Thematische Bibliographien / Belief

Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Belief“

Autor: Grafiati
Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021
Zuletzt aktualisiert am 30. Juli 2024

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Belief"

1

Williams, Peter. „Beliefs supporting belief“. Philosophers' Magazine, Nr. 7 (1999): 56–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1999768.

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2

Lakemeyer, Gerhard. „On Perfect Introspection with Quantifying-In1“. Fundamenta Informaticae 17, Nr. 1-2 (01.07.1992): 75–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/fi-1992-171-206.

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Agents with perfect introspection may have incomplete beliefs about the world, but they possess complete knowledge about their own beliefs. This fact suggests that the beliefs of introspective agents should be completely determined by their objective beliefs, that is, those beliefs that are only about the domain in question and not about other beliefs. Introspection and logical reasoning alone should suffice to reconstruct all other beliefs from the objective ones. While this property has been shown to hold for propositional belief logics, there have so far only been negative results in the case of first-order belief logics with quantifying-in. In this paper we present a logic of belier with quantifying-in, where the beliefs of a perfectly introspective agent are indeed uniquely determined by the objective beliefs. The result is obtained by weakening the notion of belief of an existing logic that does not have this property.
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Chappell, T. D. J. „Does Protagoras refute himself?“ Classical Quarterly 45, Nr. 2 (Dezember 1995): 333–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800043433.

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Protagoras believes that all beliefs are true. Since Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true is itself a belief, it follows (somewhat trivially, perhaps?) from Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true that Protagoras' belief is true. But what about the belief that Protagoras' belief is false? Doesn't it follow, by parallel reasoning and not at all trivially, that if all beliefs are true and there is a belief that Protagoras' belief is false, then Protagoras' belief is false?
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Crane, Tim. „Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?“ Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 65, Nr. 4 (01.11.2023): 414–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2023-0060.

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Abstract This paper discusses the familiar question of whether expressions of faith or conviction offered by religious believers really express their beliefs, in the standard sense of ‘belief’ used in philosophy and psychology. Some hold that these expressions do not express genuine beliefs because they do not meet the standards of rationality, coherence and integration which govern beliefs. So they must serve some other function. But this picture of ‘genuine belief’ is inadequate, for reasons independent of the phenomenon of religion. Once we get a better picture of belief, we can see that religious beliefs conform to this picture, and that typical expressions of faith really are expressions of belief in the proper sense.
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Bach, Kent. „Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs“. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, Nr. 3 (September 1997): 215–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00036.

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6

Yanke, Greg, Mohamed Y. Rady und Joseph L. Verheijde. „When Brain Death Belies Belief“. Journal of Religion and Health 55, Nr. 6 (19.08.2016): 2199–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10943-016-0298-4.

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7

Wolfe, Michael B., und Todd J. Williams. „Poor metacognitive awareness of belief change“. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, Nr. 9 (01.01.2018): 1898–910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1363792.

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When people change beliefs as a result of reading a text, are they aware of these changes? This question was examined for beliefs about spanking as an effective means of discipline. In two experiments, subjects reported beliefs about spanking effectiveness during a prescreening session. In a subsequent experimental session, subjects read a one-sided text that advocated a belief consistent or inconsistent position on the topic. After reading, subjects reported their current beliefs and attempted to recollect their initial beliefs. Subjects reading a belief inconsistent text were more likely to change their beliefs than those who read a belief consistent text. Recollections of initial beliefs tended to be biased in the direction of subjects’ current beliefs. In addition, the relationship between the belief consistency of the text read and accuracy of belief recollections was mediated by belief change. This belief memory bias was independent of on-line text processing and comprehension measures, and indicates poor metacognitive awareness of belief change.
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AHMED, ARIF. „Belief and religious ‘belief’“. Religious Studies 56, Nr. 1 (06.05.2019): 80–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412519000234.

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AbstractIs the analysis of religion best conducted in terms of the beliefs of its practitioners? I describe a Wittgenstein-inspired approach to belief on which it is dubious that religious practices satisfy the criteria for the attribution of belief. I defend this more moderate and plausible version of Needham's thesis against two natural reasons to think religious belief widespread.
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R, Velusamy. „Folklore Elements in Kalittokai“. International Research Journal of Tamil 4, S-16 (12.12.2022): 28–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.34256/irjt224s164.

