clientelism through personhood and agency as power. The contribution of the book on the discourse of clientelism can deepen the understanding of Philippine politics because it encourages an analysis that looks at the exercise of democracy through personhood, agency, and informal institutions. It invites us to view clientelism not just through corruption and violence. By combining the analysis that utilizes formal and informal institutions, personhood and structuralist, this essay explains why some countries that have transitioned into democracies remain ambiguous states and explain the persistence of clientelism.
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Montero, Alfred P. „No Country for Leftists? Clientelist Continuity and the 2006 Vote in the Brazilian Northeast“. Journal of Politics in Latin America 2, Nr. 2 (August 2010): 113–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1866802x1000200205.
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Scambary, James. „Robbing Peter to pay Paul: changing clientelist patterns in East Timor’s 2017 parliamentary elections“. Democratization 26, Nr. 7 (02.04.2019): 1114–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1595596.
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Walder, Andrew G. „A Reply to Womack“. China Quarterly 126 (Juni 1991): 333–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000005233.
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When Womack asserts that I present a picture of “the total power of local leadership” and “total dependence” of workers, he substitutes for the main thrust of my argument a quite different one. I did not argue that dependence breeds all-powerful leaders, but that it gives rise to a clientelist pattern of authority, in which the Party uses material and career rewards to build networks of loyal followers, dividing the Party's clients from rank and file workers, and helping to stimulate a thriving subculture of instrumental–personal ties (guanxi). The focus is upon how authority is exercised – not how much authority leaders have–and the main argument is that dependence breeds personal rule.
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Morice, Alain. „L’État africain typique : lieu ou instrument ?“ Politique africaine 26, Nr. 1 (1987): 42–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/polaf.1987.3868.
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The original african state : instrument or arena ? The author disrusses first the book edited by Fauré and Medard on Ivory Coast, then the one edited by Bernstein and Campbell Contradictions of Accumulation in Africa. Reviewing the various papers and case studies (Ivory Coast, Mali, Guinea, Nigeria, Kenya), Morice demonstrates that we are in the post-dependency era. «Public» and «private» interests are mingled and the state is more than an instrument. The reproductive system is sometimes akin to a mafia kind of government. A clientelist system allows for civil servants, traders, middle men and «bourgeois» to belong to the intimate sphere of the state. Even, and maybe especially, so-called socialist states, are good examples of this system which in no way is dysfunctional. The papers by Kitching and Beckman demonstrate positively this analysis.
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Burgess, Katrina. „States or parties? Emigrant outreach and transnational engagement“. International Political Science Review 39, Nr. 3 (Juni 2018): 369–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512118758154.
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Home-country institutions are increasingly engaged in reaching out to their emigrants to further their domestic agendas. Using a most-different systems design, I compare two cases in which emigrant outreach is dominated by the state (Philippines and Mexico) and two cases in which it is dominated by parties (Lebanon and the Dominican Republic). My main argument is that each type of outreach results in a different trade-off between electoral mobilization and partisan autonomy. State-led outreach encourages emigrants to transcend partisan divisions but does not mobilize overseas voters. By contrast, party-led outreach generates higher electoral turnout while reproducing and reinforcing sectarian and/or clientelist patterns of interest representation. I conclude with the implications for whether emigrants are likely to play a democratizing role in fragile democracies with serious deficits in participation, representation, and accountability.
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STOKES, SUSAN C. „Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina“. American Political Science Review 99, Nr. 3 (August 2005): 315–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055405051683.
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Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' votes. When parties influence how people vote by threatening to punish them for voting for another party, I call thisaccountability. I analyze the strategic interaction between machines and voters as an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with one-sided uncertainty. The game generates hypotheses about the impact of the machine's capacity to monitor voters, and of voters' incomes and ideological stances, on the effectiveness of machine politics. I test these hypotheses with data from Argentina.
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Ho, Ming-sho. „The Rise and Fall of Leninist Control in Taiwan's Industry“. China Quarterly 189 (März 2007): 162–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741006000853.
