Dissertationen zum Thema „Appeal to the reason“
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Bishop, Eleanor M. „Jacobin Magazine, Community Journalism, and the Legacy of American Socialist Publications in the Early Twentieth Century“. Ohio University Honors Tutorial College / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ouhonors1619224719634209.
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Addison, Rachel Helen. „The problem of moral ambivalence : revisiting Henry Sidgwick's theory of 'Rational Benevolence' as a basis for moral reasoning, with reference to prenatal ethical dilemmas“. Thesis, University of Exeter, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/27454.
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This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles (such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from being developed. The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex and sensitive ethical decision making.
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Huldt, Christian. „The reason to reason“. Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för matematikämnets och naturvetenskapsämnenas didaktik, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-152427.
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Uppsatsen baseras på designexperiment av undervisning med syftet att uppmuntra till kreativa resonemang. Studien genomfördes som ett antal undervisningstillfällen då närvarande elever presenterades för ett problem eller en frågeställning som inte var formulerad eller kunde lösas på samma sätt som typuppgifterna i läroboken. Observationer och transkript från dessa tillfällen används som underlag för en analys som bygger på interventionens syfte och möjligheter utifrån teorin om didaktiska situationer med viss påverkan från kategorisering av resonemang. Omfattningen av studien gör att få generella slutsatser kan dras, men det åskådliggörs i några exempel hur viktig lärarens lyhördhet kan vara för att fånga upp embryon till självständigt resonemang och hur rådande normer påverkar debattklimatet. I diskussionen nämns hur försök till didaktiska situationer kan användas för att få en bättre bild av elevers proximala zoner.
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Wyatt, Holliday. „The Poetics of Appeal“. VCU Scholars Compass, 2014. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/595.
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This study advances a theoretical model of appeal, the framework readers’ advisory (RA) librarians use to make book suggestions. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, it combines elements of media studies, literary theory, and library science to posit new elements of appeal and new models for understanding its dynamics. This dissertation argues that, because appeal as currently practiced relies heavily on reductive binaries, it fails to account for a number of features that play a crucial role in a reader’s experience of a work. Through a historically informed explication of the existing appeal framework, it posits a new formulation: appeal is a tripartite construct involving the sensibility of a text, the content of a work, and the interest of a reader, where reader is understood in its broadest sense. The new framework demonstrates explicitly that appeal is both textual and readerly and advances a number of additional concepts that are possible only in a more nuanced, tripartite structure. The dissertation illustrates its findings through three application chapters, considering in depth Jane Austen’s Persuasion, Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre, and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. The study further provides a new theory/practice model of appeal, strongly urging that, if RA service is to continue to advance, its provision and an understanding of its critical concepts be undertaken with depth and rigor.
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Karr, Jennifer. „Reason for Rejoice“. Master's thesis, University of Central Florida, 2013. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/5956.
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This collection of short stories features characters who face unexpected situations arising from ordinary circumstances. Most of the characters find themselves compelled to react in ways that may even surprise themselves. A young woman finds her first feeling of joy in a long time in the face of her mother's possible death. Best friends recall their years spent doing drugs and ignoring responsibility. When a woman confronts her fear of sex, she finds herself literally in another world. Rather than sticking with one form, several stories depart from traditional structures. One flash fiction piece is told in the first-person collective voice; another story evolves into magical realism; two are linked, and one story is told as an elegy. What matters are the characters, their struggles, and their relationships with one another.M.F.A.
Masters
English
Arts and Humanities
Creative Writing
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Ng, L. S. „Just public reason“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2013. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1401925/.
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This dissertation looks at the linked issues of justification and public reason – under what conditions do political authorities count as legitimate, and what is the appropriate mode of reasoning together in the public sphere? The main contender in the field currently is Rawls’s political liberalism. His conception of justification gives a key role to the justifiability of political power to each citizen, based on shared (because mutually acceptable) reasons. This approach to justification affects how we reason in the public sphere – in discussing certain fundamental issues, Rawlsian public reason requires limiting our reasons to public ones (viz., those which others could reasonably endorse), and bracketing those based on disputed conceptions of the good. How we think about justification thus has concrete implications for how we live together in political society. Rawls’s political liberalism is commonly pitted against comprehensive liberalism. The disagreement tends to be cast as being about comprehensive liberals rejecting the need for justifiability. I argue that this is mistaken, and that Rawls shares more than we might think with the comprehensive liberal. Taking Raz as the modern champion of comprehensive liberalism, I show that both Rawls and Raz are deeply committed to justifiability, and trace the disagreement between the two to a metaphysical dispute about how to conceive of the project of justifying the implementation of political principles. In light of their shared commitment to justifiability, the question becomes whether justifiability requires shared reasons. I propose a heuristic reading of Rawls’s requirement of mutually acceptable reasons, which explains how Rawls’s and Raz’s views on justification can be brought together without needing to bracket the truth of the principles of justice. This proposed reconciliation leads to a mode of reasoning in the public sphere that does not require setting aside non-public reasons in order to proceed.
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Bell, Nicholas. „Reason And Imagination“. Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2134.
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Tarantal, Willem Benjamin. „The right of appeal: Exercising the right of appeal from the lower courts“. Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2005. http://etd.uwc.ac.za/index.php?module=etd&.
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This thesis dealt with the constitutionality of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 2003 (Act 42 of 2003), pertaining to the leave requirement and petition procedures in respect of appeals against conviction, sentence or orders of the lower courts.
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Ng, Wing Hong. „John Rawls' idea of public reason : religious reason in public justification“. HKBU Institutional Repository, 2007. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/782.
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Svenning, Erik. „The Impetuous Voice of Reason : Emotion versus reason in moral decision-making“. Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för biovetenskap, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-15737.
