Thematische Bibliographien / Advertising Pricing

Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Advertising Pricing“

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Veröffentlicht am 25. Mai 2024

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Advertising Pricing"

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Bagwell, Kyle, und Garey Ramey. „Advertising and Limit Pricing“. RAND Journal of Economics 19, Nr. 1 (1988): 59. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555397.

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Wills, Robert L., und Willard F. Mueller. „Brand Pricing and Advertising“. Southern Economic Journal 56, Nr. 2 (Oktober 1989): 383. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1059217.

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Stahl II, Dale O. „Oligopolistic Pricing and Advertising“. Journal of Economic Theory 64, Nr. 1 (Oktober 1994): 162–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1060.

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Wang, Wei, und Gang Li. „A Theoretical Analysis of the Pricing and Advertising Strategies with Lévy-Walking Consumers“. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research 16, Nr. 6 (27.08.2021): 2129–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16060119.

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The pervasive adoption of mobile devices and proximity technologies enables firms to trace consumers’ trajectories and locations. This connects firms’ marketing and operations strategies more tightly with consumer mobility. In this paper, we propose a novel analytical model to examine the economic effects of consumer mobility on pricing and advertising strategies by incorporating consumers’ Lévy-walking behavior into advertising economics models. We ascertain the convergent effect of consumer mobility, i.e., consumers’ convergence to a firm leads to higher product price and advertising level. Meanwhile, it improves social welfare by increasing firm profit and consumer surplus. More interestingly, we find that consumers’ average movement distance (AMD) has opposing influences in pricing and advertising strategies. Specifically, longer AMD strengthens the convergent effect on advertising strategy but weakens that on pricing strategy. Finally, we also conduct a numerical analysis to uncover the impacts of the presence of proximity technologies on advertising outcomes. The results of this paper provide advisable guidance to firms on how to craft and adjust pricing and advertising strategies in accordance to consumer mobility. Moreover, the results present insights on welfare implications of informative advertising from the perspective of consumer mobility.
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Lal, Rajiv, und Carmen Matutes. „Retail Pricing and Advertising Strategies“. Journal of Business 67, Nr. 3 (Januar 1994): 345. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/296637.

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Chioveanu, Ioana. „Advertising, brand loyalty and pricing“. Games and Economic Behavior 64, Nr. 1 (September 2008): 68–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.004.

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Zheng, Jin-Hui, Bin Shen, Pui-Sze Chow und Chun-Hung Chiu. „The Impact of the Strategic Advertising on Luxury Fashion Brands with Social Influences“. Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2013 (2013): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/534605.

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It is well known that purchase of luxury fashion brands is strongly influenced by social needs such as the need for uniqueness and the need of conformity. The existence of these two competing social needs separates customers into two groups who exhibit different buying behaviors. This paper concerns the impacts of such social influences between different consumer groups on pricing and advertising strategies of luxury fashion brands with penalty of insufficient advertising. We start by considering different advertising allocation strategies and derive the corresponding local optimal pricing and advertising allocation policies, through which the global optimal policy that maximizes the company’s profit can be obtained. Important insights on strategic advertising for luxury fashion brands are discussed.
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Yang, Honglin, Lingling Chu und Hong Wan. „Advertising and Pricing Policies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Retailer“. RAIRO - Operations Research 53, Nr. 4 (07.08.2019): 1331–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2018111.

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We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The supplier can offer the retailer trade credit to fund his orders. To boost sales, the retailer invests part or all of initial capital exclusively in advertising at the beginning of the sales season. Demand is sensitive to both retail price and advertising expenses of the retailer. With a wholesale price contract, we analytically derive the Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to pricing by both parties and advertising by the retailer. Our results show that the retailer with less initial capital prefers to invest full initial capital in advertising irrespective of the advertising elasticity or the interest rate charged by the supplier. The retailer with more initial capital only invests part of initial capital in advertising. The retailer’s advertising policy under different initial capital levels always benefits the supply chain and the supplier. We further identify the effects of the advertising elasticity and the interest rate on the pricing policies. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis are given to elaborate our theoretical results.
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Zhou, Erfeng, Tinglong Zhang, Lei Ni und Chang Fang. „Advertising and Pricing Decisions with Reference Price Effect“. Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 22, Nr. 6 (20.10.2018): 817–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/jaciii.2018.p0817.