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Kalittokai is a classical Tamil poetic work. In this text the basic beliefs about life have been discussed. These beliefs are strong among the people. Beliefs on nature, birds, trees, astronomy and rain are very common among the people. Belief in blinking the eyes, belief over God, belief related to dreams, lizards horoscope, belief in fasting, belief in crescent prayer, and belief in fanaticism are very common among people. These are followed in their day to day life. Humans from birth to death are tied up in a knot called belief. This article is about the folklore elements in Kalittokai.
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Grigg, Richard. „The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God“. Religious Studies 26, Nr. 3 (September 1990): 389–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020540.

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The antifoundationalist defence of belief in God set forth by Alvin Plantinga has been widely discussed in recent years. Classical foundationalism assumes that there are two kinds of beliefs that we are justified in holding: beliefs supported by evidence, and basic beliefs. Our basic beliefs are those bedrock beliefs that need no evidence to support them and upon which our other beliefs must rest. For the foundationalist, the only beliefs that can be properly basic are either self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Belief in God is none of these. Thus, says the foundationalist, belief in God is justified only if there is sufficient evidence to back it up.
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Dissertationen zum Thema "Belief"

1

Etlin, David Jeffrey. „Desire, belief, and conditional belief“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45898.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-132).
This dissertation studies the logics of value and conditionals, and the question of whether they should be given cognitivist analyses. Emotivist theories treat value judgments as expressions of desire, rather than beliefs about goodness. Inference ticket theories of conditionals treat them as expressions of conditional beliefs, rather than propositions. The two issues intersect in decision theory, where judgments of expected goodness are expressible by means of decision-making conditionals. In the first chapter, I argue that decision theory cannot be given a Humean foundation by means of money pump arguments, which purport to show that the transitivity of preference and indifference is a requirement of instrumental reason. Instead, I argue that Humeans should treat the constraints of decision theory as constitutive of the nature of preferences. Additionally, I argue that transitivity of preference is a stricter requirement than transitivity of indifference. In the second chapter, I investigate whether David Lewis has shown that decision theory is incompatible with anti-Humean theories of desire. His triviality proof against "desire as belief' seems to show that desires can be at best conditional beliefs about goodness. I argue that within causal decision theory we can articulate the cognitivist position where desires align with beliefs about goodness, articulated by the decision making conditional. In the third chapter, I turn to conditionals in their own right, and especially iterated conditionals.
(cont.) I defend the position that indicative conditionals obey the import-export equivalence rather than modus ponens (except for simple conditionals), while counterfactual subjunctive conditionals do obey modus ponens. The logic of indicative conditionals is often thought to be determined by conditional beliefs via the Ramsey Test. I argue that iterated conditionals show that the conditional beliefs involved in indicative supposition diverge from the conditional beliefs involved in learning, and that half of the Ramsey Test is untenable for iterated conditionals.
by David Jeffrey Etlin.
Ph.D.
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Hernando, Miguel (Miguel Angel Hernando Cupido) 1970. „Studies in belief and belief attribution“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8764.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2001.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-209).
My dissertation is about Frege's classic problem of the morning and the evening star. I distinguish two aspects of the problem. One aspect I call it psychological, and it consists in describing the content of the beliefs of people who are willing to assent to pairs like (1) 'Hesperus is nice' and (2) 'Phosphorus is not nice.' I assume an interpretivist account of belief content, according to which an agent has the beliefs that best explain her behavior, and I propose certain principles of interpretation to substantiate this view. I use this account to argue that the person who assents to (1) and (2) is not incoherent, but simply mistaken about the proposition expressed by those sentences. In my view, the subject who assents to (1) and (2) takes them to express propositions about different planets, but at least one of those planets cannot be a real planet. I propose that it is a fictional one, and appeal to Kendall Walton's account of prop-oriented make-believe to explain how to use propositions that are about fictional entities to describe the belief state of people who are confused about some identity. The other aspect of the problem I call it semantical, and it consists in explaining how pairs of attributions like 'Charles believes that Hesperus is nice' and 'Charles does not believe that Phosphorus is nice' can be true at the same time. I offer a semantics based on the idea that, when we describe the belief state of people who are confused about some identity, we have to put ourselves in their shoes. We put ourselves in someone else's shoes by modifying our belief state to resemble the belief state of the other person; when we change our beliefs in this way, we acquire the beliefs necessary to talk of a single object as if it were two different ones. I argue that this Simulation Semantics can offer a satisfactory treatment of certain examples of belief attribution that cannot be handled by contemporary theories (examples in which the subject of the attribution is both confused about an identity, and is not familiar with the words that we use to attribute a belief to her). I also argue that this semantics has interesting applications to other problems in the philosophy of language, like for example the problem of the informativeness of identity statements. 7102 M
by Miguel Hernando.
Ph.D.
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McClung, Samuel Alan. „Peer evaluator beliefs analyzed within a teacher belief framework“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186587.

