Dissertationen zum Thema „Aristotle“
Um die anderen Arten von Veröffentlichungen zu diesem Thema anzuzeigen, folgen Sie diesem Link: Aristotle.
Geben Sie eine Quelle nach APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard und anderen Zitierweisen an
Machen Sie sich mit Top-50 Dissertationen für die Forschung zum Thema "Aristotle" bekannt.
Neben jedem Werk im Literaturverzeichnis ist die Option "Zur Bibliographie hinzufügen" verfügbar. Nutzen Sie sie, wird Ihre bibliographische Angabe des gewählten Werkes nach der nötigen Zitierweise (APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver usw.) automatisch gestaltet.
Sie können auch den vollen Text der wissenschaftlichen Publikation im PDF-Format herunterladen und eine Online-Annotation der Arbeit lesen, wenn die relevanten Parameter in den Metadaten verfügbar sind.
Sehen Sie die Dissertationen für verschiedene Spezialgebieten durch und erstellen Sie Ihre Bibliographie auf korrekte Weise.
1
Kwan, Alistair M. „Aristotle on his three elements : a reading of Aristotle's own doctrine /“. Connect to thesis, 1999. http://eprints.unimelb.edu.au/archive/00000659.
2
Müller, Sven. „Naturgemäße Ortsbewegung : Aristoteles' Physik und ihre Rezeption bis Newton“. Tübingen Mohr Siebeck, 2006. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&docl̲ibrary=BVB01&docn̲umber=015014441&linen̲umber=0001&funcc̲ode=DBR̲ECORDS&servicet̲ype=MEDIA.
3
Rosler, Andrés. „Political authority and obligation in Aristotle /“. Oxford : Clarendon press, 2005. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39905329x.
4
McConaughey, Zoé. „Aristotle, science and the dialectician's activity : a dialogical approach to Aristotle's logic“. Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lille (2018-2021), 2021. https://pepite-depot.univ-lille.fr/ToutIDP/EDSHS/2021/2021LILUH060.pdf.
Annotation:
Cette thèse développe une analyse formelle de la syllogistique assertorique d’Aristote selon une démarche historiquement et herméneutiquement fondée. Une logique dialogique moderne est proposée dans laquelle les résultats d’Aristote et sa manière d’y arriver sont reproduits,fournissant ainsi une alternative aux approches de la syllogistique fondées sur la déduction naturelle. L’idée principale de cette thèse est que la logique d’Aristote se comprend au mieux avec une approche dialogique. Elle est soutenue par une démarche historique fournissant une interprétation dialogique de sa syllogistique et de sa théorie de l’enquête scientifique, à partir d’une étude de ses textes. Cette interprétation de la syllogistique est ensuite formalisée dans un cadre dialogique, lui fournissant ainsi un soutien supplémentaireThis dissertation develops a formal analysis of Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic that is historicallyand hermeneutically sensitive. It provides a modern dialogical logic that has the same results asAristotle and that develops them in a way akin to Aristotle, providing an alternative to naturaldeduction approaches of syllogistic. The main claim of the dissertation is that Aristotle’s logic is best understood from a dialogicalapproach. It is backed by a historical approach of Aristotle’s texts, providing a dialogicalinterpretation of his syllogistic and theory of scientific inquiry. This interpretation of syllogisticis then formalized in a dialogical framework, thus giving further support to the claim
5
Thorsteinsson, Páll Rafnar. „Aristotle on law“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/252243.
6
Adams, Rachel R. „Aristotle on mind“. Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2011. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/9.
Annotation:
The mind as it is found in Aristotle's great work De Anima is a special capacity of the soul. It has both active and passive properties that work together to allow discursive thinking and moral ethical behavior to emerge. This work will look at Aristotle's philosophy of mind, and I will forward a new interpretation of the mind as he understood it: what I call the active and passive mind property dualism. Aristotle's four causes allow for a unique application of a form of dualism that accounts for the ontological status of the mind and the emergence of rational thinking. The importance of potentiality and actuality in Aristotle's metaphysics gives a different sort of formulation of the mind-body problem than is traditionally understood in the philosophy of mind. The first section of this paper will look at the terms used, especially actuality and potentiality. A comparison to Plato's tripartite soul will be given. Next, Aristotle's different kinds of soul and their varied capacities will be explored. Finally, the active mind will be explained as it appears in Book III, chapter 5.ID: 030476185; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for honors in the major in Philosophy.; Thesis (B.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-34).
B.A.
Bachelors
Arts and Humanities
Philosophy
7
Pearson, Giles Benjamin. „Aristotle on desire“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615903.