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As an industrial control strategy, Leninism imposed extensive state-party apparatuses in the workplace. After its defeat in China, the émigré Kuomintang instituted party-state infrastructure in the vast public sector inherited from Japanese colonialism to consolidate its grasp on Taiwan. This article traces the rise and fall of Leninist control in Taiwan's state-owned enterprises. Taiwan's Leninist penetration was deployed after the suppression of the 1947 uprising, and hence failed to overcome the pre-existing ethnic divide between Taiwanese and mainlanders. Further, since the 1960s, widespread moonlinghting has enabled Taiwanese workers to be more psychologically and economically detached from the clientelist network of redistribution. As the political environment turned favourable in the late 1980s, a strong current of workers's movements surged and succeeded in dismantling party-state control in nationalized industry. Taiwan's case reveals the importance of societal embeddedness as a variable that explains the trajectory of Leninist control.
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Winkler, Christian G. „Between Pork and People: An Analysis of the Policy Balance in the LDP's Election Platforms“. Journal of East Asian Studies 14, Nr. 3 (Dezember 2014): 405–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800005543.
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In this article I examine changes in the election manifestos of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. While the existing literature agrees that the LDP's policy platform has changed considerably since the introduction of the new election system in the 1990s, their analysis focuses on material policies such as pork barrel and welfare. Postmaterialist policies such as environmental protection have hardly been discussed, even though they have been relevant since pollution swept progressive mayors into power in the 1960s. I examine election platforms from 1956 through 2013, and argue that the LDP has carefully adjusted its policy mix by putting a greater emphasis on postmaterialist policies. My analysis also shows that while electoral reform has had an impact on the policy balance between postmaterialist and materialist policies as well as clientelist and programmatic policies, these changes are not linear, but vary from decade to decade.
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Hristov, Petko. „Bulgarian Ritual Kinship (Kumstvo)“. Journal of Family History 43, Nr. 1 (11.12.2017): 72–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0363199017738187.
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Among the Orthodox Christians on the Balkans, the rituals of Christian baptism and marriage traditionally give rise to ritual kinship relationships, not only among individuals but also among family groups that were until then unrelated. Only among Bulgarians, Serbians, and Macedonians, these relationships are carried on hereditarily and are constructed according to the patrilineal kinship model. The godfather’s role ( kumstvo) is inherited as symbolic capital by the family-kin groups of both the godparents and the godchildren. These are relations of symbolic inequality and have a ritual character: both the calendar feast cycle and the lifecycle rituals are marked by symbolic rights and obligations, which are still observed until the present day in most Bulgarian families, for example, mandatory gift exchange. The belief in the power of the godparent’s curse is still alive today in a number of regions in Bulgaria. On the other hand, the godparent tradition among Bulgarians acquired new meaning and new dimensions during the decades of socialism and postsocialist transition. During the last two or three decades, the godparent relationship has become a way of building new social networks, often of a clientelist nature. More and more often, ritual kinship relations are used for benefits and hierarchical ascent, similarly to nepotism. This process leads to the reformation of social networks—it still functions as social capital, but to each new generation. Every new family chooses different godparents, thus creating new social networks. Research about godparent relations among Bulgarians and, more generally, on the Balkans, is based on both existing studies on the subject and on the author’s personal fieldwork research in Bulgaria.
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Benítez, Galia. „Business Lobbying: Mapping Policy Networks in Brazil in Mercosur“. Social Sciences 7, Nr. 10 (15.10.2018): 198. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci7100198.
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In the creation of trade policy, business actors have the most influence in setting policy. This article identifies and explains variations in how economic interest groups use policy networks to affect trade policymaking. This article uses formal social network analysis (SNA) to explore the patterns of articulation or a policy network between the government and business at the national level within regional trade agreements. The empirical discussion herein focuses on Brazil and the setting of exceptions list to Mercosur’s common external tariff. It specifically concentrates on the relations between the Brazilian executive branch and ten economic subsectors. The article finds that the patterns of articulation of these policy networks matter and that sectors with stronger ties to key government decision-makers have a structural advantage in influencing trade policy and obtaining and/or maintaining their desired, privileged trade policies, compared with sectors that are connected to government actors with weak decision-making power, but might have numerous and diversified connections. Therefore, sectors that have a strong pluralist–clientelist policy structure with connections to government actors with decision-making power have greater potential for achieving their target policies compared with more corporatist policy networks.
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Cvejic, Slobodan. „On inevitability of political clientelism in contemporary Serbia“. Sociologija 58, Nr. 2 (2016): 239–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/soc1602239c.