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Social perception influences product and brand evaluations. Consumers are especially susceptible to reference price effects when they make purchase decisions for a certain product. Meanwhile, the advertising and pricing are the determinable factors that have impact on consumers’ reference price which also are fundamental marketing strategies. Therefore, how to dynamically set advertising and pricing to maximize firms’ profits are essential tasks. We investigate a duopoly market in a mature product category where two firms compete through time using advertising and pricing as their dominated marketing tools. The firms make the advertising and pricing decisions to maximize their own profits in the planning period. The main results of this paper include the following. (i) The optimal retail price and advertising effort are positively correlated to the initial reference price and basic market size. (ii) When the two firms’ initial basic market size are different, the retail price difference is positive correlated to the initial basic market size difference, so is the advertising effort difference. This conclusion will result to that the strong firm is getting stronger and stronger, however, the weak firm is getting weaker and weaker, this is the situation which happen in the e-commerce market, that is winners take all. (iii) The value of the initial reference price can also determines the reference price effect on the consumer demand rate, that is, when the initial reference price is relatively low, the reference price will have a negative effect on the consumers’ demand of both firms in the whole planning period; when the initial reference price is relatively high, the reference price will have a positive effect on the consumers’ demand of both firms in the whole planning period. Whereas, a moderate initial reference price may lead to different effects on demand.
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Yan, Ke, Shuai Liu, Min Zuo, Jiamin Zheng und Yadong Xu. „Dual-Channel Supply Chain Pricing Decisions under Discounted Advertising Value“. Systems 10, Nr. 3 (07.06.2022): 76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems10030076.

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Retailers advertise on different sales channels. When consumers buy online, the effectiveness of advertising is discounted because they cannot feel the product. Observing this phenomenon, this paper studies the advertising strategy of a dual-channel retailer. In this paper, we build stylized game models for the retailer’s price and advertising levels on online and offline channels, respectively. Our contribution is to provide prescriptions for how dual-channel retailers make price and advertise decisions and determine which channel is more profitable for retailers. We find that advertising discounts are not always harming the retailer’s profits. The level of advertising discounts causes retailers to increase the selling price when consumers engage in online shopping. Also, we derive that retailers can choose the sales channels based on the level of consumers’ channel preference of consumers. Interestingly, an increase in the level of advertising discounts will contribute to the growth of the retailer’s profit. Finally, by numerical analysis, we demonstrate the robustness of the results.
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Dissertationen zum Thema "Advertising Pricing"

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Anderson, Eric T. (Eric Thomas). „Essays on pricing and advertising“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11879.

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Baardman, Lennart. „Analytics in promotional pricing and advertising“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122389.

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This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2019
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 191-198).
Big data and the internet are shifting the paradigm in promotional pricing and advertising. The amount of readily available data from both point-of-sale systems and web cookies has grown, enabling a shift from qualitative design to quantitative tools. In this work, we address how firms can utilize the power of analytics to maximize profits in both their offline and online channels. First, we consider an online setting, in which an advertiser can target ads to the customer in question. The goal of the advertiser is to determine how to target the right audience with their ads. We study this problem as a Multi-Armed Bandit problem with periodic budgets, and develop an Optimistic-Robust Learning algorithm with bounded expected regret. Practically, simulations on synthetic and real-world ad data show that the algorithm reduces regret by at least 10-20% compared to benchmarks.
Second, we consider an offline setting, in which a retailer can boost profits through the use of promotion vehicles such as flyers and commercials. The goal of the retailer is to decide how to schedule the right promotion vehicles for their products. We model the problem as a non-linear bipartite matching-type problem, and develop provably-good algorithms: a greedy algorithm and an approximate integer program of polynomial size. From a practical perspective, we test our methods on actual data and show potential profit increases of 2-9%. Third, we explore a supply chain setting, in which a supplier offers vendor funds to a retailer who promotionally prices the product to the customer. Vendor funds are trade deals in which a supplier offers a retailer a short-term discount on a specific product, encouraging the retailer to discount the product.
We model the problem as a bilevel optimization model and show that a pass-through constrained vendor fund mitigates forward-buying and coordinates the supply chain on the short term. Finally, we present a pilot study on the impact of promotional pricing on retail profits. We assess the potential impact of our promotion planning tool on historical data from a large retailer. Our results suggest a 9.94% profit improvement for the retailer.
by Lennart Baardman.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center
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Thöne, Miriam [Verfasser]. „Essays on Advertising and Pricing Strategies in Digital Markets / Miriam Thöne“. Düsseldorf : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 2017. http://d-nb.info/113811443X/34.