8
Giulietti, Stephen. „Aristotle on deformities“. Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2008. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p029-0732.
9
Journeau, Julie. „Le statut épistémologique de l'éthique comme science pratique selon Aristote“. Thesis, Lille 3, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013LIL30033.
Annotation:
Ce travail a pour objet d'interroger le statut épistémologique de l'éthique comme science pratique et d'expliciter l'affirmation d'Aristote selon laquelle l'éthique est une science. Nous abordons cette question en deux temps : le premier est celui d'une confrontation de l'éthique avec les autres savoirs aristotéliciens dans le but de spécifier la catégorie de savoir pratique dégagée en metaph. E. 1, le second est une étude des principales particularités du savoir pratique. Dans le but de déterminer ces différentes particularités, nous revenons sur les obstacles à la scientificité de l'éthique et nous analysons ce que nous considérons être des instruments du savoir pratique : le syllogisme pratique, les endoxa, les portraits et les exemplesIn this work, I will question the epistemological status of ethics as practical knowledge and I will explain the Aristotelian affirmation that ethics is a science. I will proceed in two axes : the first one is a confrontation of the ethics to the other knowledges in order to specify the nature of the category of practical knowledge brought out in metaph. E. 1, and the second one is a study of main particularities of practical knowledge. In order to specify those particularities, I will define the impediments to ethics' scientificity and I will analyze what I identified as instruments for the elaboration of a practical knowledge : practical syllogism, endoxa, portraits and examples
10
Gühler, Janine. „Aristotle on mathematical objects“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/6864.
Annotation:
My thesis is an exposition and defence of Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics. The first part of my thesis is an exposition of Aristotle's cryptic and challenging view on mathematics and is based on remarks scattered all over the corpus aristotelicum. The thesis' central focus is on Aristotle's view on numbers rather than on geometrical figures. In particular, number is understood as a countable plurality and is always a number of something. I show that as a consequence the related concept of counting is based on units. In the second part of my thesis, I verify Aristotle's view on number by applying it to his account of time. Time presents itself as a perfect test case for this project because Aristotle defines time as a kind of number but also considers it as a continuum. Since numbers and continuous things are mutually exclusive this observation seems to lead to an apparent contradiction. I show why a contradiction does not arise when we understand Aristotle properly. In the third part, I argue that the ontological status of mathematical objects, dubbed as materially [hulekos, ÍlekÀc] by Aristotle, can only be defended as an alternative to Platonism if mathematical objects exist potentially enmattered in physical objects. In the fourth part, I compare Aristotle's and Plato's views on how we obtain knowledge of mathematical objects. The fifth part is an extension of my comparison between Aristotle's and Plato's epistemological views to their respective ontological views regarding mathematics. In the last part of my thesis I bring Frege's view on numbers into play and engage with Plato, Aristotle and Frege equally while exploring their ontological commitments to mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Frege should not be mistaken for a historical Platonist and that we find surprisingly many similarities between Frege and Aristotle. After having acknowledged commonalities between Aristotle and Frege, I turn to the most significant differences in their views. Finally, I defend Aristotle's abstractionism in mathematics against Frege's counting block argument. This whole project sheds more light on Aristotle's view on mathematical objects and explains why it remains an attractive view in the philosophy of mathematics.
11
Yoo, Weon-Ki. „Aristotle on self-motion“. Thesis, University of Bristol, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1983/fb25569f-bd4b-4611-8e8c-c8191ef47968.
Annotation:
This thesis attempts to explain Aristotle's conception of the self-mover (introduced in Physics VIII. 4-6) by analysing, in particular, the relationship between the locomotive faculty of the soul and the sumphuton pneuma. Aristotle's theory of self-motion calls for resolutions to three major problems: (a) how is self-motion to be explained without denying the existence of the first mover, i.e. the ultimate cause of the motions of all sublunary beings? (b) how is the self-motion of the living being different from the natural motion of the non-living being? and (c) what is the relationship between the unmoved moving part and the moved part of the self-mover (identified as the soul and the body)? Chapter I discusses (i) some potential problems that Aristotle faces in maintaining the theory of self-motion as a part of his overall theory of natural change, (ii) the characteristics and the relationships of the internal parts of the self-mover, and (iii) the reason for identifying the parts with the soul and the body. Chapter II turns to examine modem views on Aristotle's conception of the soul-body relationship, focusing on the functionalist interpretation of it as entailing compositional plasticity, viz. the view that the same psychological state may be realised by several different material states. Chapter III examines what psychological capacities are necessary for the arousal of animal locomotion and what their interrelationships are, whereas Chapter IV argues against Nussbaum's claim that Aristotle maintains that phantasia is an absolutely necessary capacity for an animal to arouse locomotion. Chapter V analyses the locomotive faculty and its relationship with the sumphuton pneuma. On the basis of this examination, this thesis ascribes to Aristotle the following claims: (al) that all natural beings have natures for initiating their own motions, which cannot be merely brought about by the external mover, (bl ) that self-motion is differentiated from natural motion in that, although both depend on external conditions, the former, unlike the latter, also depends on the internal condition of the mover, and (CI) that psychological capacities can be realised only in the pneuma and in nothing else.