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This paper deals with the problem of political clientelism in Serbia broadly defined as the selective distribution of benefits (money, jobs, information, a variety of privileges) to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support. The main objective is to explain why political clientelism is widespread in Serbia and which key factors determine its shape and intensity. The explanation is based on the analysis of historical factors of development of clientelism in Serbia, as well as on analysis of data from a recent research on informal relations between political and economic elites in Serbia and Kosovo. The paper concludes that clientelism and informality have represented one of the structuring principles of socioeconomic and political development of Serbian society under the conditions of weak formal institutions and socio-historical heritage of late modernization. On the other hand, since 2000 economic and political sphere in Serbia became more open and competitive which influenced change in the character of clientelism in Serbia - the increased rivalry among different clientelistic (sub)networks heightened the chance of opportunistic defection even at the top level, which made political power of patrons more tradable and the relation inside the power network less asymmetric.
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Morgan, Jana, Jonathan Hartlyn und Rosario Espinal. „Dominican Party System Continuity amid Regional Transformations: Economic Policy, Clientelism, and Migration Flows“. Latin American Politics and Society 53, Nr. 01 (2011): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00107.x.
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AbstractIn the 1980s and 1990s, economic crisis produced ideological convergence in many Latin American party systems. Much scholarship explores how this convergence frequently provoked system change that enabled renewed ideological differentiation, but little research examines instances where convergence persisted without destabilizing the system. Through comparative historical analysis of Dominican continuity amid regional change, this study identifies factors that sustain or challenge party systems. Then, through analysis of Americas Barometer surveys, it assesses the causal mechanisms through which these factors shape support for the traditional Dominican parties. The findings demonstrate that maintaining programmatic and clientelist linkages facilitates continuity. In addition, the article argues that the threats political outsiders pose to existing party systems are constrained when people excluded from the system are divided and demobilized. In the Dominican case, Haitian immigration divides the popular sector while Dominicans abroad sustain ties to the parties, with both migration flows facilitating party system continuity.
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Hijino, Ken Victor Leonard. „Delinking National and Local Party Systems: New Parties in Japanese Local Elections“. Journal of East Asian Studies 13, Nr. 1 (April 2013): 107–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800008547.
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Broader structural developments in Japan in the past two decades—decline of clientelist practices, partisan de-alignment, and decentralization—have dissolved traditionally close ties between national and local party systems, creating an environment conducive to the emergence of local parties. In this context, popular chief executives in four regions launched new parties. I trace how these parties emerged and how national parties reacted to them, from the appearance of the new-party leaders to the 2011 local elections. In comparing the four cases, two factors appear to shape their trajectories: the urbanness of their electoral environments and the responses of the two national parties at the local and the national level. In dealing with the new challengers, both the Liberal Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Japan experienced considerable intraparty conflict and defections, indicating a process of delinking between national and local party systems.
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Aspinall, Edward, Noor Rohman, Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, Rubaidi und Zusiana Elly Triantini. „VOTE BUYING IN INDONESIA: CANDIDATE STRATEGIES, MARKET LOGIC AND EFFECTIVENESS“. Journal of East Asian Studies 17, Nr. 1 (30.01.2017): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2016.31.
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AbstractWhat underlying logic explains candidate participation in vote buying, given that clientelist exchange is so difficult to enforce? We address this question through close analysis of campaigns by several dozen candidates in two electoral districts in Java, Indonesia. Analyzing candidates’ targeting and pricing strategies, we show that candidates used personal brokerage structures that drew on social networks to identify voters and deliver payments to them. But these candidates achieved vote totals averaging about one quarter of the number of payments they distributed. Many candidates claimed to be targeting loyalists, suggestive of “turnout buying,” but judged loyalty in personal rather than partisan terms, and extended their vote-buying reach through personal connections mediated by brokers. Candidates were market sensitive, paying prices per vote determined not only by personal resources, but also by constituency size and prices offered by competitors. Accordingly, we argue that a market logic structures Indonesia's system of vote buying.
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Kim, Eun Kyung. „Sector-based vote choice: A new approach to explaining core and swing voters in Africa“. International Area Studies Review 21, Nr. 1 (29.11.2017): 28–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2233865917742066.