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Qiao, Liang. „Pricing and advertising responses of national brands to store brand introduction /“. May be available electronically:, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU1MTUmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=12498.

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Schlosser, Rainer. „Six essays on stochastic and deterministic dynamic pricing and advertising models“. Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16973.

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Die kumulative Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit stochastischen und deterministischen dynamischen Verkaufsmodellen für langlebige sowie verderbliche Güter. Die analysierten dynamischen Modelle sind durch die Möglichkeit der simultanen Variation von Preis und Werbung in stetiger Zeit charakterisiert und folgen den aktuellen Entwicklungen der Dynamischen Preissetzung. Dabei steht die Berücksichtigung und Analyse von (i) Zeitinhomogenitäten, (ii) Adoptionseffekten, (iii) Oligopolwettbewerb und (iv) der Risikoaversion des Entscheiders im Zentrum der Arbeit. Für die Spezialfälle isoelastischer und exponentieller Nachfrage in Verbindung mit isoelastischer Werbewirkung gelingt es explizite Lösungen der optimalen Preis- und Werbekontrollen herzuleiten. Die optimal gesteuerten Verkaufsprozesse können analytisch beschrieben und ausgewertet werden. Insbesondere werden neben erwarteten Preis- und Restbestandsentwicklungen auch assoziierte Gewinnverteilungen untersucht und Sensitivitätsresultate hergeleitet. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert unter welchen Bedingungen monopolistische Strategien sozial effizient sind und welche Besteuerungs- und Subventionsmechanismen geeignet sind um Effizienz herzustellen. Die Ergebnisse sind in sechs Artikel gefasst und bieten ökonomische Einsichten in verschiedene praktische Verkaufsanwendungen, speziell im Bereich des elektronischen Handels.
The cumulative dissertation deals with stochastic and deterministic dynamic sales models for durable as well as perishable products. The models analyzed are characterized by simultaneous dynamic pricing and advertising controls in continuous time and are in line with recent developments in dynamic pricing. They include the modeling of multi-dimensional decisions and take (i) time dependencies, (ii) adoption effects (iii), competitive settings and (iv) risk aversion, explicitly into account. For special cases with isoelastic demand functions as well as with exponential ones explicit solution formulas of the optimal pricing and advertising feedback controls are derived. Moreover, optimally controlled sales processes are analytically described. In particular, the distribution of profits, the expected evolution of prices as well as inventory levels are analyzed in detail and sensitivity results are obtained. Furthermore, we consider the question whether or not monopolistic policies are socially efficient; in special cases, we propose taxation/subsidy mechanisms to establish efficiency. The results are presented in six articles and provide economic insights into a variety of dynamic sales applications of the business world, especially in the area of e-commerce.
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Prasad, Ashutosh. „Essays on product-introduction timing, pricing, advertising and piracy in contemporary media /“. Digital version accessible at:, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.

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Weber, Martin. „Optimal inventory control in the presence of dynamic pricing and dynamic advertising“. Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17339.