12
Kouremenos, Theokritos. „Aristotle on Mathematical Infinity /“. The Ohio State University, 1995. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487930304685193.
13
Lear, Jonathan. „Aristotle and logical theory /“. Cambridge ; New York ; Port Chester [etc.] : Cambridge university press, 1990. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb373723536.
14
Kallich, Lara. „The particular and the general a study of Aristotle's Twofold Conception of Substance in Metaphysics VII /“. Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/695.
15
Damico, Greg Anthony. „On Definitional Unity in Aristotle“. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, 2012. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3482113.
16
Majithia, Roopen. „Aristotle on the good life“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0006/NQ40381.pdf.
17
Panayides, Christos Yiangou. „Aristotle on modality and determinism“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ59651.pdf.
18
Gregoric, Pavel. „Aristotle on the common sense“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.273207.
19
Lawrence, Gavin. „Aristotle on thought and action“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9fe04a91-2848-4b55-8938-86633210efe4.
Annotation:
The immediate object is a determinate resolution of Aristotle's position in Nicomachean Ethics 7.3. over the Socratic problem and in particular the possibility of last-ditch akrasia. My approach seeks interpretational constraints and illumination from considering the argument as a structured whole. Moreover, the passage is a point on which larger issues in Aristotle's philosophies of mind, action, and morals converge: the elucidation offered attempts both to frame and throw light on these. Chapter One makes preliminary moves on several fronts. Firstly it looks briefly at Aristotle's position over last-ditch akrasia in De Anima and Eudemian Ethics. Then it outlines the problems of Nicomachean Ethics 7.3. and classifies previous lines of solution. Thirdly an intuitive picture is given of Aristotle's method and basic stance. Finally some contrasts are drawn between Aristotle's and modern approaches to akrasia. Chapters Two to Five discuss the four Sections of Nicomachean Ethics 7.3's argument. Chapters Two and Three take Section 1 and 2 together and consider two major problems of interpretation. Chapter Two asks whether these Sections concern akrasia at all, and, if so, how. I argue that their concern is direct, general (i.e. not confined to some akratic species), and inclusive (i.e. embracing non-akratic phenomena). Chapter Three asks about the interpretation of "exercising knowledge". Firstly the results of Chapter Two are defended; an aporetic discussion of this difficult issue then follows. Chapter Four examines Section 3. After analysing its structure, it distinguishes three principal issues. I argue firstly that Section 3, like 1 and 2, concerns akrasia directly, generally and inclusively; secondly that the knowledge that the akratic is temporally unable to use (that is 'tied') is his (universal) knowledge of what is worthwhile; thirdly that this failure involves a cognitive failure (I suggest a distortion of the agent's situational appreciation) - and not, as some scholars have recently urged, merely a motivational failure. Chapter Five, perforce selective, tackles firstly various problems of Section 4's argumentative structure, and then the interpretation of 1147a26-31 (the 'normal case'). Finally 1147a31-5 (the 'akratic case') is examined and a case argued for its offering two syllogisms but only one practical syllogism.
20
King, Richard Alfred Harmsworth. „Aristotle on life and death“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.627566.
21
Mira, Chaparro Juan Pablo. „Aristotle on music and emotions“. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/25742.