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This study examines economic components of the support base for each party in Ghana’s de facto two-party system. Most accounts of partisan voting in African democracies contend that some voters routinely support the same party because it rewards co-ethnics through patronage in the form of private and local community goods. A few recent studies have found that some voters vote retrospectively and sociotropically, rewarding or punishing the incumbent party on the basis of its overall performance in office. However, neither the ethno-clientelist account nor the performance assessment account addresses the possibility that African parties build their support bases around competing economic policy interests. Using a merged dataset from the Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 and district-level industrial employment and agricultural production data from Ghana, I find that it is economic interests by agricultural sub-sector that are highly predictive of parties’ issue-based platforms. Voters who do not share a common interest with any of the main parties’ key policies are most likely to switch party preferences election to election.
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Ruth, Saskia P. „Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in Latin America“. Latin American Politics and Society 58, Nr. 1 (2016): 72–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00300.x.
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AbstractThis article analyzes the relationship between clientelism and citizens' political orientation in Latin America. Consistent political perceptions in the citizenry are central in traditional theories of political competition. This article argues that clientelism hinders the development of consistent political orientation by reducing the utility of information cues, such as left-right labels. More specifically, clientelistic parties generate indifference among their supporters toward the left-right divide by offering them an alternative voting rationale, and increase uncertainty in the political realm by making left-right labels less meaningful. Both arguments are tested with multilevel regression analyses using cross-sectional data covering 18 Latin American countries. The results indicate that clientelistic party supporters are more likely to show indifference toward the left-right dimension and, to a lesser extent, that their left-right orientation corresponds less with their political attitudes.
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Esteban, Mario. „The Chinese Amigo: Implications for the Development of Equatorial Guinea“. China Quarterly 199 (September 2009): 667–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741009990154.
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AbstractIn the last five years China has dramatically increased its presence in Africa. Despite its abundant natural resources, the notoriety of its political regime and its close relationship with Beijing, Equatorial Guinea is a glaring omission in the China–Africa literature. This article intends to fulfil that gap by analysing the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Malabo at both the official and the social levels to assess its impact on the development of Equatorial Guinea. As bad governance is the main obstacle for the development of Equatorial Guinea, the article compares the role played by Chinese companies and government in reinforcing Obiang's authoritarian regime with that played by their Western counterparts. It concludes that Chinese extractive firms play a marginal role in the financial extraversion that strongly links the Obiang regimen with US oil companies. Conversely, the Chinese government offers Obiang more extensive and stable support than Western governments to the extent that most of the undeniable developmental potential of Chinese co-operation is wasted through clientelist networks.
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Houtzager, Peter P. „State and Unions in the Transformation of the Brazilian Countryside, 1964-1979“. Latin American Research Review 33, Nr. 2 (1998): 103–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0023879100038255.
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In the early 1960s, the dramatic mobilization of rural wage laborers and small farmers placed the agrarian question at the top of the Brazilian political agenda. The question facing governing elites was how to modernize an archaic agrarian sector that was widely perceived as posing a major bottleneck for development and a breeding ground for agrarian radicalism. Until that time, wage laborers and small farmers in various forms of land tenure had effectively been excluded from existing labor legislation, social security, and coverage by national law in general. Instead, various traditional and clientelist forms of social control regulated rural social relations. The new rural movements were led by relatively moderate urban groups or individuals seeking to create a rural political base. Their appearance soon after the Cuban Revolution however, and in the larger context of the cold war, triggered fears of possible revolution. National debate quickly centered not on whether but on how the Brazilian state should intervene in the countryside. Attempts by the populist government of President João Goulart to address the agrarian question were cut short by the military coup of 1964. In its wake, the fledgling rural movements were brutally repressed in a wave of state-sponsored repression and private landowner violence.
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Goldring, Luin. „The Mexican State and Transmigrant Organizations: Negotiating the Boundaries of Membership and Participation“. Latin American Research Review 37, Nr. 3 (2002): 55–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002387910002447x.
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AbstractThis article examines relations between the Mexican state and transmigrants through an analysis of migrant- and state-led transnational practices and policies. It addresses discussions of the strength and extent of Mexican state control and hegemony as well as debates in the transnationalism literature on the potential autonomy of transmigrant groups and the role of subnational linkages. The analysis is based on information on transmigrant organizations and Mexican political authorities in Los Angeles and Mexico and focuses on Zacatecas. Mexican transmigrant organizations predate current state initiatives aimed at Mexicans in the United States, but state involvement has been crucial to the institutionalizing of transnational social spaces. The state's hegemonic project involves the largely symbolic reincorporation of paisanos living abroad back into to the nation but depends on provincial and municipal authorities and transmigrant organizations for implementation. Because these vary, the project has been implemented unevenly. The complexity of these processes can be captured only by examining transnational social spaces at a subnational level. The case of Zacatecas shows how a corporatist and semi-clientelist transmigrant organization has managed to gain concessions that broaden opportunities for participation. It remains to be seen whether and how promises of political representation will be fulfilled.