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Diese Dissertation analysiert das optimale Zusammenspiel dynamischer Preissetzung, dynamischer Werbung und Bestandsmanagement. Wir betrachten verschiedene Optimierungsprobleme für einen monopolistischen Händler bei gegebener zeitabhängiger deterministischer Nachfrage. In Kapitel 2 erweitern wir das Modell von Rajan et al. (1992). Der Händler darf einen dynamischen Preis, eine dynamische Werberate und die Lagergröße bei fester Verkaufsdauer wählen, so dass der Barwert von Umsatz minus Lager-, Einkaufs- und (nichtlinearen) Werbekosten maximiert wird; zusätzlich zerfällt der Lagerbestand mit exponentieller Rate. Wir ermitteln die optimale Preis-Werbe-Steuerung und die optimale Lagergröße und betrachten auch semi-statische Situationen. Wir führen eine Sensitivitätsanalyse im Hinblick auf den Einfluss der Modellparameter auf die optimalen Ergebnisse durch und vergleichen die Ergebnisse des dynamischen Modells mit denen der semi-statischen Modelle. In Kapitel 3 interpretieren wir den Verkaufsprozess als gesteuerten Diffusionsprozess eines neuen Produktes und die Lagergröße als unerschlossenen Marktanteil. Der Anfangszustand ist exogen gegeben und die Nachfrage hängt zusätzlich vom gegenwärtigen Zustand des Systems ab. Ein Zerfall des Lagerbestandes und alle Kosten bis auf Werbekosten sind ausgenommen. Anders als in Helmes et al. (2013) leiten wir die optimale Steuerung mithilfe des Pontrjaginschen Maximumprinzips her. Als Anwendung betrachten wir das Modell von von Bertalanffy. In Kapitel 4 erweitern wir die Analyse von einperiodigen Modellen auf langfristige Modelle. Die Länge des Verkaufszyklus und die Lagergröße sind Entscheidungsvariablen, wobei die optimalen Steuerungen aus Kapitel 2 bzw. Kapitel 3 während eines Zyklus angewandt werden. Existenzbedingungen für ein optimales Paar aus Zykluslänge und Lagergröße werden hergeleitet. Wir analysieren verschiedene Anwendungs- und Illustrationsbeispiele und verifizieren Strukturaussagen der optimalen Entscheidungsgrößen.
This dissertation analyzes the optimal coordination of dynamic pricing, dynamic advertising, and inventory management. We consider different optimization problems for a monopolistic retailer who faces a time-dependent deterministic demand. In Chapter 2, we generalize the model of Rajan et al. (1992). The retailer is allowed to choose a dynamic price, a dynamic advertising rate, and the inventory capacity for a sales period of fixed length so that the present value of revenue minus inventory, purchasing and (nonlinear) advertising costs is maximized; in addition, the inventory deteriorates at an exponential rate. We derive the optimal dynamic price-advertising control and the optimal capacity and also consider partially static cases. For the optimally controlled dynamic model we carry out a sensitivity analysis with respect to the model parameters and we compare the results of the dynamic model with those of the partially static models. In Chapter 3, we interpret the sales process as the controlled adoption process of a new product and the inventory capacity as untapped market share. The initial state is assumed to be exogenously given and the demand depends on the current state of the system. We exclude, however, deterioration effects and any other costs but the cost of advertising. We derive the optimal controls using a different technique than Helmes et al. (2013) - we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principle. As an interesting application we consider the controlled von Bertalanffy model. In Chapter 4, we extend the analysis of one-period models to multi-period and longterm average models. Assuming that the optimal controls derived in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are applied throughout a cycle, we treat the cycle length and the capacity as decision variables. We derive conditions that ensure the existence of an optimal pair of cycle length and capacity. Various examples and illustrations are given, and structural properties of the optimal pair are verified.
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Kurad, Astrid [Verfasser]. „Advertising pricing in German consumer magazine industry : an industrial economic analysis of market concentration, advertising prices, and their interrelations / Astrid Kurad“. Flensburg : Zentrale Hochschulbibliothek Flensburg, 2008. http://d-nb.info/101828009X/34.

