Zeitschriftenartikel: „Advertising Pricing“

1

Bagwell, Kyle, und Garey Ramey. „Advertising and Limit Pricing“. RAND Journal of Economics 19, Nr. 1 (1988): 59. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555397.

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2

Wills, Robert L., und Willard F. Mueller. „Brand Pricing and Advertising“. Southern Economic Journal 56, Nr. 2 (Oktober 1989): 383. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1059217.

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3

Stahl II, Dale O. „Oligopolistic Pricing and Advertising“. Journal of Economic Theory 64, Nr. 1 (Oktober 1994): 162–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1060.

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4

Wang, Wei, und Gang Li. „A Theoretical Analysis of the Pricing and Advertising Strategies with Lévy-Walking Consumers“. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research 16, Nr. 6 (27.08.2021): 2129–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16060119.

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The pervasive adoption of mobile devices and proximity technologies enables firms to trace consumers’ trajectories and locations. This connects firms’ marketing and operations strategies more tightly with consumer mobility. In this paper, we propose a novel analytical model to examine the economic effects of consumer mobility on pricing and advertising strategies by incorporating consumers’ Lévy-walking behavior into advertising economics models. We ascertain the convergent effect of consumer mobility, i.e., consumers’ convergence to a firm leads to higher product price and advertising level. Meanwhile, it improves social welfare by increasing firm profit and consumer surplus. More interestingly, we find that consumers’ average movement distance (AMD) has opposing influences in pricing and advertising strategies. Specifically, longer AMD strengthens the convergent effect on advertising strategy but weakens that on pricing strategy. Finally, we also conduct a numerical analysis to uncover the impacts of the presence of proximity technologies on advertising outcomes. The results of this paper provide advisable guidance to firms on how to craft and adjust pricing and advertising strategies in accordance to consumer mobility. Moreover, the results present insights on welfare implications of informative advertising from the perspective of consumer mobility.

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5

Lal, Rajiv, und Carmen Matutes. „Retail Pricing and Advertising Strategies“. Journal of Business 67, Nr. 3 (Januar 1994): 345. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/296637.

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6

Chioveanu, Ioana. „Advertising, brand loyalty and pricing“. Games and Economic Behavior 64, Nr. 1 (September 2008): 68–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.004.

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7

Zheng, Jin-Hui, Bin Shen, Pui-Sze Chow und Chun-Hung Chiu. „The Impact of the Strategic Advertising on Luxury Fashion Brands with Social Influences“. Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2013 (2013): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/534605.

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It is well known that purchase of luxury fashion brands is strongly influenced by social needs such as the need for uniqueness and the need of conformity. The existence of these two competing social needs separates customers into two groups who exhibit different buying behaviors. This paper concerns the impacts of such social influences between different consumer groups on pricing and advertising strategies of luxury fashion brands with penalty of insufficient advertising. We start by considering different advertising allocation strategies and derive the corresponding local optimal pricing and advertising allocation policies, through which the global optimal policy that maximizes the company’s profit can be obtained. Important insights on strategic advertising for luxury fashion brands are discussed.

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8

Yang, Honglin, Lingling Chu und Hong Wan. „Advertising and Pricing Policies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Retailer“. RAIRO - Operations Research 53, Nr. 4 (07.08.2019): 1331–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2018111.

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We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The supplier can offer the retailer trade credit to fund his orders. To boost sales, the retailer invests part or all of initial capital exclusively in advertising at the beginning of the sales season. Demand is sensitive to both retail price and advertising expenses of the retailer. With a wholesale price contract, we analytically derive the Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to pricing by both parties and advertising by the retailer. Our results show that the retailer with less initial capital prefers to invest full initial capital in advertising irrespective of the advertising elasticity or the interest rate charged by the supplier. The retailer with more initial capital only invests part of initial capital in advertising. The retailer’s advertising policy under different initial capital levels always benefits the supply chain and the supplier. We further identify the effects of the advertising elasticity and the interest rate on the pricing policies. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis are given to elaborate our theoretical results.

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9

Zhou, Erfeng, Tinglong Zhang, Lei Ni und Chang Fang. „Advertising and Pricing Decisions with Reference Price Effect“. Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 22, Nr. 6 (20.10.2018): 817–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/jaciii.2018.p0817.