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This is a review of what the currently dominant theories of moral decision-making are and where they derive from. While the introduction serves as a common ground to explain what moral decision-making is, the earlier parts of the thesis describe older traditionalist theories within the field, theories of emotional decision-making, in the form of the somatic marker hypothesis, as well as critique of the older traditionalist theories through the social intuitionist model. Both of these two theories are explained as the foundation of the current theories of moral decision-making and after establishing a clear basis on what the currently dominant theories of moral decision-making are built on, said theories are introduced in the form of the dual-processing theory and the event-feature-emotion complexes which are thoroughly reviewed, explained in detail and serves as the core of the text. This is afterward followed by criticism as well as arguments in favor of both theories as well as criticisms from other researchers who disagree with the methodology which the theories of moral decision-making are conducted on. The essay reviews the current state of the field of moral decision-making which has been split up into two different approaches, the locationist approach and the constructionist approach. The essay concludes that there are terms which needs to be clarified in order for the field to move forward and studies to be made regarding the social implications of gut reactions in moral decision-making.
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‘t, Hart Brian. „The Advertising Appeal of Genuinuity“. Thesis, Curtin University, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/85766.
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The study explores how brands can differentiate from brand puffery through the use of brand genuinuity appeals to improve consumer perceptions and purchase intention. A scale measuring consumers’ attitudes towards the brand’s genuinuity was developed and validated. The main study involved a 3x2 factorial design, exploring brand genuinuity appeals in a luxury automotive (tangible) and a luxury hotel (intangible) context. Results showed the importance of brand genuinuity and provided important insights for academics and practitioners.
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Lancaster, Philip Charles. „Reason, necessity and genocide“. Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9233.
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This work examines core assumptions of the rationalism that underlies liberal political theory by placing it against the background of a dramatic historical phenomenon---genocide. An attempt is made to draw on historical accounts of two genocides to develop a critique of liberal political theory as it has been articulated during the latter years of the 20th Century by John Rawls. Ultimately, this thesis attempts to sort out the conceptual problems arising at the junction point of normative and descriptive theories of politics and argues that the basic elements of both kinds theories would benefit greatly from closer attention to history. The first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the ways in which political reason can be adapted to the needs of state and suggests that there are problems associated with the attempt to universalize the notion of human rights across a community of nations lacking the basic contextual requirements for rights. Chapter two considers the uncomfortable fit between political structure and value in liberal political theory. It argues that the administrative structure of states now exists as an important part of contemporary formal reality and thus ought to be a critical element in any serious study of politics. An argument begins here that works towards the final conclusion that states constitute an arena within which individualist and collectivist values collide. The third chapter examines the relationship between liberal values and rationality. It includes a technical discussion of Max Weber's theory of rationality but limits the discussion to political applications. This chapter raises a series of questions about the concept of rationality used in the construction of political theory. Chapters four, five and six examine the complications that arise when a liberal perspective is taken to issues of ontological existence, community values and the powers inhering in states to shape identity frames in the interests of administrative efficiency. This leads into a more technical discussion of rationality as represented in the theories of John Rawls and Alan Gewirth that is contained in the seventh chapter. Chapters eight and nine are devoted to discussions of elements of the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide respectively. Both examples are used as a means of illustrating the complex power relations arising out of the various forms of collective agency needed to sustain state sovereignty and which complicate political theory far beyond the explanatory power of liberal rationalism. The examples are used to argue that theories based on notions of disassociated rational persons just fail to support their normative conclusions. The final chapter argues for a re-examination of the way in which political theory is read and suggests that liberal theory, in particular, tends towards abstraction in ways that limit its usefulness as either explanatory or normative theory.
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Lancaster, Phil. „Reason, necessity and genocide“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ57050.pdf.
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Howe, Mark. „The primacy of reason“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.317717.
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Lamond, Grant. „Commitments and practical reason“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.310331.
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Jesson, S. N. „Forgiveness and its reason“. Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2011. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12038/.
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Forgiveness might be said to involve a certain kind of intellectual suffering: we forgive, and are forgiven, whilst a great many questions remain undecided, and while it is far from obvious that they are unimportant. This thesis explores the way in which the difficulties in submitting forgiveness to thought may be significant. Contemporary accounts of forgiveness are put into creative dialogue with the work of Simone Weil, Rene Girard and Jacques Derrida in an attempt to assess different forms of approach to the resistance forgiveness offers to thought. Utilising the work of Simone Weil in particular, and through a creative interpretation of some of the gospel sayings from which the modern notion of forgiveness originates, the argument is made that forgiveness can be seen to involve a process of transformation of understanding that is akin to spirituality of death and resurrection. On this account, forgiveness is paradoxical and resistant to thought not because it involves a simple suspension of, or opposition to reasoned forms of judgment, but because it involves a way of holding together attitudes, concerns and insights that do not easily cohere. As such it calls for a ‘posture’ that cultivates and waits with this tension, rather than a theory that allows the meaning and goodness of forgiveness to appear unambiguously. In this sense forgiveness is an expression of a love that both hopes all things and bears all things; a way of accepting the worst whilst desiring the best.
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Brandhorst, Mario. „Foundations of practical reason“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:12719f6b-eeb1-404f-8eff-bb5f1782ab84.