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Simbanegavi, Witness. „Price discrimination, advertising and competition“. Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, (EFI), 2005. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/684.htm.

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Molinari, Benedetto. „Sticky information and non-pricing policies in DSGE models“. Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7379.

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La tesis consta de dos partes. En la primera parte se analiza la relación entre las fricciones en los flujos de información que llegan a la empresa y la persistencia del patrón de la inflación. En particular, se presenta un nuevo estimador por el modelo de Makiw y Reis (2002) "Sticky Information Phillips Curve", y se aplica usando datos trimestrales de EE.UU. El resultado principal es que el modelo tan solo puede explicar la persistencia de la inflación asumiendo que la variancia de la inflación sea mucho mas grande de la que observamos o, equivalentemente, que el modelo no puede explicar conjuntamente la variancia y la persistencia de la inflación.

En la segunda parte se presentan nuevas evidencias sobre la publicidad agregada en EE.UU. y se estudian los efectos de la publicidad en la economía usando un modelo dinámico estocástico de equilibrio general. En particular, el capitulo 2 se enfoca en las relaciones de corto plazo entre las mas comunes variables macroeconómicas - consumo agregado, producto interno bruto, totalidad de horas trabajadas en la economía - y la publicidad agregada, con particular atención a la relación de causalidad entre publicidad y consumo. En cambio, el capitulo 3 se enfoca sobre las relaciones de largo plazo, enseñando como la publicidad agregada afecte el nivel de trabajo de la economía. A través del modelo presentado en el capitulo 2, se demuestra que un mayor nivel de publicidad implica un mayor números de oras trabajadas asociadas con un menor nivel de bienestar por los consumidores.
This thesis is organized in two parts. In the first one, I seek to understand the relationship between frictions in information flows among firms and inflation persistence. To this end, I present a novel estimator for the Sticky Information Phillips Curve (Mankiw and Reis, 2002), and I use it to estimate this model with U.S. postwar data. The main result is that the Sticky Information Phillips Curve can match inflation persistence only at the cost of mispredicting inflation variance. I conclude that the Sticky Information Phillips Curve is a valid model to explain inflation persistence but not an overall valid theory of inflation.

The second part presents new evidence about aggregate advertising expenditures in U.S., and analyzes the effect of advertising in the aggregate economy by the mean of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Chapter 2 focuses on the short run impact of advertising on the aggregate dynamics, and shows that an increase in aggregate advertising significantly increases the aggregate consumption. Chapter 3 focuses on the long run effects of advertising on the labor supply, showing that in economies where aggregate advertising is higher, agents supply more hours of works and are generally worse off in terms of welfare.
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Bücher zum Thema "Advertising Pricing"

1

Ellison, Glenn. A model of add-on pricing. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003.

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Dorn, Edward G. A successful system for pricing & producing advertising services. Palatine, IL: CEL Publications, 1995.

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Dreifürst, Bernhard. Wirkungen von Sonderangebotsaktionen. Bonn: [Bonner Betriebswirtschaftliche Schriften], 1985.

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Devinney, Timothy Michael. Advertising and price elasticity in a model of dominant firm markets. Brussels: European Institute For Advanced Studies in Management, 1988.

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Grewal, Dhruv. The effects of price-comparison advertising on buyers' perceptions of acquisition value and transaction value. Cambridge, Mass: Marketing Science Institute, 1996.

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Grewal, Dhruv. The effects of price-comparison advertising on buyers' perceptions of acquisition value and transaction value. Cambridge, Mass: Marketing Science Institute, 1996.

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United States. Congress. Senate. Special Committee on Aging. Direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs: What are the consequences? : hearing before the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, Washington, DC, July 22, 2003. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2003.

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United States. Congress. Senate. Special Committee on Aging. Direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs: What are the consequences? : hearing before the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, Washington, DC, July 22, 2003. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2003.

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Hu, Sheng C. Optimal advertising pricing policies in a mature market: A dynamic duopoly model. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1989.