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Social perception influences product and brand evaluations. Consumers are especially susceptible to reference price effects when they make purchase decisions for a certain product. Meanwhile, the advertising and pricing are the determinable factors that have impact on consumers’ reference price which also are fundamental marketing strategies. Therefore, how to dynamically set advertising and pricing to maximize firms’ profits are essential tasks. We investigate a duopoly market in a mature product category where two firms compete through time using advertising and pricing as their dominated marketing tools. The firms make the advertising and pricing decisions to maximize their own profits in the planning period. The main results of this paper include the following. (i) The optimal retail price and advertising effort are positively correlated to the initial reference price and basic market size. (ii) When the two firms’ initial basic market size are different, the retail price difference is positive correlated to the initial basic market size difference, so is the advertising effort difference. This conclusion will result to that the strong firm is getting stronger and stronger, however, the weak firm is getting weaker and weaker, this is the situation which happen in the e-commerce market, that is winners take all. (iii) The value of the initial reference price can also determines the reference price effect on the consumer demand rate, that is, when the initial reference price is relatively low, the reference price will have a negative effect on the consumers’ demand of both firms in the whole planning period; when the initial reference price is relatively high, the reference price will have a positive effect on the consumers’ demand of both firms in the whole planning period. Whereas, a moderate initial reference price may lead to different effects on demand.

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10

Yan, Ke, Shuai Liu, Min Zuo, Jiamin Zheng und Yadong Xu. „Dual-Channel Supply Chain Pricing Decisions under Discounted Advertising Value“. Systems 10, Nr. 3 (07.06.2022): 76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems10030076.

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Retailers advertise on different sales channels. When consumers buy online, the effectiveness of advertising is discounted because they cannot feel the product. Observing this phenomenon, this paper studies the advertising strategy of a dual-channel retailer. In this paper, we build stylized game models for the retailer’s price and advertising levels on online and offline channels, respectively. Our contribution is to provide prescriptions for how dual-channel retailers make price and advertise decisions and determine which channel is more profitable for retailers. We find that advertising discounts are not always harming the retailer’s profits. The level of advertising discounts causes retailers to increase the selling price when consumers engage in online shopping. Also, we derive that retailers can choose the sales channels based on the level of consumers’ channel preference of consumers. Interestingly, an increase in the level of advertising discounts will contribute to the growth of the retailer’s profit. Finally, by numerical analysis, we demonstrate the robustness of the results.

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11

Jena, Sarat Kumar, und Deepti Jog. „Price competition in a tourism supply chain“. Tourism Economics 23, Nr. 6 (02.11.2016): 1235–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354816616674611.

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In recent trend, advertising is seen to significantly impact channel members’ demand, pricing and profit in tourism supply chain (TSC). Most TSC studies, to date, assumed the market demand to be influenced only by tour price under price competitive environment, not considering the effect of advertising investment. In order to address this problem, two models are established considering decentralized channels: tour operator Stackelberg (TS) and local operator Stackelberg (LS). We analytically show TS model to provide better results than LS model and advertising to strongly influence the channel members’ pricing strategies and profit. Then we generalized the solution considering multiple operators under price competition. We studied two coordination mechanisms, cooperative advertising and two-part tariff, and found the two-part tariff provides better mechanism for improving the profit in LS model compared to cooperative advertisement.

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12

Niazadeh, Rad, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani und Brendan Lucier. „Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions“. Operations Research 70, Nr. 1 (Januar 2022): 223–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2104.

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Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementarities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction can yield unacceptably low revenue. In “Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions,” Niazadeh, Hartline, Immorlica, Khani, and Lucier study and suggest core-selecting auctions, which boost revenue by setting payments so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different outcome. Their main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder-optimal core point with an almost linear number of calls to the welfare-maximization oracle. This algorithm is faster than previously proposed heuristics in the literature and has theoretical guarantees. By accompanying the theoretical study with an experimental study based on Microsoft Bing Ad Auction data, the authors conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time-sensitive practical use cases such as real-time online advertising and can yield more revenue than the VCG or generalized second price auction.

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13

Yang, Wei, Youyi Feng und Baichun Xiao. „Two Pricing Mechanisms in Sponsored Search Advertising“. Games 4, Nr. 1 (20.03.2013): 125–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g4010125.