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This thesis is an examination of the foundations of practical reason. Building on the later work of Wittgenstein, I argue for a subjectivist view of moral judgment and of judgments about reasons for action. On this view, moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action can be true or false, but they are not objective. The argument for this view has the form of an inference to the best explanation. Using a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, I suggest that moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action should not be construed as referring to an ethical or normative reality that exists independently of us. There are ethical facts and facts about our reasons, but these facts arise as the result of our involvement in a linguistic practice. This provides a new way of accounting for these judgments that differs both from moral realism and expressivism. The view of reasons that emerges is closely related to, but not identical with, reasons internalism as described by Bernard Williams. I reject his argument in favour of internalism and provide a new and independent argument to support this view of our reasons. In the course of spelling out that argument, I show why internalism as described by Williams should be modified, and why this does not commit us to externalism. In the final chapters, I show that there is an important parallel between our practical predicament and the account of our epistemic condition as portrayed by Wittgenstein. The inference to the best explanation is completed by considering a number of objections to subjectivism that are based on the idea that a subjectivist account of moral judgment and of reasons fails to do justice to the ethical phenomena. I reject these objections, and suggest that a subjectivist can both be reflectively aware of his subjectivism and continue to live well.
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Chang, Ruth. „Incomparability and practical reason“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1997. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:74dd9fa8-ad30-4652-b212-1f63985a3aa7.
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In this thesis I aim to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? I argue that there is no incomparability among bearers of value and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. The two questions are closely related; in arguing against incomparability a positive picture of comparability emerges. The case against incomparability is a case for a new conception of comparability more capacious than has been traditionally conceived. This 'broad' conception of comparability has three distinctive features: it distinguishes incomparability from noncomparability, it includes the possibility of 'emphatic' comparability, or comparisons between 'higher' and 'lower' goods; and it makes logical space for a fourth generic value relation - what I shall call 'on a par' - beyond the standard trichotomy of relations of 'better than', 'worse than', and 'equally good'. Each of these features arises out of defects of certain incomparabilist arguments. Indeed, the approach to the broad conception of comparability via examination of incomparabilist arguments makes clear that much of the intuitive pull of incomparability depends on a narrow and impoverished conception of comparability. Investigation of comparability and incomparability is motivated by a proposed substantive account of practical justification according to which there can be no justified choice without the comparability of the alternatives. The existence of widespread incomparability, then, undermines the rationality of practical life. This thesis' argument against incomparability and for a broad conception of comparability serves to vindicate the role of practical reason in choice.
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Taylor, Craig Duncan. „Sympathy, reason and necessity“. Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.338469.
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Coleman, Daniel. „Voice of Reason: Stories“. OpenSIUC, 2018. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses/2449.
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Voice of Reason is a collection of short fiction that explores, often from a satirical angle, Millennial-inflected versions of ambition, ego and idealism. The stories are heavily influenced by the precision and subtle humor of Ian McEwan and Richard Yates, by the generosity and formal ingenuity of William Trevor and Alice Munro, and by the tonal experimentation of George Saunders and Miranda July.
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Johnston, Leslie Lorraine. „The Reason for Living“. Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School, 1988. https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/etd/605.
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Kimura, Gregory William. „Neopragmatism and theological reason“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615049.
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Reilly-Cooper, Rebecca. „Emotions and public reason“. Thesis, University of Manchester, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.698184.
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Isherwood, Jack Robert. „Re-thinking public reason“. Thesis, Australian Catholic University, 2015. https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/download/125dc735ff6bb740e78f2412d862b1077c89fe0251dbadff751ddc97b712f305/2645036/Re_thinking_Public_Reason_FINAL.pdf.
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This thesis critically examines the concepts of civil discourse and civil disobedience expounded by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor. I claim that their accounts fail to consider the impacts of epistemic injustices, which lead to the unfair dismissal of the political claims made by marginalized communities in the political realm, and the impacts of social practices of ignorance which render the contestation of social and political injustices extremely difficult. Consequently, I develop an account of civil discourse and civil disobedience inspired by feminist epistemological theory. I claim that this framework is more attuned to inequalities of epistemic status, leading to my argument that civil discourse should be re-thought as a relationship of trust which requires interlocutors to fulfil particular epistemic responsibilities towards each other. I further argue that this re-conceptualization of civil discourse allows us to transcend a dominant dichotomous interpretation of the concept in the current academic literature. This discourse either claims that civility is an essential political practice in the face of deep political and moral disagreement or that civil discourse is simply a means to stifle contentious political struggles and to solidify the political dominance of privileged social individuals, groups and communities. Furthermore, I also claim that civil disobedience should be re-conceived as a political practice which challenges patterns of vested social ignorance regarding oppressive social, economic and political arrangements while also contesting epistemic injustices. I develop this argument by critically appraising the theories of civil disobedience proffered by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Like their theories of public reason, I maintain that they fail to consider the operation of oppressive epistemic norms, thereby severely limiting the insights of their accounts. Consequently, I develop a different set of normative criteria for analysing acts of civil disobedience which adequately considers the impact of oppressive epistemic norms while also proffering an explanation of how civil discourse is reconcilable with coercive political disobedience. Ultimately, therefore, I hope to illustrate that extending feminist epistemological insights into discussions of civil disobedience and civil discourse offers a fruitful way of exploring the broader connection between persuasion and coercion in contemporary liberal democracies.
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Pitt, Jamaal Boxill Bernard R. „Excluding inclusive public reason“. Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,1915.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008.Title from electronic title page (viewed Dec. 11, 2008). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy." Discipline: Philosophy; Department/School: Philosophy.
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Hinkle, Larry. „Our reason for hope“. Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1995. http://www.tren.com.
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Sturgeon, Scott. „Having reason in mind“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185375.