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Barthwal, Ankita, und Asim Ali. „Bypassing the Patronage Trap: Evidence from Delhi Assembly Election 2020“. Studies in Indian Politics 9, Nr. 2 (07.10.2021): 254–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23210230211043081.
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Scholars have long theorized on the limits of patronage politics and the possibility of counter-mobilization it produces against clientelist strategies. Analysing the recent win of the Aam Aadmi Party in the 2020 Assembly election in Delhi, this article shows that programmatic policies of welfare can help parties to circumvent this trap and avoid targeted patronage networks. We find that this broad-based appeal increases the social base of the party to even include those segments of voters who remain aloof to patronage-based exchanges. Additionally, we test the salience of majoritarian issues in the presence of universal welfare. We find that by locating themselves on issue positions of relative advantage, and reducing the ideological distance with their chief competitor, a policy-focussed party may capture not just ideology-agnostic, but also peripheral voters who might be opposed to the other challenger. Using a logistic regression model, we find that policy concerns catapulted AAP to victory, while its ideological distance from the BJP added to this. Our analysis has significance for understanding the underlying changes to patronage-based linkages, especially in the presence of heightened ethnic appeals that increasingly characterizes electoral contexts in the country.
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Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter und David Szakonyi. „Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace“. World Politics 66, Nr. 2 (28.03.2014): 195–228. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s004388711400001x.
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The authors explore how modern autocrats win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees to vote for the regime and thereby subvert the electoral process. using two original surveys of employers and workers conducted around the 2011 parliamentary elections in russia, they find that just under one-quarter of employers engaged in some form of political mobilization. they then develop a simple framework for identifying which firms engage in voter mobilization and which workers are targeted for mobilization. firms that are vulnerable to state pressure—financially dependent firms and those in sectors characterized by asset immobility—are among the most common sites of workplace-based electoral subversion. the authors also find that workers who are especially dependent on their employer are more likely to be targeted for mobilization. By identifying the conditions under which workplace mobilization occurs in authoritarian regimes, the authors contribute to the long-standing debate about the economic bases of democratization. in addition, they explore an understudied means of subverting elections in contemporary autocracies: the use of economic coercion to mobilize voters. Moreover, their research finds that clientelist exchange can thrive in industrial settings and in the absence of deeply embedded political parties.
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Trottier, Julie, und Jeanne Perrier. „Water driven Palestinian agricultural frontiers: the global ramifications of transforming local irrigation“. Journal of Political Ecology 25, Nr. 1 (06.08.2018): 292. http://dx.doi.org/10.2458/v25i1.22759.
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In agricultural transformations, small scale farmer driven processes interact with globally driven processes. Donor-led or foreign investor-led irrigation development systematically interacts with local, farmer-led irrigation development. This article harnesses Kopytoff's concept of 'interstitial frontier' to study such interactions. It discusses the shape an agricultural frontier may have and its interactions with local forms of water and land tenure. It discusses the manner in which changing access to water may spur the development of agricultural pioneer fronts. It distinguishes surface water driven, groundwater driven and wastewater driven agricultural frontiers. It then explores the manner such frontiers are transforming water tenure in the West Bank. This is an important aspect of the globalization of Palestinian society. The method this article develops is applicable elsewhere. Within interstitial frontiers, investors, whether local farmers or outsiders, enroll a globally maintained scientific discourse of efficient water use to secure donor funding. Meanwhile, they try developing clientelist ties with the authorities to secure their new access to water. The impacts on neighbouring, peasant-run irrigated systems, food security, housing security and many other mechanisms that sustain a society, are important and too often neglected.
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Klonowski, Michał, und Michał Słowikowski. „Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s St. Petersburg speech: conditions, content and consequences from the point of view of relations in the Triangle Russia–Kazakhstan–China“. Wschód Europy. Studia humanistyczno-społeczne 8, Nr. 2 (30.03.2023): 115–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/we.2022.8.2.115-137.