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The purpose of this study was to describe the views of peer evaluators within a career ladder system in one school district in the Southwestern United States. The methods and data analysis used 3 parts of a theoretical framework developed by Lortie (1975): goals sought in the workplace (perspectives on purpose), effective teaching (and the effects of endemic uncertainties of teaching to effectiveness), and preferences in job tasks (logic of sentiments). Eleven peer evaluators were interviewed. The data from the interviews were qualitatively analyzed and presented. Among the findings, peer evaluators' perspectives on purpose included goals to gain experience for leaving the classroom. Peer evaluators' endemic uncertainties included the assessment of teaching and the description of an effective teacher. Within peer evaluators' logic of sentiments, they preferred to observe students and work with teachers. Peer evaluators disliked determining the compensation of teachers. Within their logic of sentiments, peer evaluators viewed teachers as a well-qualified group willing to continue their own professional growth. Peer evaluators found their relationship with teachers constrained because of their roles of assisting teachers in their professional growth and summatively assessing teachers. Implications of this study include the need for further study to describe the views of teachers involved in differentiated staffing in career ladder programs. Additionally, further study is needed to determine the relationship of the views of teachers within a career ladder program to the success of the policies and activities of these programs.
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Renner, William. „Acausal belief propogation for inference on belief networks“. Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=79116.

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This thesis proposes an acausal version of the Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP) algorithm, motivated by the conjecture that such algorithms might possess different stability and convergence properties than in their usual causal formulation. It is shown that, prior to the introduction of evidence, the new algorithm has a fixedpoint giving the correct marginal distributions even for loopy networks, unlike its causal counterpart. A translation for causal networks is given to allow for behavior of the two algorithms to be compared for the same networks, and the comparison is discussed based on empirical results. The acausal algorithm is seen to exhibit different, but not necessarily superior, convergence properties for the networks tested. It may nonetheless be useful as an application of the principle of Loopy Belief Propogation for systems which are given by acausal rather than causal models, for which it provides a much faster computation than the sampling-based techniques frequently applied in such cases.
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Borders, Andrew Johnson. „Balancing belief“. [Huntington, WV : Marshall University Libraries], 2008. http://www.marshall.edu/etd/descript.asp?ref=869.

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Najle, Maxine Belén. „ANALYSIS OF AUTOMATIC JUDGMENTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF“. UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/psychology_etds/161.

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The measurement of religious belief has some social desirability concerns that make the development of an implicit measure of religiosity advantageous. Currently, there are few options for implicitly measuring religious belief. This study attempted to add to this literature by analyzing the automatic judgements of religious belief through the use of an implicit measure known as the MouseTrack task, allowing for the measurement of latency in the expression of these beliefs as well as the certainty of these beliefs by tracking the path taken during the decision process. A sample of 121 undergraduates was recruited from the UK SONA subject pool. Desired religious variance was not achieved in the sample, making interpretation of results difficult. Detailed breakdowns of these path analyses are given. Key trends in findings are discussed.
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Santos, Clara Maria Melo dos. „Good reasoning : to whom? when? how?; an investigation of belief effects on syllogistic and argumentative reasoning“. Thesis, University of Sussex, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.296530.

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Li, Shiyan. „Geometry of belief“. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering - Faculty of Informatics, 2007. http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/81.

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Usually, the researchers of traditional belief change theories (e.g., AGM theory) assume that the knowledge of the agents which have the lower priorities should fully accept the knowledge of those higher priority ones in the process of belief revision. These kinds of theories are called prioritized belief change theories. On the contrary, in the discussion of non-prioritized belief change theories (e.g., Konieczny and Pino-P{\'e}rez's merging theory), the belief changes happen among the agents which have the same priorities. In this dissertation, we provide a new style of epistemic states and the belief change operations on this kind of epistemic states such that the prioritized or non-prioritized characteristics of belief change operators will be determined only by the properties of agents' knowledge.
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Clarke, Roger. „Belief in context“. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/39817.