Annotation:
This research aims to offer an original reconstruction of Aristotle’s psychology of music that explains his views on the relation between instrumental music and emotions. I argue that, contrary to the relevant scholarship, for Aristotle instrumental music cannot convey emotions to the listener. What instrumental music does, I claim, is to cause an objectless mood or disposition (διάθεσις) that “prepares the way” (προοδοποιεῖν) for the emotions. Most interpreters of Politics VIII (1340a12-29) argue that for Aristotle a piece of instrumental music would be able to represent emotions and the listener would be moved to the same emotion by a sort of sympathetic contagion. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of emotions. For Aristotle a necessary condition for the emotions is that those experiencing them “judge” (κρίνειν) a situation based on their beliefs. If it is accepted that there is such a thing as an emotional contagion through music, then the cognitive theory of emotion presented by Aristotle is at risk since no such a judgment would be required. The thesis is presented in three chapters. In chapter one the cognitive elements that give rise to emotions are analysed. The nature of the term παθή is explored as well as the difference between its use as a ‘general affection’ and its use as the mental process that we now call ‘emotion.’ In this latter sense the emotions are mental states directed to an object on which a judgment is made and that are accompanied by pain or pleasure. The nature of the emotional judgment is investigated and the possibility of its existence in non-rational animals is explored. It is concluded that, even if we accept emotions in animals, intentionality and predication of an object are necessary conditions for the existence of emotions. In the second chapter, I discuss two instances where it seems Aristotle makes an exception to the judgment as necessary condition for the emotions. First, emotions aroused by the perception of signs of emotions, like the mere voice of the orator (Rhet. 1408a16-26) and the spectacle in the theatre (Poet. 1453b1-10) and second, emotions aroused by bodily changes (De an. 403a25). I argue that in Aristotle’s view in both cases the factors at work (voice, sight, bodily condition) only facilitate the arousal of emotions, but the actual arousal requires an additional narrative context that supplies grounds for the judgment that in turn gives rise to the emotion in question. In the first case the orator’s voice and the theatre’s spectacle work just as a condiment (ἥδυσμα) that helps to intensify (συναπεργάζεσθαι) the object of judgment (Pol. 1340b17; Poet. 1449b25; 1450b16; Rhet. 1386a31). Our emotional response has as its object their story, not the elements that decorate it. In the second case, the bodily changes are the material constituents of emotions; facilitate the generation of emotions: hotness around the heart, for example, makes the subject prone to anger; but the emotion of anger appears only after a particular situation is evaluated by the mind. In the third chapter, I turn to the specific case of music. From an exegesis of Pol. 1340a12-29, I argue that the emotions ostensibly transmitted by music (μουσική) to the listener are due to the lyrics of the songs (μέλη), not to the instrumental music itself. Therefore the question about the nature of the emotional effect of pure instrumental music remains open. My answer to this question is based on the analysis of the causal mechanism by means of which instrumental music affects the listener. Aristotle’s physiology reveals the physical impact of sound on the sense of hearing, and from there to the heart, the first sensorium. Bodily changes in the organ create an objectless disposition (διάθεσις) in the listener by relaxing or agitating his body, without providing any content for the mind besides the perception of the sound. Exciting or relaxing the heart by means of music would leave the listener in the disposition of readiness to react emotionally, but the emotion would appear only once an intentional object, i.e., the content of the emotion, is presented and evaluated by the mind. Finally, I show the relevance of my interpretation of these dispositions to understanding the role of emotions in the education of character in the Politics. Aristotle proposes to use only a certain type of music in his educational curriculum, not one too relaxed or too tense, but a middle between them that puts the students in a stable and noble disposition that would, in turn, lead them to be guided by reason instead of their emotions.
22
Swekoski, Don G. „Rhetorical Revolutions: Heidegger and Aristotle“. Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1342805511.
23
King, Richard A. H. „Aristotle on life and death /“. London : Duckworth, 2004. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb391981465.
24
Karamanolis, George E. „Plato and Aristotle in agreement? : the Platonist discussion of Aristotle's philosophy from Antiochus to Porphyry“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.367464.
25
Opperman, Paul James. „Aristotle's theory of perception : physiology and psychology /“. Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5712.
26
Wood, Matthew Stephen. „Aristotle and the Question of Metaphor“. Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/32476.
Annotation:
This doctoral dissertation aims to give a comprehensive and contextual account of Aristotle’s theory of metaphor. The dissertation is organized around the central claim that Aristotle’s definition of metaphor in Chapter 22 of the Poetics, as well as his discussion of it in Book III of the Rhetoric, commit him to what I call a vertical theory of metaphor, rather than to a horizontal one. Horizontal theories of metaphor assert that ‘metaphor’ is a word that has been transferred from a literal to a figurative sense; vertical theories of metaphor, on the other hand, assert that ‘metaphor’ is the transference of a word from one thing to another thing.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the dissertation itself has five chapters. The first chapter sketches out the historical context within which the vertical character of Aristotle’s theory of metaphor becomes meaningful, both by (a) giving a rough outline of Plato’s critical appraisal of rhetoric and poetry in the Gorgias, Phaedrus, Ion, and Republic, and then (b) showing how Aristotle’s own Rhetoric and Poetics should be read as a faithful attempt to reform both activities in accordance with the criteria laid down by Plato in these dialogues. The second and third chapters elaborate the main thesis and show how Aristotle’s texts support it, by painstakingly reconstructing the relevant passages of the Poetics, Rhetoric, On Interpretation, Categories and On Sophistical Refutations, and resolving a number of interpretive disputes that these passages raise in the secondary literature. Finally, the fourth and fifth chapters together pursue the philosophical implications of the thesis that I elaborate in the first three, and resolve some perceived contradictions between Aristotle’s theory of metaphor in the Poetics and Rhetoric, his prohibition against the use of metaphors in the Posterior Analytics, and his own use of similes and analogical comparisons in the dialectical discussions found in the former text, the De Anima and the later stages of his argument in the Metaphysics.