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The aim of the article is to answer the question of how relations between Kazakhstan and the two key superpowers – Russia and China – involved in the policy of the Central Asian region have changed in the light of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The starting point for the discussion on the complex relations in the Russia-Kazakhstan-China triangle is the speech of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg in June 2022. It triggered an avalanche of comments indicating that Kazakhstan, in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, fears of sanctions from the West and concern for stable socio-economic development driven by revenues from the sale of natural resources, is not ready to support Russia in its confrontation with the West. On the other hand, it intends to follow the Chinese path, seeing Beijing as an influential patron who will stop Moscow from aggressive actions against Kazakhstan. The theoretical basis of the article is the concept of omni-enmeshment. In the literature on the subject, it is assumed that its implementation provided Kazakhstan with stability, security and continuity of the existence of the political regime associated with the person of Nursultan Nazarbayev. The authors assume that this concept could have been realized as long as the powers involved in the region maintained a balance in mutual relations. The war with Ukraine and the confrontation with the West caused Russia to deliberately destroy the Kazakh model of international order in the region. It may take aggressive actions against Kazakhstan because it has not sufficiently taken care of the infrastructural security of its energy links with the West. For many years, Kazakhstan has avoided clientelist obligations towards one of the superpowers, but facing Russia's actions, it is clearly inclined to seek protection from China, which is ready to accept the burden of responsibility for the security of the region, in the interest of the security and success of the Belt and Road Initiative.
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Szwarcberg, Mariela. „Building a following: Local Candidates’ Political Careers and Clientelism in Argentine Municipalities“. Latin American Politics and Society 55, Nr. 03 (2013): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00200.x.
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Abstract Why do some candidates prefer to use clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters while others do not? Building on existing explanations that highlight the importance of voters’ demand for particularistic goods and parties’ capacities to supply goods and monitor voters, this article focuses on candidates’ political careers. It argues that how candidates begin mobilizing voters to participate in rallies and elections becomes crucial in explaining their preferences to use clientelism. Candidates who receive a salary based on their ability to mobilize voters—paid party activists—are more likely to use clientelism than candidates who are not paid for their political work, unpaid party activists.
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Lisoni, Carlos M. „Persuasion and Coercion in the Clientelistic Exchange: A Survey of Four Argentine Provinces“. Journal of Politics in Latin America 10, Nr. 1 (April 2018): 133–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1866802x1801000105.
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How do political parties guarantee enforcement of a clientelistic exchange? This research note empirically supports a catalog of clientelism compliance enforcement tactics. It also suggests that by focusing on the personalization of tactics and the constraints they place on individual voters, we can evaluate how intrusive these tactics are and further help to bridge existing instrumentalist and reciprocity theories of client compliance. The supporting evidence comes from interviews carried out with 73 elected Argentine local and provincial officials. How persuasive or coercive the tactics need to be to make clients comply with their part of the bargain has implications for our understanding of the legitimacy of the clientelistic bondage and our assessment of the roles of patrons and brokers in such exchanges.
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Nagy, Kristóf. „Remaking civil society under authoritarian capitalism: The case of the Orbán regime’s Hungarian Academy of Arts“. Intersections 9, Nr. 4 (2023): 80–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v9i4.1127.
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Authoritarian regimes are known for their attacks on civic organizations; however, this article demonstrates how such rules also set up and operate new forms of civil society. Drawing on a year-long ethnographic fieldwork at the cultural flagship institution of the Orbán-regime, the Hungarian Academy of Arts (HAA), this research engages with civic organizations often labeled as ‘uncivil,’ ‘dark,’ or ‘illiberal.’ Instead of applying the normative notion of civil society, it joins a century-long body of literature that, following Gramsci, stresses the integral nature of political and civil society. The article contributes to this research trajectory by spotlighting a new hegemonic regime’s dynamic remaking of civil society. The article conceptualizes the process of remaking civil society and reveals four facets beyond top-down command (1) the making of clientelist social relations that affect both the privileged and the rank-and-file actors, (2) the managed articulation of dissent toward the regime that pacifies discontent (3) the relative autonomy of regime-allied civic organizations and (4) the orchestration of pre-existing bottom-up initiatives. By coining the concept of recivilization, this article contributes to understanding how emerging regimes remake civil society and mobilize voluntary social practices to maintain their rule. Through this understanding, this article highlights that authoritarianism is more than top-down ruling and suggests the novel notion of recivilization as a concept to capture the pro-systemic role of civil society.