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I argue for a view I call sensitivism about belief. According to sensitivism, belief is sensitive to just those factors of context which epistemic contextualists claim are relevant to the semantics of words like "know": in particular, whether an agent believes p depends on the not-p alternatives salient to the agent, and the practical importance of p for the agent. I argue for sensitivism about both outright belief and partial belief, and outline a sensitivist formal model of belief. In chapter 1, I make a preliminary case for sensitivism, and for interest in sensitivism. After surveying some similar views in the literature, I present a scenario which is nicely explained by sensitivism, and which gives the view some intuitive plausibility. I also argue for the relevance of sensitivism to the debate over epistemic contextualism. In chapter 2, I argue that we need sensitivism about outright belief if we want to maintain both a Stalnakerian picture of how assertion works, and the principle that an assertion that p is sincere if and only if the assertor believes that p. I then outline a sensitivist formal model of outright belief. In chapter 3, I present a solution to the preface paradox which this model of belief makes available, and argue that it is more intuitively appealing than the more popular probabilistic solutions. In chapter 4, I argue that we should extend sensitivism to credences as well as outright belief. In particular, I advance the following two theses: (CONTEXT) Degrees of belief change from context to context, depending on the space of alternative possibilities. (UNITY) Outright belief is belief to degree 1. I claim that (UNITY) solves the usual paradoxes to which threshold views of outright belief fall prey, and (CONTEXT) undermines the usual reasons given for rejecting (UNITY).
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Davis, Jack Frank. „Belief and imagination“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2018. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10049327/.

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Two assumptions are often made about the nature of the cognitive attitudes that allow us to engage with fiction and in pretence: the uniformity and the non-doxastic assumptions. The uniformity assumption tells us that both of these activities involve the same cognitive attitudes. The non-doxastic assumption tells us that these cognitive attitudes are not beliefs, but belief-like states that we can call belief-like imaginings. I will challenge both of these assumptions in this thesis. In the case of the uniformity assumption, I will draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary imaginative counterparts. I will argue that if a belief-like counterpart is involved in our engagement in pretence, it will be a voluntary counterpart, whereas an involuntary one will have to be associated with our engagement with fiction. Against the non-doxastic assumption, I will argue that we can explain our engagement with these activities by introducing beliefs with distinct contents. In the case of pretence, I will suggest that the relevant beliefs are of the form ‘[I believe] I PRETEND that “p”’. In the case of fiction, I will argue that the relevant beliefs are of the form ‘I believe p [in the fiction]’. This will lead to us challenging the non-doxastic assumption on the grounds that belief-like imaginings are unnecessary for explaining how we are able to engage with fiction and in pretence. I will also offer some arguments for why belief-like imaginings might be insufficient for explaining how we are able to engage with fiction and in pretence. In particular, I will argue that belief-like imaginings do not do enough to explain how we recognise when someone else is engaging in pretence, and that they struggle to make sense of why our representations related to fiction and pretence exhibit what Walton calls ‘clustering’.
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Bücher zum Thema "Belief"

1

Vattimo, Gianni. Belief. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1999.

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Collins, Francis S. Belief. New York: HarperCollins, 2010.

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Johnson, Stephanie. Belief. London: Vintage, 2001.

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Jaszczolt, Katarzyna. Expressions of belief and belief ascription. [Lodz: University of Lodz], 1995.

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Luetz, Johannes M., und Patrick D. Nunn, Hrsg. Beyond Belief. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67602-5.

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Kellenberger, James. Religious Belief. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74170-9.

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Fermé, Eduardo, und Sven Ove Hansson. Belief Change. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60535-7.

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Dubois, Didier, und Henri Prade, Hrsg. Belief Change. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5054-5.

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O'Brien, Dellanna. Beyond belief! Birmingham, Ala: Woman's Missionary Union, 2000.

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Ṭaḥāwī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Islamic belief. Leicester: UK Islamic Academy, 1995.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Belief"

1

Alvarado, Sergio J. „Beliefs and Belief Relationships“. In The Kluwer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science, 49–80. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1561-2_3.

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Matthews, Robert J. „Belief and Belief’s Penumbra“. In New Essays on Belief, 100–123. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_6.

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Bratta, Phil. „They Believe Their Belief“. In Affect, Emotion, and Rhetorical Persuasion in Mass Communication, 93–105. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351242370-7.