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The project consists of a defense of the reductivist program generally and an application of the program to the theory of epistemic justification. Chapter One sets out the problem of reducing justification to other terms and defends the legitimacy of this problem against attacks by Quine in particular and supervenience theorists generally. Chapter Two is an explication and refutation of all possible theories which reduce justification-facts to facts about the reliability of cognitive processes. All such theories founder due to their insensitivity to the perspectival component of thought. Chapter Three argues that this perspectival component is non-truth-theoretic and hence that the connection between justification and truth is much less important than has been generally supposed. Chapter Four lays out the structure of epistemic justification and proposes a reductive thesis entailing this structure. It is argued that essential elements of both coherence theories of justification and foundations theories of justification are present in rational thought and that this is explicable in terms of the teleology of human cognition. Chapter Five explicates and defends the theory constructed in Chapter Four.
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Alexander, Sarah Ann. „Resting in the Court of Reason: Kant's Resolution to the Antinomy of Pure Reason“. unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08032007-105300/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.Title from file title screen. Melissa M. Merritt, committee chair; Jessica Berry, Sebastian Rand, committee members. Electronic text (81 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Nov. 9, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-81).
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Dalessandro, Luke K. „Preserving the appeal of transactional programming“. Thesis, University of Rochester, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3614950.
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Transactional Memory (TM) promises a unique combination of safety, convenience, and scalability for synchronization in parallel programs. Programs are annotated with transactions designating regions of code that must execute atomically, and the TM implementation is responsible for guaranteeing this property. Scalable TM implementations will be speculative, executing transactions concurrently where possible and transparently suppressing those that conflict, while guaranteeing that the history of committed transactions is serializable. Recently, practical language integration issues, e.g., publication and privatization, explicit speculation, and interoperability with traditional synchronization, have threatened to erode much of the simplicity that originally made transactional programming appealing. In this thesis we preserve the appeal of transactional programming in practical language settings through wholesale replacement of the traditional memory consistency model with strict serializability (SS)—a transactional memory consistency model derived from the database semantics of the same name. We develop NOrec, a low overhead and moderately scalable software TM that supports SS. We develop and test a novel hybrid TM strategy that pairs NOrec with “best-effort” hardware TM in order to scalably support SS on limited hardware. Finally, we implement a novel sandboxing system that simplifies existing software TMs and enables TM implementations that were not previously viable. We conclude that it is possible to address the practical concerns with language integration without sacrificing the elegant simplicity of transactional programming.
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Hendricks, Hays Birkhead. „Louisville's Lustrons : houses with magnetic appeal“. Virtual Press, 1994. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/897512.
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The housing shortage in the United States at the close of World War II led President Truman and his National Housing Expediter, Wilson W. Wyatt, Sr., to enact the Veteran's Emergency Housing Act. Enacted in the spring of 1946, one goal of the V.E.H.A. was to encourage the production of prefabricated and factory-built housing units.The Lustron Homes Corporation, founded by Carl Strandlund, was a subsidiary of Chicago Vitreous Enamel Products Company which received over $37 million from the Federal Government between 19461950, in order to manufacture standardized all-steel houses.This creative project explores the wartime and postwar housing situation across the country, and specifically, in Louisville, Kentucky. An interview with Wilson W. Wyatt, Sr. is included.The production, assembly, and sales practices of the Lustron Homes Corporation are explored through research, and through an interview with the regional salesman who represented Kentucky. Documentation and photographs of Louisville's Lustrons are included.Department of Architecture
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Thompson, Allen Andrew. „Virtue and reason in nature /“. Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5718.
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Dickson, Barnabas W. „Practical reason: desires and imagination“. Thesis, University of Sussex, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.564136.
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This thesis offers an account of certain aspects of practical reason. The chief aim is to develop our understanding of practical rationality by undermining some of the connections which are thought to exist between explicit criteria and codifiable rules on the one hand, and practical reason on the other. The thesis begins with a consideration of the question of what reasons for action are constituted from. It is argued that a necessary component of any practical reason is a desire of the person for whoa the reason is a reason (Part One). Equipped with this account of practical reasons two rationalistic prejudices are then attacked. The first of these is the claim that it must be possible to formulate explicit criteria of rational choice which set the standards of deliberation over a wide range of deliberative problems. It is argued that this claim is undermined by an examination of the actual circumstances in which deliberation takes place. On the positive side it is then contended that an understanding of deliberation requires consideration of the process of deliberation, and that this leads, in particular, to a recognition of the important role of imaginative thinking in solving deliberative problems (Part Two). The second prejudice that is attacked is the claim that a conception of how to act which determines the specific choices an agent makes must be codifiable. Against this, it it suggested that the idea that such conceptions can be determinate and yet not fully codifiable enables one to make better sense of certain aspects of deliberation. An argument demonstrating how it is possible for there to be such conceptions is than developed.
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Paxton, Joseph Michael. „Reason, Reflection, and Moral Change“. Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13064963.
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Recent work in moral psychology emphasizes the role of immediate intuitive responses in shaping moral judgments, while at the same time questioning the causal role of more reflective reasoning processes. On this account (mainly due to Haidt, 2001), such reflective processes primarily provide post-hoc rationalizations for more immediate responses, and only appear to cause the associated judgments. This account poses a strong skeptical challenge to prior theories that focused on the role of reasoning in shaping moral judgments (most notably Kohlberg, 1969). In this dissertation, I attempt to address this challenge. I do so in Part I by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of recent studies on moral reasoning and reflection. In Part II, I describe the results of six original studies that were designed to examine the roles of reasoning and reflection in moral judgment while accounting for skeptical interpretations. Part III concludes with a summary of the conditions under which reasoning and reflection were found to occur, along with a speculative account of the practical implications of this work and suggestions for future research on the cognitive mechanisms underlying reflective reasoning processes.Psychology
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Marriott, Stephen Charles. „Critical theory : reason and dialectic“. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2000. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2823/.