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14

MacDonald, Leo, und Henning Rasmussen. „Revenue management with dynamic pricing and advertising“. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 9, Nr. 1-2 (30.10.2009): 126–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/rpm.2009.36.

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15

Fridgeirsdottir, Kristin, und Sami Najafi-Asadolahi. „Cost-per-Impression Pricing for Display Advertising“. Operations Research 66, Nr. 3 (Juni 2018): 653–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1697.

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16

Esteban, Lola, und José M. Hernández. „Advertising Media Planning, Optimal Pricing, and Welfare“. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 25, Nr. 4 (27.03.2016): 880–910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12173.

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17

Najafi-Asadolahi, Sami, und Kristin Fridgeirsdottir. „Cost-per-Click Pricing for Display Advertising“. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 16, Nr. 4 (Oktober 2014): 482–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2014.0491.

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18

Kamrad, Bardia, Shreevardhan S. Lele, Akhtar Siddique und Robert J. Thomas. „Innovation diffusion uncertainty, advertising and pricing policies“. European Journal of Operational Research 164, Nr. 3 (August 2005): 829–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.10.046.

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19

Chen, Ying-Ju. „Optimal dynamic pricing for sponsored search advertising“. Operations Research Letters 43, Nr. 2 (März 2015): 177–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.01.003.

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20

Busterna, John C. „National Advertising Pricing: Chain vs. Independent Newspapers“. Journalism Quarterly 65, Nr. 2 (Juni 1988): 307–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107769908806500207.

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21

Lacy, Stephen, und Stephen Dravis. „Pricing of Advertising in Weeklies: A Replication“. Journalism Quarterly 68, Nr. 3 (September 1991): 338–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107769909106800303.

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22

Yenmez, M. Bumin. „Pricing in position auctions and online advertising“. Economic Theory 55, Nr. 1 (08.03.2013): 243–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0748-0.

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23

Zhu, Ling, und Jie Lin. „A Pricing Strategy of E-Commerce Advertising Cooperation in the Stackelberg Game Model with Different Market Power Structure“. Algorithms 12, Nr. 1 (18.01.2019): 24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/a12010024.

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A lot of research work has studied the auction mechanism of uncertain advertising cooperation between the e-commerce platform and advertisers, but little has focused on pricing strategy in stable advertising cooperation under a certain market power structure. To fill this gap, this paper makes a study of the deep interest distribution of two parties in such cooperation. We propose a pricing strategy by building two stackelberg master-slave models when the e-commerce platform and the advertiser are respectively the leader in the cooperation. It is analyzed that the optimization solution of the profits of both parties and the total system are affected by some main decision factors including the income commission proportion, the advertising product price and the cost of advertising effort of both parties’ brand in different dominant models. Then, some numerical studies are used to verify the effectiveness of the models. Finally, we draw a conclusion and make some suggestions to the platforms and the advertisers in the e-commerce advertising cooperation.

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24

Sadjadi, Seyed Jafar, und Amin Alirezaee. „Impact of pricing structure on supply chain coordination with cooperative advertising“. RAIRO - Operations Research 54, Nr. 6 (16.09.2020): 1613–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2019099.

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This paper develops a game-theoretic model in a two-echelon supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two retailers to study the effect of pricing structure and cooperative-advertising decisions on the supply chain coordination performance. In the proposed model, different pricing structures are analyzed and then, two types of pricing structure in supply chain coordination mechanisms are presented, in addition to considering four possible scenarios for pricing structure. For the first two scenarios, retailers determine the retail prices, while in the other two ones, the sales price is set by the manufacturer. Therefore, the retailers are obliged to comply with this rule. The manufacturer-Stackelberg and the cooperative games are formulated for each scenario by considering key assumptions associated with advertising expenditures to maintain the potential demand size. This paper also presents some analytical results and determines the equilibrium of the models for each scenario. Finally, a numerical analysis is conducted to illustrate the impact of pricing structure on the optimal decision variables and the profit of the supply chain members.

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25

Gao, Tianxiang. „World Cup Advertising Pricing and Comprehensive Value Analysis for Companies“. BCP Business & Management 47 (10.07.2023): 84–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v47i.5173.