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Luger, Tana M. „Health Beliefs/Health Belief Model“. In Encyclopedia of Behavioral Medicine, 999–1000. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39903-0_1227.

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Orbell, Sheina, Havah Schneider, Sabrina Esbitt, Jeffrey S. Gonzalez, Jeffrey S. Gonzalez, Erica Shreck, Abigail Batchelder et al. „Health Beliefs/Health Belief Model“. In Encyclopedia of Behavioral Medicine, 907–8. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1005-9_1227.

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Wilks, Yorick, und Afzal Ballim. „Belief Systems: Ascribing Belief“. In Künstliche Intelligenz, 386–403. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-83739-5_12.

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Brown, Duncan. „Writing Belief, Reading Belief“. In Finding My Way, 89–108. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032633831-5.

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Foley, Michael, und Gordon Geddes. „Belief“. In Religious Studies: Christianity GCSE, 99–162. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13913-2_4.

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Friedman, Aleene M. „Belief“. In Treating Chronic Pain, 141–54. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-5968-3_11.

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Kim, Nancy. „Belief“. In Judgment and Decision-Making, 235–50. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-26956-0_13.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Belief"

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Liu, Daxin, und Gerhard Lakemeyer. „Reasoning about Beliefs and Meta-Beliefs by Regression in an Expressive Probabilistic Action Logic“. In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/269.

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In a recent paper Belle and Lakemeyer proposed the logic DS, a probabilistic extension of a modal variant of the situation calculus with a model of belief based on weighted possible worlds. Among other things, they were able to precisely capture the beliefs of a probabilistic knowledge base in terms of the concept of only-believing. While intuitively appealing, the logic has a number of shortcomings. Perhaps the most severe is the limited expressiveness in that degrees of belief are restricted to constant rational numbers, which makes it impossible to express arbitrary belief distributions. In this paper we will address this and other shortcomings by extending the language and modifying the semantics of belief and only-believing. Among other things, we will show that belief retains many but not all of the properties of DS. Moreover, it turns out that only-believing arbitrary sentences, including those mentioning belief, is uniquely satisfiable in our logic. For an interesting class of knowledge bases we also show how reasoning about beliefs and meta-beliefs after performing noisy actions and sensing can be reduced to reasoning about the initial beliefs of an agent using a form of regression.
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Lorini, Emiliano, und Francois Schwarzentruber. „Multi-Agent Belief Base Revision“. In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/270.

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We present a generalization of belief base revision to the multi-agent case. In our approach agents have belief bases containing both propositional beliefs and higher-order beliefs about their own beliefs and other agents’ beliefs. Moreover, their belief bases are split in two parts: the mutable part, whose elements may change under belief revision, and the core part, whose elements do not change. We study a belief revision operator inspired by the notion of screened revision. We provide complexity results of model checking for our approach as well as an optimal model checking algorithm. Moreover, we study complexity of epistemic planning formulated in the context of our framework.
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Hunter, Aaron, François Schwarzentruber und Eric Tsang. „Belief Manipulation Through Propositional Announcements“. In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/154.

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Public announcements cause each agent in a group to modify their beliefs to incorporate some new piece of information, while simultaneously being aware that all other agents are doing the same. Given a set of agents and a set of epistemic goals, it is natural to ask if there is a single announcement that will make each agent believe the corresponding goal. This problem is known to be undecidable in a general modal setting, where the presence of nested beliefs can lead to complex dynamics. In this paper, we consider not necessarily truthful public announcements in the setting of AGM belief revision. We prove that announcement finding in this setting is not only decidable, but that it is simpler than the corresponding problem in the most simplified modal logics. We then describe AnnB, an implemented tool that uses announcement finding as the basis for controlling robot behaviour through belief manipulation.
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Boukhris, Imen, Zied Elouedi und Salem Benferhat. „Analyzing belief function networks with conditional beliefs“. In 2011 11th International Conference on Intelligent Systems Design and Applications (ISDA). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isda.2011.6121782.

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Delgrande, James P., Joshua Sack, Gerhard Lakemeyer und Maurice Pagnucco. „Epistemic Logic of Likelihood and Belief“. In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/360.