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Whilst Hegel's influence upon the Frankfurt School's reconstruction of Marx has not gone unnoticed, this influence has never really been adequately theorised. In particular, the question of how the Frankfurt School understood the relation between Hegel's method and Marx's materialism has received very little systematic attention. The present study is a response to this situation: it presents the Frankfurt Marxist tradition as a significant although by no means uncritical contribution to the theory of historical materialism. Moreover, that contribution is shown to derive from some of the central concepts of Hegel's philosophy. Thus in opposition to those commentators, Marxists and non-Marxists alike, who have tended to view Frankfurt Marxism as an exercise in eclectic revisionism, I argue that the work of Horkheimer and his colleagues constitutes an attempt to restate and defend, on the basis of an immanent critique of Hegel's idealism, the fundamental principles of Marx's historical materialism. Accordingly, the central chapters of this thesis are devoted to a close examination of the way in which members of the Frankfurt School, building on the work of Lukács and Korsch, sought to appropriate Hegel's subject-object dialectic on behalf of materialism. In the course of this investigation the following themes come to prominence: the relation between Hegel's social philosophy and a critical theory of society; Horkheimer's project of multi-disciplinary materialism; the methodological significance of the category of totality; materialism as the preponderance of the object; the possibility and nature of a Freud-Marx synthesis; the concept of a critical as opposed to a traditional scientific theory of society. Taken together these themes constitute the basic problematic of the Frankfurt Marxist tradition. The intention of this study is to demonstrate the importance of that problematic for the further development of the materialist theory of history and society.
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MATTOS, ANITA TANDETA. „NIETZSCHENULLS GENEALOGY: REASON AND VIOLENCE“. PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=9604@1.
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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICOFUNDAÇÃO DE APOIO À PESQUISA DO ESTADO DO RIO DE JANEIRO
Partindo do lugar reservado à interpretação no método genealógico de Nietzsche, o presente mostra que a genealogia, por ouvir o silêncio inerente às produções culturais, por se ater àquilo que as construções silenciam enquanto são produzidas e preservadas, necessariamente aborda a violência velada por tais empreendimentos. Há um excesso de violência no desenvolvimento da cultura metafísica, proporcional à quantidade existente de mecanismos de encobrimento dessa violência. O esclarecimento genealógico das violências recusadas indica a aposta de Nietzsche no alargamento da razão, cuja direção implica na redução da violência e em novos destinos para o mal-estar sentido pela consciência moral.
Starting with the examination of the place reserved for the interpretation in the Nietzsche´s genealogical method, this work shows that genealogy, by listening the silence inherent to cultural productions, necessarely broaches the violence covered by such undertakings.There is an excess of violence in the development of the metaphysical culture, proportional to the quantity of existing mechanisms for concealing this violence. The revelation of these hidden violences through genealogical method indicated Nietzsche´s bet on the expantion of reason, whose consequences are the reduction of the same violence and the cration of new destinies for the discomfort felt by the moral conciousness.
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Hummel, Patrik Alexander. „Personal identity and practical reason“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/16607.
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In this thesis, I argue that the interdependence between personal identity and practical concerns is overstated. In paradigmatic places where philosophers and common sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should reason and care, or vice versa, the two spheres are in fact neutral to each other. I defend this claim by considering four specific cases. First, a rough characterization of the distinction between the complex and the simple view is that the former takes personal identity to consist in other relations, whereas the latter does not. I argue that the extreme claim according to which the complex view fails to give reasons for future-directed concern can be resisted. We maintain forward-looking attitudes and projects not because someone will be us, but because we relate to future selves in other, more important ways. Second, I argue that intuitions in a range of popular imaginary cases are contaminated by practical concerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from straightforward. Third, I argue that on a closer look, the complex versus simple distinction is confused. It thus cannot be what grounds differences in judgements on what matters. Debates about personal identity should be framed in terms of better understood notions. Finally, I argue that it is not a constraint on rational transformative choice that decision-maker and transforming individual are identical. Moreover, whether we are deciding for ourselves or for others - the importance of informed consent for transformative treatments is not diminished by the decision-maker's failure to projectively imagine the outcomes.
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Antilici, Francesco. „Can infants reason about beliefs?“ Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2018. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/21294/.
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At what point in development does the capacity to reason about what people think emerge? While developmental psychologists have been investigating this question for more than thirty years, the evidence they have gained so far is conflicting. On the one hand, the results of traditional, direct false-beliefs tests, which involve asking participants how a person with a false belief will act, suggest that most children under four years of age are still unaware that beliefs can be false. On the other hand, false-belief tests using indirect measures, such as, for example, looking times or anticipatory looking, suggest that even infants ascribe false beliefs to other people. As many have noted, these results pose a deep developmental puzzle. In this work, I defend the claim that infants can already reason about beliefs. On the one hand, I argue that alternative interpretations of indirect false-belief tests fall short of the mark. On the other, I argue that the fact that young children fail direct false-belief tests can be explained in either of two ways, both of which are compatible with the claim that the capacity to reason about beliefs emerges early on. The first option is to maintain that young children fail because of performance difficulties. This type of position has been defended by other authors, but I argue that the particular proposal I put forward (which I call the processing-time account) offers a better account of the evidence. In contrast, the second option (which I call they hybrid approach) is one that, to the best of my knowledge, no one else has defended so far. This consists in arguing that direct and indirect false-belief tests recruit distinct cognitive systems, each of which can independently sustain the ability to reason about beliefs, but which follow different developmental trajectories. After exploring these two options, I consider which is best supported by the evidence.
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Jayaram, Athmeya. „Public Reason and Private Bias“. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2019. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=13422411.