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The contemporary sports industry is rapidly expanding, and sports are assuming greater significance in people's everyday routines. The World Cup is the largest sporting event globally, boasting a massive market that offers a plethora of benefits to companies. This article aims to delve into the advertising pricing system of the World Cup and the driving factors and logic of exhibitors. It studies the division of the World Cup pricing system, the rights enjoyed by each system, and the reasons for corporate sponsorship, as well as the benefits it brings. The significance of this article is to introduce the pricing of World Cup advertising and analyze the various benefits for companies sponsoring the event. Data related to the FIFA World Cup Russia 2018 and the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 will be examined to determine the approximate pricing of the FIFA World Cup Russia 2018 and the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 advertisements and the overall value of these two World Cups to companies.

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26

Tan, Yee-Fan, Lee-Yeng Ong, Meng-Chew Leow und Yee-Xian Goh. „Exploring Time-Series Forecasting Models for Dynamic Pricing in Digital Signage Advertising“. Future Internet 13, Nr. 10 (22.09.2021): 241. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/fi13100241.

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Audience attention is vital in Digital Signage Advertising (DSA), as it has a significant impact on the pricing decision to advertise on those media. Various environmental factors affect the audience attention level toward advertising signage. Fixed-price strategies, which have been applied in DSA for pricing decisions, are generally inefficient at maximizing the potential profit of the service provider, as the environmental factors that could affect the audience attention are changing fast and are generally not considered in the current pricing solutions in a timely manner. Therefore, the time-series forecasting method is a suitable pricing solution for DSA, as it improves the pricing decision by modeling the changes in the environmental factors and audience attention level toward signage for optimal pricing. However, it is difficult to determine an optimal price forecasting model for DSA with the increasing number of available time-series forecasting models in recent years. Based on the 84 research articles reviewed, the data characteristics analysis in terms of linearity, stationarity, volatility, and dataset size is helpful in determining the optimal model for time-series price forecasting. This paper has reviewed the widely used time-series forecasting models and identified the related data characteristics of each model. A framework is proposed to demonstrate the model selection process for dynamic pricing in DSA based on its data characteristics analysis, paving the way for future research of pricing solutions for DSA.

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27

Shen, Weiran, Pingzhong Tang, Xun Wang, Yadong Xu und Xiwang Yang. „Coupon Design in Advertising Systems“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, Nr. 6 (18.05.2021): 5717–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16717.

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Online platforms sell advertisements via auctions (e.g., VCG and GSP auction) and revenue maximization is one of the most important tasks for them. Many revenue increment methods are proposed, like reserve pricing, boosting, coupons and so on. The novelty of coupons rests on the fact that coupons are optional for advertisers while the others are compulsory. Recent studies on coupons have limited applications in advertising systems because they only focus on second price auctions and do not consider the combination with other methods. In this work, we study the coupon design problem for revenue maximization in the widely used VCG auction. Firstly, we examine the bidder strategies in the VCG auction with coupons. Secondly, we cast the coupon design problem into a learning framework and propose corresponding algorithms using the properties of VCG auction. Then we further study how to combine coupons with reserve pricing in our framework. Finally, extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms based on both synthetic data and industrial data.

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28

Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse M. Shapiro, Frank Yang und Ali Yurukoglu. „Pricing Power in Advertising Markets: Theory and Evidence“. American Economic Review 114, Nr. 2 (01.02.2024): 500–533. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220943.

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Existing theories of media competition imply that advertisers will pay a lower price in equilibrium to reach consumers who multi-home across competing outlets. We generalize and extend this theoretical result and test it using data from television and social media advertising. We find that the model is a good match, qualitatively and quantitatively, to variation in advertising prices across demographic groups, outlets, platforms, and over time. We use the model to quantify the effects of competition within and across platforms. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L82, M37)

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29

Xu, Biao, Xiangbin Yan und Jinting Huang. „Advertising and pricing strategies in online video platform“. International Journal of Business Information Systems 1, Nr. 1 (2022): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijbis.2022.10050677.

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30

Amoozad Mahdiraji, Hannan, Adel Hatami-Marbini, Niloofar Mohammadi Moazed, Manouchehr Ansari und Ali Asghar Abbasi Kamardi. „Differential game approach to pricing and advertising decisions“. Operations Research Letters 49, Nr. 5 (September 2021): 688–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.07.002.