In many ways, the most philosophically noteworthy insight uncovered by my dissertation is the basic consideration that, for Aristotle, all metaphors involve a statement of similarity between two or more things – specifically, they involve a statement of what I call secondary resemblance, which inheres to different degrees of imperfection among things that are presumed to be substantially different, as opposed to the primary and perfect similarities that inhere among things of the same kind. The major, hitherto unnoticed consequence I draw from this insight is that it is ultimately the philosopher, as the one who best knows these secondary similarities, who is implicitly singled out in Aristotle’s treatises on rhetoric and poetry as being both the ideal poet and the ideal orator, at least to the extent that Aristotle holds the use of metaphor to be a necessary condition for the mastery of both pursuits. This further underscores what I argue in the first chapter is the inherently philosophical character of the Poetics and the Rhetoric, and shows the extent to which they demand to be read in connection with, rather than in isolation from, the more ‘central’ themes of Aristotle’s philosophical system.
27
Striowski, Andra. „Aristotle on Time and the Soul“. Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/34579.
Annotation:
In this thesis I seek to explain a simple and yet quite difficult point about the nature of time: time is not motion, despite the fact that time and motion seem to be intertwined and interdependent. Aristotle calls time “something of motion (ti tēs kinēseōs).” His most concentrated account of time is presented within his treatise on physics, which is devoted to the study of motion and its principles and causes. The challenge of interpreting Aristotle’s account of time is to understand how it is fitting both that 1) a discussion about the nature of time emerges within the Physics, and that 2) a full and adequate account of time must exceed the scope of physics. Such a challenge obliges our attention not only as readers of Aristotle, but is furthermore relevant to anyone who seeks to give a coherent account of time, as one must in any case confront the ways in which time differs from motion while being an indispensable condition of it.
Near the end of his account of time in the Physics, Aristotle presents us with an aporia that speaks directly to this challenge when he asks whether or not there can be time without soul. I suggest that a negative answer to this question – if time cannot exist without soul – means that the nature of time properly extends beyond physics. Aristotle has left it up to us to explore this possibility, since he does not pursue it explicitly himself. He merely formulates it in the Physics as a question. However, I argue that the absence of a definitive answer to this question there is not a sign that the nature of time is somehow beyond the capacity of Aristotle’s thought. After examining Aristotle’s account of time in the Physics, I look at his corpus more broadly, paying close attention to the way that Aristotle distinguishes the soul from the rest of nature at the beginning of the De Anima. The distinction between the living and the non-living is not made in the Physics, because it is not required for that study. In the Physics Aristotle studies what is shared by living things and the elements that sustain life within the ordered cosmos. As such, the focus of the Physics is on the causes of motion and change as what connects and distinguishes embodied individuals within this whole. But what it would mean to say that time depends on soul, and not simply on motion, cannot be addressed adequately in the Physics, since what distinguishes the activities of living from the incomplete activity of moving does not pertain to the main concerns of this treatise.
By paying respectful attention to the structure of distinctions that organize Aristotle’s works as such, I make the case for time’s dependence on soul. I examine Aristotle’s accounts of animal and human awareness of time in the De Anima and Parva Naturalia and find that certain activities of the soul – sensation, memory, and deliberative reasoning - provide resources that can help us come to understand the most perplexing features of his account of time in the Physics, precisely those features that the analogies between time and motion or magnitude fail to explain: the simultaneity of diverse motion, the sameness and difference of the now, the differentiation of time into parts, and the way that time contains and exceeds (“numbers”) all possible motions. Thus I conclude that there cannot be time without soul, because the soul’s active nature must come into view in order to explain the features of time that distinguish it from motion.
28
Emmick, Christopher. „Educational praxis in Plato and Aristotle /“. Connect to online version of this title in UO's Scholars' Bank, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/6059.
29
Tchoudnowsky, Alexis. „Aristotle and the metaphysics of liberty“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335915.
30
Murphy, Damian Gregory. „Mixing, mixtures, and perception in Aristotle“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.613756.