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Public reason theorists argue that it is permissible for the state to enforce political norms, such as laws or constitutional principles, when those norms are acceptable to ?reasonable people.? Reasonable people are neither actual people, with all their flaws, nor are they perfect people; they are rather a partially idealized group ? realistic in some ways and idealized in others. Each of the major public reason theorists ? John Rawls, Gerald Gaus, Jonathan Quong, Joshua Cohen ? idealizes reasonable people to a different degree, but they all share two claims: 1) Reasonable people hold diverse views of the good life. Nevertheless, 2) Reasonable people can all accept basic liberal political norms grounded in freedom and equality. My dissertation begins by arguing that theorists are not free to choose any level of idealization, but are constrained in this choice by the justifications of their theories. In particular, idealization is constrained by one essential part of public reason?s justification, which I call the ?diversity argument.? The diversity argument explains the first element of reasonable people: why do they disagree about the good? The answers, I argue, attributes certain realistic qualities and tendencies to reasonable people, which therefore constrains how much we can idealize them. In chapters on the major public reason theorists, I argue that they all offer a diversity argument that does not match the level of idealization that they employ. As a result, they are unable to show that liberal norms are acceptable to reasonable people, appropriately idealized. In the final chapter, I argue that the mismatch in these theories goes even deeper, which we can see when we ask why we must accommodate disagreement at all. The answers that philosophers have given us ? reasonable disagreement is the inevitable result of human reasoning, human psychology, or free conditions ? also apply to irrational disagreement. Irrational influences such as implicit bias and motivated reasoning are also inevitable results of who we are and how we live, which means we must accommodate these realistic tendencies in political justification. So, if public reason theories must now accommodate disagreement among reasonable-but-sometimes-irrational people, what could be acceptable to all such people? I conclude by suggesting a new direction for public reason theories. People who disagree about the good life, but recognize their common biases, can still justify their views to each other by supporting institutions that mitigate those biases, such as non-discrimination laws and deliberative institutions. This requires a new kind of social contract theory ? one that is grounded in the shared recognition of our limitations, rather than our shared reasons.
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Walden, Kenneth Edward Dale. „One and the same reason“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/68521.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, September 2011.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-155).
My dissertation is about the relationship between theoretical and practical reason. I argue that these two kinds of reason are unified in important respects. In Chapter One I argue that there is a single, fundamental kind of reasoning (roughly, unrestrained self-reflection) and that theoretical and practical reason ought to be understood as instances of this more fundamental kind of reasoning, distinguished only by their subject matter. I then argue that two formulations of Kant's Categorical Imperative jointly codify the activity of this basic reasoning. Therefore, the Categorical Imperative is, in this sense, the supreme principle of reason. In Chapter Two I show how the very abstract norms formulated in Chapter One can be sharpened if we connect them to the conditions of human agency. I argue that the demands of being an agent require us to submit to a procedure of negotiation and legislation with other agents that is similar to the contractualism of Hobbes and Rawls. The difference between my view and theirs is that my contractualism, because it is tied to our agency, issues in categorical requirements. In Chapter Three I develop a theory of normative concepts that satisfies two demands that have appeared incompatible: the demand that our normative concepts be intimately connected to human nature and the demand that normative items be things we aspire to, and thus things that are relevantly beyond us and our activities. I show how we can satisfy both of these desiderata through an open-ended constructivism that understands normative items as transcendent ideals. In Chapter Four I argue that a robust, philosophically serviceable distinction between theoretical judgments about the world and practical judgments about what one ought to do cannot be sustained because these two kinds of judgments are inextricably entangled. They are entangled because we must employ both kinds of judgment to fully explain actions. This fact entails that practical and theoretical judgments occupy a single holistic theory.
by Kenneth Edward Dale Walden.
Ph.D.
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Striefel, Kelsey Leigh. „Opioids: A Reason for Concern“. Diss., North Dakota State University, 2018. https://hdl.handle.net/10365/27894.
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The opioid epidemic has drawn increasing attention as opioid prescribing rates and opioid related deaths continue to rise. Opioid prescribing by health care providers has quadrupled over the past 18 years and is directly proportionate to opioid-related overdoses. Primary care providers initiate chronic opioid pain management and frequently fail due to the multifaceted nature of chronic pain. A rural North Dakota health care system implemented strategies to improve chronic opioid pain management. Strategies were based on the 2016 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain. Interventions were directed at improving opioid prescribing practices for chronic non-cancer pain management of primary care providers and reducing risks of long term opioid use. Providing clinicians with education and a quick-reference sheet on current evidence-based recommendations and accepted best practices developed their knowledge to complete remaining interventions. Chart audits identified patients on chronic opioid therapy, patients with a signed pain contract, and those with daily opioid doses meeting or exceeding recommended upper daily morphine milligram equivalence. Provider notification of identified patients allowed for further recommended interventions. Chart flagging allowed providers to easily identify patients currently on a pain contract, patients eligible for a pain contract, and patients receiving the upper daily morphine milligram equivalence limits. Evaluation was performed four months after initiation of the project. Results showed the education provided increased clinicians? knowledge and comfort in the evidence-based guidelines for managing chronic pain with opioids. Recommended monitoring strategies were improved after providers received education. Evaluation found the prescription drug monitoring program review and documentation had improved from 0 to 18. Annual urine drug screens increased from 9 to 15. Eighty-five percent of pain contract eligible patients were enrolled in a pain contract. Evaluation of patients prescribed daily morphine milligram equivalence ? 50 and ? 90 that had appropriate recommended interventions were 57% and 50% respectively. Forty-five pain management patients were identified at the time of evaluation and flagged in the electronic health record. Overall, each intervention implemented showed improvement upon comparison of pre-implementation and post-implementation data.
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Korsgaard, Christine M. „The standpoint of practical reason /“. New York : Garland, 1990. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb35551767d.