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31

Asdemir, Kursad, Nanda Kumar und Varghese S. Jacob. „Pricing Models for Online Advertising: CPM vs. CPC“. Information Systems Research 23, Nr. 3-part-1 (September 2012): 804–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/isre.1110.0391.

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32

Yan, Ruiliang, und Kai Yu Wang. „Market forecasting information and firm pricing-advertising strategies“. International Journal of Information and Decision Sciences 1, Nr. 4 (2009): 382. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijids.2009.027758.

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33

Esteves, Rosa-Branca, und Joana Resende. „Personalized pricing and advertising: Who are the winners?“ International Journal of Industrial Organization 63 (März 2019): 239–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.11.003.

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34

Kumar, Subodha, und Suresh P. Sethi. „Dynamic pricing and advertising for web content providers“. European Journal of Operational Research 197, Nr. 3 (September 2009): 924–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.12.038.

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35

Helmes, Kurt, und Rainer Schlosser. „Oligopoly Pricing and Advertising in Isoelastic Adoption Models“. Dynamic Games and Applications 5, Nr. 3 (17.09.2014): 334–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0123-1.

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36

Helmes, Kurt L., und Rainer Schlosser. „Dynamic advertising and pricing with constant demand elasticities“. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37, Nr. 12 (Dezember 2013): 2814–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.08.004.

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37

Taleizadeh, Ata Allah, und Masoud Charmchi. „Optimal advertising and pricing decisions for complementary products“. Journal of Industrial Engineering International 11, Nr. 1 (05.02.2015): 111–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40092-015-0101-2.

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38

Anderson, Simon, Alicia Baik und Nathan Larson. „Personalized pricing and advertising: An asymmetric equilibrium analysis“. Games and Economic Behavior 92 (Juli 2015): 53–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.006.

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39

Esteban, Lola, Agust�n Gil und Jos� M. Hern�ndez. „Pricing with Endogenous Direct Advertising in a Monopoly“. Review of Industrial Organization 25, Nr. 2 (September 2004): 129–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-004-1094-y.

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40

Jiang, Baojun, und Kannan Srinivasan. „Pricing and persuasive advertising in a differentiated market“. Marketing Letters 27, Nr. 3 (24.04.2015): 579–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11002-015-9370-1.

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41

Song, Hongjuan, und Yushi Jiang. „Dynamic pricing decisions by potential tourists under uncertainty: The effects of tourism advertising“. Tourism Economics 25, Nr. 2 (04.09.2018): 213–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354816618797250.

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The aim of this study is to examine the advertising information learning processes of potential tourists and observe how potential tourists sequentially adjust their perceived reference prices and purchase intentions with different risk preferences and choices with respect to gains (the current price is lower than the consumer’s reference price) or losses (the current price is higher than the reference price). In this study, a Bayesian experiment was conducted to elicit reference prices in the presence of tourism advertising with uncertain information. The findings show that with respect to gains, risk avoiders do not reduce their reference prices as significantly as do risk seekers when exposed to price-informative advertising. Exposure to image advertising changes potential tourists’ risk preferences, and the reference price drops more significantly for risk avoiders than for risk seekers. With respect to losses, informative and image advertising impact the reference price for participants with different risk preferences but not at a statistically significant level.

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Xie, Bo, Weizi Li, Peiyan Jiang, Xiaoxue Han und Lei Qi. „Cooperative Advertising Strategy Selection Problem for considering Pricing and Advertising Decisions in a Two-Period Online Supply Chain“. Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2022 (10.03.2022): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/8922589.

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This article studies the cooperative advertising problem of a two-period online supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an online retail platform. The manufacturer provides national advertising in the first period to build the brand image and increase the awareness of the product. And the online retail platform provides platform advertising for selling the product to consumers on its platform during two periods. The manufacturer and the online retail platform may choose different cooperative advertising strategies for national advertising and platform advertising, which are one-way subsidy strategy, two-way subsidy strategy, and revenue-share strategy. We formulate a Stackelberg game model to study the cooperative advertising problem by taking price and advertising effect into account and analyze how the profit is influenced in different cooperative advertising strategies. We find that under the revenue-share strategy, the manufacturer provides a higher subsidy rate for the online retail platform advertising than that in other cooperative advertising strategies. Interestingly, there are conditions where, while just the manufacturer contributes a percentage of the platform advertising and the online retail platform has no effort on the national advertising, the total profit would be better than that in revenue-share strategy even in revenue-share strategy, the cooperative relationship is closer between the manufacture and the online retail platform.