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Hauser, John R. Competitive advertising and pricing in duopolies: The implications of relevant set-response analysis. [Boston, Mass: Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 1987.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Advertising Pricing"

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Kumar, Subodha. „Pricing Models in Web Advertising“. In SpringerBriefs in Operations Management, 9–13. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18645-0_2.

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Sherman, Zoe. „Pricing the eyes of passersby“. In Modern Advertising and the Market for Audience Attention, 78–100. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge explorations in economic history: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315511573-3.

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Mangàni, Andrea. „Internet Advertising: Market Structure and New Pricing Methods“. In Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies, 301–13. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44463-7_26.

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Zhang, Bolei, Zhuzhong Qian, Wenzhong Li und Sanglu Lu. „Pricing Strategies for Maximizing Viral Advertising in Social Networks“. In Database Systems for Advanced Applications, 418–34. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18123-3_25.

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Jørgensen, Steffen, und Simon Sigué. „A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing“. In Games in Management Science, 1–14. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_1.

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Dockner, Engelbert, und Gustav Feichtinger. „Dynamic Advertising and Pricing in an Oligopoly: a Nash Equilibrium Approach“. In Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics, 238–51. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_9.

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Goertz, Thomas, Jella Pfeiffer, Henning Schmidt und Franz Rothlauf. „Integrating Keyword Advertising and Dynamic Pricing for an Online Market Place“. In Operations Research Proceedings 2013, 145–51. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07001-8_20.

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Wang, Junping, und Shengdong Wang. „Optimal Manufacturing, Ordering, Pricing and Advertising Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain System“. In Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, 589–97. London: Springer London, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4600-1_50.

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Ye, Qiongwei, Zhang Qian und GuangXing Song. „The Analysis of Advertising Pricing Based on the Two-Sided Markets Theory in Social Network“. In IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, 277–87. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45526-5_26.

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Aust, Gerhard. „Vertical Cooperative Advertising and Pricing Decisions in a Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain: A Game-Theoretic Approach“. In Contributions to Management Science, 65–99. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11626-6_4.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Advertising Pricing"

1

Wang, Zheng. „Cooperative Advertising Research with Product Pricing“. In International Conference on Education, Management and Computing Technology (ICEMCT-16). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icemct-16.2016.38.

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Bharadwaj, Vijay, Wenjing Ma, Michael Schwarz, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram, Erik Vee, Jack Xie und Jian Yang. „Pricing guaranteed contracts in online display advertising“. In the 19th ACM international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1871437.1871491.

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3

Hartline, Jason, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier und Rad Niazadeh. „Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions“. In EC '18: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219231.

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4

Weber, Thomas. „Dynamic Learning in Markets: Pricing, Advertising, and Information Acquisition“. In Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2019.794.

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5

Cai, Dong-Song. „Advertising and pricing strategy in diffusion of network products“. In 2008 4th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wicom.2008.2212.

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6

Shi, Dayi, Yong He, Lindu Zhao und Peng Zhang. „Pricing Strategies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Local Advertising“. In 2015 48th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2015.134.

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Yu, Yanan, und Yong He. „Pricing and advertising investment policy for agricultural products with government subsidy“. In 2019 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2019.8887743.

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8

Lak, Parisa, Akin Kocak, Pawel Pralat, Ayse Bener und Akram Samarikhalaj. „Towards dynamic pricing for digital billboard advertising network in smart cities“. In 2015 IEEE First International Smart Cities Conference (ISC2). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isc2.2015.7366211.

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9

Zhang, Cheng, Zhi Liu, Bo Gu, Kyoko Yamori und Yoshiaki Tanaka. „Wireless LAN access point deployment and pricing with location-based advertising“. In 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/cnsm.2017.8255996.

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10

Hu, Yu, Jiwoong Shin und Zhulei Tang. „Pricing of Online Advertising: Cost-Per-Click-Through Vs. Cost-Per-Action“. In 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2010.470.

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Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Advertising Pricing"

1

Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse Shapiro, Frank Yang und Ali Yurukoglu. Pricing Power in Advertising Markets: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Juli 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30278.

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