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Pavlakos, George I. „Law's ontology and practical reason“. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/23149.
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The thesis is an attempt to reconcile law's dual nature, its factual dimensions (its facticity) and its normative/evaluative dimension (its normativity), in a non-reductive manner. The tension between those two dimensions appears particularly acute when we try to discern some object of reference for our normative talk/discourse. Then the possibility of absence of such objects poses a high threat to the meaningfulness of the enterprise of law tout court. Faced with this danger lawyers usually end up reducing legal references to physical, non-normative entities. Palpable for our senses are those entities may be, they do not seem to eliminate the threat of meaningfulness posed to the legal enterprise, as they end up eliminating law's normativity. In contrast I argue that legal and broader practical norms can be reconstructed as abstract objects that are available to knowledge. The method employed, relies predominantly on a semantic explication of the 'objecthood' of norms along the lines of a neo-Fregean theory of mental content. Further, I employ an analysis of the meaning of legal expressions in order to show that a semantic account of legal 'objecthood' will be demarcated by the pragmatic-normative requirements that support the relevant practices in which legal meaning is generated (as is specified by some version of Wittgenstein's meaning as use' theory of meaning). I proceed to argue that those pragmatic requirements include some transcendental pragmatic norms which specify an ultimate practical or moral point of view against the background of which practical meaning is possible. Later, this point of view is specified as a Super-norm or Principle of Autonomy. This norm bestows a evaluative element upon the meaning of all practical expressions/propositions and, via the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis, into the normative objects (norms, rules and so on) that correspond to them. Finally it is claimed that legal norms are a species of practical norms, to the extent that both fall under the same criteria of validity that are specified by the point of view of the Norm of Autonomy.
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O'Day, Kenneth Bartels. „Moral skepticism and practical reason“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/187217.
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Three subtypes of alpha-2 adrenergic receptors (α₂AR) have been identified: α₂A, α₂B and α₂C. α₂ARs are known to mediate a number of functions in many tissues. It is not clear, however, what the distribution of α₂AR subtypes is in these tissues. The distribution of α₂AR subtypes is fundamental to understanding receptor function and the development of more effective and specific α₂-adrenergic agents for therapeutic use. The working hypothesis for this dissertation is that there are specific subtypes of α₂ARs in tissues and in cells that have discrete localizations and may subserve different physiological function. To test this hypothesis two specific aims have been raised. The first aim was: the generation of subtype-specific antibodies. Experiments were conducted to express fusion proteins containing part of the third intracellular loop of each α₂AR. Chickens were immunized with fusion proteins and antibodies were purified from the yolk of the chicken eggs. The antibodies have complete subtype specificity as characterized by immunofluorescence studies on COS-7 cells transfected with DNA encoding the α₂ARs. The second aim was: the immunohistochemical localization of α₂AR subtypes in the primary culture of rat spinal cord, anterior segments of human and rabbit eyes and transfected COS-7 cells. Experiments were conducted to localize the α₂AR subtypes in cultured cells and tissues using indirect immunofluorescence techniques. The immunofluorescence results were confirmed by alternative approaches, e.g. reverse transcription-PCR, ligand binding and cAMP assay. The experimental results showed that multiple α₂AR subtypes are expressed in one tissue and that specific subtypes of α₂ARs are expressed in different tissues. Using a dual-labeling technique, two subtypes were co-localized in the same neuronal cell of the rat spinal cord. Furthermore, the immunofluorescence studies on the transfected COS-7 cells showed that the three subtypes of α₂ARs displayed different subcellular localization. Taken together the results of the studies presented in this dissertation provide evidence in support of the working hypothesis. The present work has provided a new opening in the study of the localization of α₂AR subtypes. This information provides new insights into the understanding of α₂AR functions in tissues.
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Roberts, Deborah Joan. „Self-respecting practical reason: an analysis of self-respect and its implications for practical reason“. Thesis, Rhodes University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002849.
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What should I do? As long as I am aware of the relevant facts of the situation and deliberating soundly, Bernard Williams argues that I should do what I want to do. It makes no sense to say that there are reasons that are fixed objects of concern, or values, that exist for an agent regardless of what she is in fact motivated to do. Reasons, for Williams, are hypothetical. I argue that he takes this view of practical reason because of a prior answer to the question “How should I live?”. A universal account of the good life would mean an account of values, or interests, that all human beings should have. Williams thinks it is not possible to give a universal account of the good life for human beings; any such account must be constructed out of the particular reasons of a community. But, he takes a constructivist view of the good life because he thinks that to be universal an account of the good life would have to be objective. Since objectivity cannot be achieved, he argues, neither can universality. Williams is only half right. That objectivity is not possible is inconsequential. A foundation for ethics has to be internal, but this does not preclude it being universal. I develop such a foundation based on the Aristotelian conception of human nature. A life cannot be wholly good if it is not self-respecting. Moreover, self-respect fits the framework for the specification of the good life that this foundation provides: I argue that self-respect can be shown to have a structure which provides an account of real interests - reasons that are objects of fixed concern. As such, reasons recognise rather than construct the good, making categorical reasons possible. A person can have a reason to change or act, even if reason itself cannot effect that change or action. Thus, I can be wrong about what I should do not only by being wrong about what would count as a satisfaction of my interests, but also by being wrong about what my interests are.
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Haglund, Gustav, und Román Clara Mood. „Visual appeal versus usability : A quantitative analysis of the importance of visual appeal and usability in e-commerce“. Thesis, Jönköping University, Tekniska Högskolan, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-48016.