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43

McLeod, Phillip W., und Michael W. Maher. „Analyzing Newspaper Costs in Predation Lawsuits“. Newspaper Research Journal 19, Nr. 4 (September 1998): 58–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/073953299801900406.

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44

Liu, Gang, und Fengyue An. „Video Platforms’ Value-Added Service Investments and Pricing Strategies for Advertisers“. Sustainability 13, Nr. 24 (11.12.2021): 13701. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su132413701.

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Using a game-theoretical approach, this paper develops a duopoly model and examines value-added service (VAS) investments and pricing strategies on video platforms with opposite inter-group network externalities between two groups. We consider two scenarios with VAS investment, namely, a single platform investing in VASs for advertisers (S-Model) and both platforms investing in VASs for advertisers (B-Model). We found the following: (i) In the S-Model, the investing platform’s VAS level remains maximum when the marginal investing cost is low; otherwise, it decreases with the cost. Investing and non-investing platforms’ advertising prices are unaffected by the marginal investing cost if the cost is low; otherwise, the prices decrease and increase with the cost, respectively. Furthermore, the investing platform’s advertising price is higher than the non-investing platform’s. (ii) In the B-Model, the two platforms’ VAS levels remain maximum if the marginal investing cost is low; otherwise, they decrease with the cost. The two platforms’ advertising prices are equal and irrelevant to the marginal investing cost. (iii) The investing platform’s VAS level in the S-Model is higher than or the same as that in the B-Model and the investing platform’s advertising price in the S-Model is higher than that in the B-Model. (iv) Compared to the scenario without VAS investment, the investing platform’s advertising price is higher in the S-Model, but the same in the B-Model.

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45

Mao, Wei. „Research on Pricing Decision Considering Advertising Benefit and Consumer Psychological Benefit“. Highlights in Business, Economics and Management 6 (27.03.2023): 298–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v6i.6335.

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For perishable goods, the optimal pricing models studied by current scholars seldom consider price effect, psychological benefit and consumption time. Based on the current basic newsboy model, this paper focuses on the price characteristics and consumer psychology of perishable products under the background of single dealer, in order to build a complete optimal price decision model of perishable products. According to the two-stage ladder pricing of perishable products in the pricing stage, this paper constructs the optimal price decision model of dealers in different sales stages by representing consumer demand and dealer profit equation, so as to provide enterprises with the maximum optimal strategy. Moreover, sensitivity analysis of parameters in the model is carried out to ensure the stability of the model.

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McQuilken, Lisa, Nichola Robertson, Michael Polonsky, Paul Harrison und David Bednall. „Perceptions of mobile plan unit pricing and terms and conditions“. Marketing Intelligence & Planning 34, Nr. 6 (05.09.2016): 734–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mip-08-2014-0153.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to test the efficacy of disclosing unit pricing and increasing the type size of complex terms and conditions in advertising. This is in line with recommendations made by global telecommunications regulators, including in Australia, to protect consumers in selecting mobile plans. Design/methodology/approach The authors employed a 2 (unit price disclosed: no, yes)×3 (type size: nine-, 12- and 15-point terms and conditions) full factorial, between-subjects experimental design using a scenario and fictional advertisements for 24-month mobile phone plans. This was complemented by 24 in-depth interviews with consumers who had recently purchased “real” plans and their assessment of these. Findings Extra information in the form of unit pricing has a positive influence on consumers’ value perceptions, but not on perceived confusion or risk. Presenting complex terms and conditions in larger type increases consumers’ perceived confusion and risk, but not perceived value, as consumers have difficulty understanding the complicated information presented. Research limitations/implications This study focused on a single country market for one product type of mobile phones, using a limited range of mobile plans. Practical implications Public policymakers and providers are advised to pre-test planned changes to advertising’s informational content prior to implementation to identify the efficacy of proposed changes to protect consumers. Consumers may also need to be educated to accurately interpret complex plans. Originality/value The study contributes to the domain of informational content in advertising as a form of consumer protection. The effect of unit pricing and larger type for terms and conditions on consumer perceptions has not been examined previously in complex product settings.