31
Konczol, Miklos. „Legal rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle“. Thesis, Durham University, 2013. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9485/.
Annotation:
This thesis deals with certain aspects of Aristotelian rhetoric, its relationship to earlier and contemporary authors, in particular to Plato, and its influence on Hellenistic rhetoric. The focus is on the theory of judicial rhetoric throughout. In Chapter I, a reconstruction of Plato’s view of rhetoric is intended to set the background against which the characteristic traits of Aristotelian judicial rhetoric will be examined. It is argued that Plato is consistently hostile towards ‘ordinary’ rhetoric, i.e. rhetoric that is aimed at persuasion and accessible to the citizens of the polis without restrictions. He finds no place for this kind of rhetoric in a properly functioning society. Chapter II focuses on Aristotle’s appraisal of judicial rhetoric: its possible function and relative value. The main contention of the chapter is that unlike Plato, Aristotle regards rhetoric as useful for eliciting just decisions. Aristotle does not, as often argued, limit the task of the courtroom orator to the discussion of facts, nor does he consider judicial rhetoric inferior to the deliberative branch. Chapter III looks at what Aristotle calls the specific arguments of judicial rhetoric. Its aim is to clarify the theoretical tenets underlying the legal arguments discussed in the Rhetoric as well as their structure and way of functioning. It is argued that most of these arguments focus on the problem of intention, which also explains some of the links among them and how they allow for a smooth transition between questions of facts and lawfulness. Chapter IV revisits the problem of Aristotelian influence on later judicial rhetoric, in particular on Hermagoras’ theory of issues (staseis). It examines the ways in which issues appear in the Rhetoric and compares them to their counterparts in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Hermagoras’ (reconstructed) system, highlighting the points where Aristotle may have inspired later doctrine.
32
Oki, Takashi. „Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9f6e9f40-eb61-43a8-92d6-b3749820e738.
Annotation:
In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism. In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in Physics B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example. In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in Physics B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism. In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in Physics B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity. In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in Metaphysics E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in Physics B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.
33
Kim, Do Hyoung. „The nature of deliberation in Aristotle“. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/10624.
Annotation:
This dissertation argues that: (1) deliberation (bouleusis) is distinguished from theoretical thought, in so far as the former is strictly about the particulars of a given situation, while the latter is about universal concepts; and that (2) deliberation is practical only in so far as it prescribes the best option for action, that is, it prescribes practical truth, but there is no element within the deliberative soul that can initiate an action directly. With these two points in mind, I will show in Chapter One that what lets us consistently cognize the moral ‘end’, the moral first principle, is a character or emotional disposition we acquire as a result of habituation (ethismos). Having explained how the conception of ends can be determined, I provide an argument for the first thesis mentioned above, and claim in Chapter Two that deliberation is not of the ends (ta telê), but is only of the means (ta pros to telos). My argument for the second thesis will lead me to claim in Chapter Three that prohairesis, the conclusion of deliberation, is not an action. I end my argument with an investigation showing that the interpretation of Aristotelian deliberation supported in this thesis secures its justification not only in those discussions that are directly related to the nature of deliberation, but also in the context of other important discussions in Aristotle’s ethics, namely, about the possibility of acrasia (in Chapter Four) and the definition of eudaimonia (in Chapter Five). My argument will provide a better treatment and solution, than existing attempts, of the puzzles surrounding the concepts of acrasia and eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics.
34
Solis, Eric Matthew, und Eric Matthew Solis. „Curable and Incurable Vice in Aristotle“. Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625328.
Annotation:
In this thesis I provide an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of moral vice and argue (1) that Aristotle's account is consistent, and (2) that Aristotle is not committed to the view that all vicious agents are incapable of improving their characters. The main argument attempts to show that a proper interpretation of Aristotle's account of vice must observe a distinction between what Aristotle recognizes as two distinct sorts of vicious agents: those who are capable of change, and those who are not. I argue that this distinction amounts to the same thing as what I call the distinction between curably and incurably vicious agents. Recognizing this distinction and drawing out the ideas which ground it, I argue, shows that Aristotle's account of vice is consistent, and that he is not committed to the view that all vicious agents are incapable of improving their characters.
35
Katayama, Errol G. „Aristotle on artifacts : a metaphysical puzzle /“. Albany (N.Y) : State university of New York press, 1999. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb371816451.
36
Searby, Denis Michael. „Aristotle in the Greek gnomological tradition /“. Uppsala : Uppsala Universitet, 1998. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb376774865.
37
Judson, Lindsay. „Aristotle on necessity, chance and explanation“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a2a915a2-d946-4da3-a472-172afbe9bafc.