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Unappealing websites are rejected quickly upon visiting them, while visitors spend more time on visually appealing websites before judging its reliability; but to what extent can visual appeal alone carry the success of a website, and is it so powerful that good usability can be sacrificed? This paper studies the respective importance of visual appeal and usability in e-commerce as factors, in order to determine which factor plays the bigger role in generating trust and credibility for an e-commerce site, as credibility perception is highly correlated with its visual complexity. The relation between these two factors and the likelihood to make a purchase is also discussed. Two prototypes for a fictional consumer electronics e-commerce website were created: one with good design and flawed usability, and another with flawed design and good usability. These prototypes were shown to students aged 20-25 and asked which one they found more trustworthy and which they would rather make a purchase from. With the correlation between trust and purchase intention being apparent, the design of an e-commerce website for consumer electronics should focus mainly on the visual appeal. Usability seems to have some value, however it does not seem to be of the same importance as the visual appeal of the site in regards to generating trust, and consequently customers. The prototypes were constructed in Adobe XD, demonstrated with video recordings, and sent out in a survey to 70 students.
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De, Bruin Lauren Michele. „Cigarette smokers' perceptions of fear-appeal advertising“. Diss., Pretoria : [s.n.], 2006. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-04052007-111238.
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Hall, Jeffrey L. „ELEMENTS THAT INFLUENCE VISUAL APPEAL IN PHOTOGRAPHS“. Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1174794370.
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Chen, Hao. „Basketball Player Perspective and Shoe Material Appeal“. University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1406881008.
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Hedström, Jakob, und Johanna Karlsson. „Consumers' Attitudes Toward Sexual Appeal in Advertising“. Thesis, Luleå tekniska universitet, Institutionen för ekonomi, teknik och samhälle, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-64435.
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To use sexual messages in advertisements are becoming more common by each day, it is known as a method that can be highly effective to influence consumers’ attitudes. However, it is important to carefully consider how the appeal is used as high levels of sexual appeal can be perceived as unethical or offensive to consumers. Several factors are influential on consumers’ attitudes to sexual appeal in advertising. The focus of this study is laid upon the following five factors when it comes to sexual appeal in advertising: level of nudity, gender of the consumer, gender of the model, culture and personality of the consumer. This thesis examines how young consumers from Canada, Hong Kong and Sweden in the age span between 18–24 years differ in their attitude toward sexual advertisement, connected to the previous mentioned factors. This was done by concluding semi-structured interviews with male and female students from each nation, where they expressed their opinions about sexual commercials. It was found that female participants had a moral dilemma when it came to high levels of sexual appeal. Some of the male respondents were found to be uncomfortable when being exposed to high levels of male nudity, which could be neutralized by including a female model. Furthermore it was found that the personality of the respondent affected how he or she reacted to the shown advertisement. The findings of this study could be of good use to marketers and advertisers as they do not need to adapt their advertisements to each geographical market to the same extent as it possibly was believed before, as long the targeted group consists of younger consumers.Användandet av sexuella meddelanden i reklam blir mer och mer populärt varje dag, denna marknadsföringsmetod är väldigt effektiv när det kommer till att påverka konsumenters attityder. Det är dock väldigt viktigt att ta hänsyn till hur det används då höga nivåer av sexuellt innehåll kan uppfattas som oetiskt eller kränkande bland konsumenter. Ett flertal faktorer påverkar konsumenters attityder till sexuell reklam. Denna studie fokuserar på följande fem faktorer när det kommer till sexuell reklam: nakenhetsnivå konsumentens kön, modellens kön, kultur och konsumentens personlighet. Denna uppsats utvärderar hur unga konsumenter från Kanada, Hong Kong och Sverige i åldersspannet 18–24 år varierar i sina attityder till sexuell reklam, kopplat till tidigare nämnda faktorer. Detta möjliggjordes genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med manliga och kvinnliga studenter från varje land, där de uttryckte sina åsikter om sexuella reklambilder. Studien resulterade i att de kvinnliga respondenterna hade ett moraliskt dilemma när det kom till höga nivåer av sexuell reklam. En del av de manliga respondenterna blev obekväma när de exponerades för höga nivåer av manlig nakenhet, vilket kunde neutraliseras av att inkludera en kvinnlig modell. Studien fann även att respondentens personlighet påverkade hur han eller hon reagerade mot den visade reklamen. Resultaten av denna studie kan komma till god användning för marknadsförare och annonsörer då de som tidigare trott, inte behöver anpassa sina reklamer till varje geografisk marknad, så länge som den tilltänkta kundgruppen består av unga konsumenter.
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Winslow, Andrew J. „The Myth Appeal: Studies in Cultural Narrative“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195177.
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Though Aristotle is famous for defining three persuasive appeals in his treatise On Rhetoric, I argue that a fourth appeal exists in the pages of The Poetics. In addition to character (ethos), logic (logos), and emotion (pathos), the fourth appeal is to narrative (mythos), or the substantive body of values contained within the socio-cultural elements of a given culture. Using the works of Joseph Campbell, Kenneth Burke, and Roland Barthes as touchstones, the goal of this dissertation is to offer a systematic analysis of this appeal. Because human beings at once function with attention to the whole of lived experience, the myth appeal touches on social norms (the assumed reality), ideology (the lived and presumed reality), and hyperreality (where symbols become a reality unto themselves). The substance of the myth appeal is narrative, or undercurrents of stories used in the place of argument. Here, I offer four examples to display these tensions; the first is an "action-figure" toy line to illustrate how an existing mythology from comics conveys ideological values; the second is a post 09/11 comic book series which used hyperreality to critique social norms; the third is Alan Sokal's academic hoax , which showed a cultural tension across all three areas; and finally, a survey of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on privacy to discuss the emerging mythology of abortion. I conclude with a systematic approach to myth, and a brief discussion of additional persuasive appeals.