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Wu, Zhihui, Lichao Feng und Dongyan Chen. „Coordinating Pricing and Advertising Decisions for Supply Chain under Consignment Contract in the Dynamic Setting“. Complexity 2018 (09.09.2018): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/7697180.

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In this paper, via the differential game method, the problems of the pricing and advertising decision are investigated by considering the effect of number of the platform users on demand. In addition, a novel contract is developed to coordinate the supply chain. Firstly, the optimal strategies of the pricing and advertising are given in the decentralized and centralized scenarios by applying the differential game theory. Also, the comparison analysis concerning on the optimal strategies is proposed in two decision scenarios. It is shown that the centralized scenario could lead to the higher advertising effort of each member and a lower retail price. Next, we construct the state-dependent contract with hope to coordinate the supply chain and then improve the performance of the supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the impacts of the price-elasticity index of demand and the effectiveness of the number of retailer’s platform users onto the feasible region of the corresponding contract.

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Wang, Yongzhao, Liqun Wei und Jianxiong Zhang. „A Joint Dynamic Pricing, Advertising, and Production Model with Inventory-Level-Dependent Goodwill“. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2020 (11.08.2020): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9257380.

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Inventory level has a significant impact on the goodwill of products to customers, which seldom becomes the focus of previous studies. In this paper, joint dynamic pricing, advertising, and production decision-making problem is investigated, where the demand rate depends on sales price and goodwill. The inventory and backlog as well as advertisement are considered as goodwill-building factors. The optimal dynamic pricing, advertising, and production policies are derived by using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the obtained results, and sensitivity analysis of main system parameters is carried out to obtain some managerial insights. We find that when the initial goodwill is relatively high, the firm’s profit first decreases and then increases with respect to the impact intensity of inventory on goodwill; otherwise, the firm always benefits from a higher impact intensity of inventory on goodwill. Furthermore, the optimal production and advertising policies are complementary caused by the feature of inventory-dependent goodwill.

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Mandal, Pratap Chandra. „Public Policy Issues in Pricing“. International Journal of Applied Management Theory and Research 1, Nr. 2 (Juli 2019): 17–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijamtr.2019070102.

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Companies adopt pricing policies which maximize their revenues and profits generated. Sometimes, those pricing policies are not fair. The major public policy issues include unfair pricing practices within distribution channel levels such as price-fixing and predatory pricing, and across distribution channel levels such as retail price maintenance, deceptive pricing, and discriminatory pricing. Companies also set dynamic pricing. They set high prices for products to cover distribution costs, advertising and promotion costs, and excessive markups to generate extra revenues. Companies try adopting fair pricing policies. Laws and regulations are enforced to ensure it and that customers are benefited. However, sometimes it is difficult to ensure the legal and ethical aspects of pricing practices. Both governments and companies should be aware about the social goods used by customers and their pricing implications. Proper understanding and implementation of pricing policies will benefit both companies and customers and help in developing long-term customer relationships.

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Wang, Yuyan, und Zhaoqing Yu. „Research on Advertising and Pricing in E-Supply Chain Under Different Dominant Modes“. Journal of Systems Science and Information 6, Nr. 1 (26.03.2018): 58–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.21078/jssi-2018-058-11.

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AbstractThe E-supply chain is formed gradually along with the development of network, which is getting more attention among enterprises with unique advantages. Three E-supply chain operation modes are constructed in this paper, then the optimal pricing and advertising strategies under those modes are studied and compared, which are demonstrated with numerical examples. The results of comparison and analysis show that: Selling price, network platform service level, advertising investment and the profits of manufacturer, network platform and E-supply chain all increase with advertising effectiveness of stimulating demand growth. Under centralized decision-making mode, service level is highest, advertising investment is largest and the profit of E-supply chain is highest as well. When manufacturer leads decentralized decision-making mode, not only network service level, advertising investment and the profit of manufacturer can gain better results, but also profit of network platform can be higher while the advertisement effect of increasing demand is big enough. Additionally, it is confirmed that centralized decision-making is better than decentralized decision-making for system operation. Besides, decentralized decision-making mode led by manufacturer is superior to it led by network platform on the condition that advertisement effect is obvious.

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