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A major challenge in AI is dealing with uncertain information. While probabilistic approaches have been employed to address this issue, in many situations probabilities may not be available or may be unsuitable. As an alternative, qualitative approaches have been introduced to express that one event is no more probable than another. We provide an approach where an agent may reason deductively about notions of likelihood, and may hold beliefs where the subjective probability for a belief is less than 1. Thus, an agent can believe that p holds (with probability <1); and if the agent believes that q is more likely than p, then the agent will also believe q. Our language allows for arbitrary nesting of beliefs and qualitative likelihoods. We provide a sound and complete proof system for the logic with respect to an underlying probabilistic semantics, and show that the language is equivalent to a sublanguage with no nested modalities.
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Buckingham, David, Daniel Kasenberg und Matthias Scheutz. „Simultaneous Representation of Knowledge and Belief for Epistemic Planning with Belief Revision“. In 17th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2020}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2020/18.

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We propose a novel approach to the problem of false belief revision in epistemic planning. Our state representations are pointed Kripke models with two binary relations over possible worlds: one representing agents' necessarily true knowledge, and one representing agents' possibly false beliefs. State transition functions maintain S5n properties in the knowledge relation and KD45n properties in the belief relation. When new information contradicts an agent's beliefs, belief revision draws new possible worlds from the agent's knowledge relation. Our method also improves upon prior work by accommodating false announcements. We develop our system as an extension to the mA* action language, presenting transition functions for ontic, sensing, and announcement actions.
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Souza, Marlo, und Renata Wassermann. „Belief Contraction in Non-classical logics as Hyperintensional Belief Change“. In 18th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2021}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2021/56.

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AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. Despite its popularity and importance to the area, it is well recognised that AGM's work relies on a strong idealisation of the agent's capabilities and the nature of beliefs themselves. Particularly, it is recognised in the literature that Belief and Knowledge are hyperintensional attitudes, i.e. they can differentiate between contents that are necessarily equivalent, but to our knowledge, only a few works have explicitly considered how hyperintensionality affects belief change. This work investigates abstract operations of hyperintensional belief change and their connection to belief change in non-classical logics, such as belief contraction operations for Horn Logics and Description Logics. Our work points to hyperintensional belief change as a general framework to unify results in belief change for non-classical logics.
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Baker, Clayton. „Predictive Modelling of Human Reasoning Using AGM Belief Revision“. In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/811.

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While many forms of belief change exist, the relationship between belief revision and human reasoning is of primary interest in this work. The theory of belief revision extends classical two-valued logic with an approach to resolve the conflict between a set of beliefs and newly learned information. The goal of this project is to test how humans revise conflicting beliefs. Experiments are proposed in which human subjects are required to resolve conflicting beliefs via relevance and confidence. In our analysis, the human responses will be evaluated against the predictions of two perspectives of propositional belief revision: formal and psychological.
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Gregoire, Eric. „Change Your Belief about Belief Change“. In 2013 IEEE 25th International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ictai.2013.133.

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Feng, Yuzhang, Yuan Fang Li, Colin Keng-Yan Tan, Bimlesh Wadhwa und Hai Wang. „Belief-augmented OWL (BOWL) Engineering the SemanticWeb with Beliefs“. In 12th IEEE International Conference on Engineering Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS 2007). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iceccs.2007.18.

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Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Belief"

1

Minker, Jack, und Donald Perlis. Distributed Belief Systems. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada244286.

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2

Smith, Joseph D. Belief: Foundation of Military Strategy. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada263590.

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3

Meeuwis, Maarten, Jonathan Parker, Antoinette Schoar und Duncan Simester. Belief Disagreement and Portfolio Choice. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25108.

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4

Enke, Benjamin, Frederik Schwerter und Florian Zimmermann. Associative Memory and Belief Formation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Januar 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26664.

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5

Bianchi, Francesco, Sydney Ludvigson und Sai Ma. Belief Distortions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Juni 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27406.

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6

Williams, Mary P. Breast Health Belief Systems Study. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada378006.

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Ahn, Sungsoo, Michael Chertkov und Jinwoo Shin. Sythesis of MCMC and Belief Propagation. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), Mai 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1254988.

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8

Jenkins, Odest C. Coordinating Robotic Networks through Belief Propogation. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, September 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada577130.

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9

Dempster, Arthur P. Theory and Applications of Belief Functions. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, November 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada217092.

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10

Minker, Jack, und Donald Perlis. Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Belief Systems, and Parallelism. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, Juli 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada201458.

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