Annotation:
Aristotle endorses a very striking doctrine connecting necessity with what seems to be a non-modal notion -- that of 'being or happening always'. He also forges a connection between the idea of 'happening by chance' and 'happening neither always nor for the most part'. These two connections form the subject of this essay. My guiding aim is to provide an account of what the 'always/necessary' doctrine involves and of why Aristotle might have held it. Reflection on the nature of the connection between 'by chance' and 'neither always nor for the most part' throws light on what Aristotle means by 'happening always', and, in consequence, on the nature of the link between 'always' and 'necessary'; it also suggests that the basis of this link is to be found in Aristotle's general conception of the natural world as the object of explanation and knowledge. The primary texts upon which discussion of these connections must focus are De Caelo I. 12 and the analysis of chance in Physics II. 4â6. I discuss these two texts in turn, after a opening chapter which surveys the evidence for Aristotle's acceptance of the 'always/necessaryâ doctrine and considers the nature of the restrictions which he places on it. Chapter 2 comprises a translation of and commentary on Cael. I. 12, together with a translation and discussion of its companion chapter, I. 10. In Chapter 3, I examine the nature of Aristotle's argument in I. 12, and criticise various interpretations which see it as evidence that Aristotle's 'always/necessary' doctrine rests on a distinctive conception of possibility. The translation of and commentary on Phys. II. 4-6 (Chapter 4) are followed in Chapter 5 by a discussion of issues relating to the association of chance with 'neither always nor for the most part'. The final chapter returns to the question of the connection between 'always' and 'of necessity'.
38
Emmick, Christopher 1980. „Educational Praxis in Plato and Aristotle“. Thesis, University of Oregon, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/6059.
Annotation:
vii, 66 p. A print copy of this title is available from the UO Libraries, under the call number: KNIGHT LB85.P7 B367 2007Philosophy of education should be unfolded alongside a deep understanding of how critical thinking transforms the student/teacher relation as a form of philosophic praxis. This account primarily draws on the philosophic works of Plato and Aristotle, but also engages a variety of contemporary thinkers on the question of education as philosophically transformative critical thinking. The dialogic structure of Plato's Republic demonstrates the relation between character and logos in a way that shows learning as praxis in self-realization. Aristotle's inquiry into psuche provides understanding and language for the inner life ofa learner that is both active and complex. I argue that, in its most basic formulation, critical thinking names a process that allows students to harness their voice and mature in the classroom while also presenting teachers with the ability to participate in the active learning of their teaching environment.
Adviser: Peter Warnek
39
Kim, Bradford Jean-Hyuk. „Aristotle on the value of friends“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2018. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7a7d2d16-2514-457c-a217-968af1111a60.
Annotation:
In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship is egoistic. Focusing on the Nicomachean Ethics, I begin with VIII.2. Here Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only because of the lovable (φιλητóv), which divides into the useful, pleasant, and good. I argue that "because of (διὰ)" refers to at least the final cause and that "the lovable" refers to what appears to contribute one's own happiness (εuδαιμoνία); therefore Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. This result may seem incompatible with some types of concern Aristotle principally attributes to his normative paradigm of complete friendship: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. One might argue that these types of concern are altruistic, and so it cannot be the case that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. I argue that these types of concern ultimately hinge on one's own happiness. The object is the lovable (what appears to contribute to one's own happiness), specifically the good instantiated by the other's virtue; further, what a virtuous person takes as valuable about another's virtue is how it facilitates her own virtuous activity, that is, her own happiness. From here I turn to Aristotle's notion of 'another self'. One popular interpretation of other selfhood defies the altruism/egoism divide. Here the essential feature of other selfhood is virtue, which allows for no prioritization among virtuous people; there is no prioritization of the other over oneself (as in altruism) nor of oneself over the other (as in egoism), since the relevant parties are equal in moral standing (they are virtuous). Assessing the instances of 'another self' in the Nicomachean Ethics VIII.12, IX.4, and IX.9, I argue for an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization. That is, what makes other selves valuable is how they facilitate one's own virtuous activity, one's own happiness. Finally, I address the doctrine of self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics IX.8. Again, some interpreters derive non-prioritization from the text; Aristotle claims that all virtuous people identify with the understanding (voũç), so, the non-prioritization interpretation goes, there can be no prioritization among virtuous agents, as they are identical in the relevant way. I argue for an egoistic interpretation of IX.8; Aristotle endorses praiseworthy self-love, which involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (καλòν) for oneself over others. Moreover, such self-prioritization occurs precisely by gratifying the understanding, that which was supposed to ground non-prioritization.
40
Leiß, Pekka. „Die aristotelische Lehre von der Zeit : ihre Aporien und deren Auflösung /“. Trier : WVT, Wiss. Verl. Trier, 2004. http://www.gbv.de/dms/goettingen/388121815.pdf.
41
Echeñique, Javier. „Aristotle on ethical ascription : a philosophical exercise in the interpretation of the role and significance of the hekousios/akousios distinction in Aristotle's Ethics“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1348.
Annotation:
In his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.
42
Johansen, Thomas Kjeller. „The material basis of perception in Aristotle“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/251571.
43
Bowe, Geoffrey Scott. „Aristotle and Plotinus on being and unity“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape11/PQDD_0001/NQ42723.pdf.
44
Bowe, Geoffrey Scott. „Aristotle and Plotinus on being and unity /“. *McMaster only, 1997.
45
Kavanaugh, Leslie Jaye. „The architectonic of philosophy Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz /“. Amsterdam : Amsterdam : Amsterdam University Press ; Universiteit van Amsterdam [Host], 2007. http://dare.uva.nl/document/47358.
46
Martinez-Bedard, Brandie. „Types of Causes in Aristotle and Sankara“. Digital Archive @ GSU, 2006. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/rs_hontheses/3.
Annotation:
This paper is a comparative project between a philosopher from the Western tradition, Aristotle, and a philosopher from the Eastern tradition, Sankara. These two philosophers have often been thought to oppose one another in their thoughts, but I will argue that they are similar in several aspects. I will explore connections between Aristotle and Sankara, primarily in their theories of causation. I will argue that a closer examination of both Aristotelian and Advaita Vedanta philosophy, of which Sankara is considered the most prominent thinker, will yield significant similarities that will give new insights into the thoughts of both Aristotle and Sankara.
47
Vlahovic, Denis. „The sovereignty of the lawcode in Aristotle /“. Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=38527.
Annotation:
In contrast with the procedural orientation of Athenian law in his day, Aristotle thinks that the lawcode should include principles which explain the rules of the lawcode and guide the interpretation of these rules in difficult cases. It should be determined by majority vote whether the decisions and proposals of political experts are consistent with the principles of the lawcode. Aristotle's views on practical explanation support his views on political deliberation. Someone has a techne rather than mere empeiria if he can give an account of the principles of an art and is able to explain the results of his deliberations in the art in terms of the principles. Such explanation does not have the same status as apodeixis in the epistemai, in that such an explanation cannot demonstrate that a conclusion follows necessarily from the principles of the art. However, a person who has experience in the art is able to evaluate deliberative options based on such arguments.Aristotle has an account of practical intellection which, like Plato's, is theory-based. Aristotle's account is an adjustment of Plato's account in the light of Isocrates' criticisms of Plato. Aristotle combines the accounts of Plato and Isocrates---the emphasis of the one on explanation and the emphasis of the other on practical principles. Aristotle's views on practical intellection allow him to solve a problem associated with Plato's proposals in the Laws, which resemble in important respects Aristotle's own proposals. Plato intends in the Laws to introduce an arrangement on which the polis is governed by non-philosopher citizens educated by the lawcode. However, because of his views on practical intellection, Plato is forced to put the 'Nocturnal Council' in charge of 'preserving the laws'. Because of his views on practical intellection, Aristotle can accept that the majority can be in charge of preserving the law. Aristotle's views on practical intellection also allow him to say that one ought to spell out the principles of the lawcode and privilege them in the interpretation of the law---which is different from the Athenian, procedural approach to the law---even though no universally true claims are possible on practical issues.
48
Austin, Kathleen J. „Aristotle, Aquinas, and the history of quickening“. Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=79819.
Annotation:
This thesis examines a primary question raised by both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas: What constitutes the beginning of a human being? Aristotle and Aquinas raise this question for very different reasons. Modern critical commentators revisit it for their own reasons, namely for the purposes of ethical debates surrounding conception and abortion. They frequently attribute the notions of delayed ensoulment and quickening to Aristotle. Through examination of the primary texts, I demonstrate that this attribution is erroneous. Aristotle contends that ensoulment is substantially complete at conception, though subject to gradual actualization throughout the lifespan of a human being; while Thomas suggests that conception is a process, requiring several substantial changes before a human soul is infused. I argue that Aquinas adapts Aristotle in accordance with his Christian theological commitments, and modern commentators follow him to develop their own notions of delayed ensoulment and quickening.
49
Slomkowski, Paul. „The notion of the topos in Aristotle“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.359536.
50
Barton, Jane. „Experience and explanation : the Hippocratics to Aristotle“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.397029.